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The World Technology Evaluation Center (WTEC) is a companion to the long
established Japanese Technology Evaluation Center (JTEC) at Loyola College. WTEC
is operated for the Federal Government to provide assessments of European research
and development (R&D) in selected technologies. The National Science Foundation
(NSF) is the lead support agency. Other sponsors of WTEC and JTEC include the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Commerce
(DO(), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the U.S. Air Force.
The steady integration of the European market system and the pressures of competition
from worldwide sources in high technology have stimulated the consolidation of
European R&D among companies and nations. The resulting trends are for faster
paced development of technologies directly competitive w'lth those in the U.S. As
European nations and corporations become leaders in research in targeted
technologies, it is essential that the United States have access to the results. WTEC
provides the important first step in the process by alerting U.S. researchers to state of
the art accomplishments in other nations. WTEC findings are also of interest in
formulating governmental research and trade policies.
The assessments are performed by panels of about six U.S. technical experts. Panel
members are leading authorities in the field, technically active, and knowledgeable
about both U.S. and foreign research programs. Each panelist spends about one month
of effort reviewing literature, making assessments, and writing reports on a part-time
basis over a twelve month period. Panels conduct extensive tours of university and
industrial research facilities in selected foreign host countries. To provide a balanced
perspective, panelists are selected from industry, academia, and government.
The focus of the assessments is on the status and iong-term direction of foreign R&D
efforts relative to those of the United States. Other important aspects include the
evolution of the technology and the identification of key researchers, R&D organizations,
and funding sources.
The panel findings are presented to workshops where invited participants critique the
preliminary results. Final reports are distributed by the National Technical Information
Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 (703-487-4650). The
panelists also present technical findings in papers and books. All results are
unclassified and public.
The function of the WTEC staff at Loyola College is to coordinate excellent assessments
and to produce reports of the highest professional quality. WTEC helps select topics,
recruits experts as panelists, organizes tours of foreign laboratories and industrial sites,
assists in the preparation of workshop presentations, and provides editorial assistance
for the final report.
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FOREWORD
This is the first report prepared through the World TechnologY Evaluation Center
(WTEC), sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and coordinated
by Loyola College in Maryland. It describes research and development efforts in
Europe in the area of instrumentation and control of nuclear power plants for
electricity generation. WTEC is an outgrowth of and a companion to the Japanese
TechnologY Evaluation Center (JTEC) which, for a number of years, has published
a series of important technologY assessments under NSF sponsorship. While JTEC
will continue as a channel for evaluating Japanese technologies, WTEC broadens
the geographic scope of technologY assessment.
Over the past decade, the United States' competitive position in world markets for
high technologY products appears to have eroded substantially. As U.S.
technological leadership is challenged, many government and private organizations
seek to set policies that will help maintain U.S. competitive strengths. To do this
effectively requires an understanding of the relative position of the United States
and its competitors. Indeed, whether our goal is competition or cooperation, we
must improve our access to the scientific and technical information in other
countries.
Although many U.S. organizations support substantial data gathering and analysis
directed at other nations, the government and privately sponsored studies that are
in the public domain tend to be "input" studies. That is they provide measurement
of expenditures, personnel data, and facilities, but do not provide an assessment
of the quality or quantity of the outputs obtained. Studies of the outputs of the
research and development process are more difficult to perform since they require
a subjective analysis by individuals who are experts in the relevant technical
fields.
The National Science Foundation staff includes professionals with expertise over
a wide range of technologies. These individuals provide the technical expertise
needed to assemble panels of experts who can perform competent, unbiased,
scientific and technical reviews of research and development activities. Further,
a principal activity of the Foundation is the review and selection for funding of
research proposals. Thus the Foundation has both experience and credibility in
this process. The WTEC activity builds on this capability.
Specific technologies, such as nuclear instrumentation and control, or
telecommunications, or biotechnologY, are selected for study by individuals in
government agencies who are able to contribute to the funding of the study. A
typical assessment is sponsored by two or more agencies. In cooperation with the
..°
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sponsoring agencies, NSF selects a panel of experts who will conduct the study.
Administrative oversight of the panel is provided by Loyola College in Maryland,
which operates WTEC under an NSF grant.
Panelists are selected for their expertise in specific areas of technology and their
broad knowledge of research and development in both the United States and in
the countries that are of interest. Of great importance is the ability of panelists
to produce a comprehensive, informed and unbiased report. Most panelists have
travelled previously to the host countries or had professional association with their
expert counterparts. Nonetheless, as part of the assessment, the panel as a whole
travels to host countries to spend one full week, as a minimum, visiting research
and development sites and meeting with researchers. These trips have proven to
be highly informative, and the panelists have been given broad access to both
researchers and facilities. Upon completion of its trip, the panel conducts a one-
day workshop to present its findings. Following the workshop, the panel
completes a written report that is intended for widespread distribution.
Study results are widely distributed. Representatives of the host countries and
members of the media are invited to attend the workshops. Final reports are made
available through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Further
publication of results is encouraged in the professional society journals and
magazines. Articles derived from earlier JTEC studies have appeared in Science,
IEEE Spectrum, Chemical and Engineering News and others. Additional
distribution media, including video tapes, are being tested.
Over the years, the assessment reports have provided input into the policy making
process of many agencies and organizations. A sizable number of the reports are
used by foreign governments and corporations. Indeed, the Japanese have used
JTEC reports to their advantage, as the reports provide an independent assessment
attesting to the quality of Japan's research.
The methodology developed and applied to the study of research and
development in Japan is now proven to be equally relevant to Europe and other
leading industrial nations. In general, the United States can benefit from a better
understanding of cutting-edge research that is being conducted outside its borders.
Improved awareness of international developments can significantly enhance the
scope and effectiveness of international collaboration and thus benefit all our
international partners in joint research and development efforts.
Paul J.Herer
National Science Foundation
Washington, DC
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A study of instrumentation and controls (I&C) technology used in nuclear power
plants in Europe was conducted by a pane] of U.S. specialists. This study
included a review of the literature on the subject, followed by a visit to some of
the leading organizations in Europe in the field of nuclear I&C.
KEY' FINDINGS
These findings relate to the countries visited and to Pressurized Water Reactor
(PWR) nuclear power plants. The countries that the panel visited were France,
Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Norway.
The U.S. is clearly behind in the application of advanced instrumentation and
control (I&C) in nuclear power reactors. The September 1991 issue of Nuclear
Engineering International [Ref. Exec.1] also reflects the status that was observed
by the JTEC panel. The contribution to that issue by Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) describes a recent recognition of the need and initial planning for
the use of advanced I&C systems in the United States. The contributions from
Japan, France, and Canada discuss the architecture to be used and the capabilities
and difficulties of digital systems, including software validation and verification.
Those contributions from outside the U.S. are all based on several years of
operating experience with advanced I&C in commercial power reactors.
All countries in Europe that operate nuclear power plants, as well as Canada,
Japan, and the U.S., are moving toward the use of digital computers, especially
microprocessors, in information and control systems. The amount of automation
and the role of the operator are under discussion in all countries. The view of the
operator's role presently varies by country. In Japan and Germany the move is
toward a high degree of automation, whereas in France the emphasis is on
computer-generated procedures with the decision to enable being made by skilled
operators. In U.S. and Soviet plants, the emphasis is on using digital systems to
help the operator identify problems, decide on the appropriate corrective actions,
and aid in the execution of those actions.
The U.S. is behind in the development and experience of using digital systems in
nuclear plants. France has the most experience with digital safety systems and
has built successful automatic control and informational systems, the original
design having been purchased from U.S. reactor vendors. Germany has developed
_._,_i_c ___ i;_i L;_I_:_; LL':' L__,'_.;(
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a unique control and safety strategy that automatically moves reactor systems back
into the safe operating region. Over a broad spectrum of control failures, both of
equipment and from human error, this automatic action is sufficient to minimize the
number of scrams, smoothing transients to minimize component stresses, and
produces time for operator diagnoses. The system presently involves full digital
reactor control, and in the preventive and mitigation area uses semiconductor-
based analog equipment, which will be replaced by digital equipment without
much increase in functionality.
Europe is ahead in the use of fault diagnosis and signal validation systems. Work
on the use of digital information programs for fault management systems in nuclear
plants is moving more rapidly in both Europe and Japan than in the U.S.
The hardware for the digital systems used in all countries is by and large from
U.S. computer companies, but the lack of deployment of digital systems in U.S.
nuclear plants has kept the U.S. behind in the development of experience in the
computer system architecture for the instrumentation and control systems in the
plants.
In France and Germany, control strategies have been extended to allow nuclear
power plants to be used for automatic changes in power to match demands from
the utility grid. These capabilities involve improved control of local power
distribution changes during transient power conditions.
Instrumentation for nuclear power plants is similar to that in the U.S. in all
countries visited by the panel. Some special instrumentation is being developed.
For example, a special neutron detection system is under development in France
to provide improved in-core and ex-core power density and transient power level
information. Germany has pioneered the use of prompt, in-core cobalt detectors
for gathering detailed power density information.
The European countries are ahead in the use of computer assisted software
engineering (CASE) tools, and they are more advanced in the development of
standards.
As a conclusion to the key findings, at the workshop review of the panel's
preliminary findings, one final statement was made by a member of the audience:
The U.S. being behind may not be so bad. Look hard
at the mistakes that those ahead have made. Two
examples where technology got too far ahead:
1) The Darlington case in Canada where: a) full
cognizance of evolving world standards was not
considered in the early development; and b) there were
unneeded complexities in the safety system.
2) The N-4 plant problem in France is another example
where complexity is a big factor.
xiii
In general, the caution of the French and Canadians is attributable to the fact that
the programmability of the digital systems can entice the user to add complexities
that can evolve into problems. Efforts must be made to maintain simplicity. This
problem is often not recognized until the review, quality assurance (verification
and validation), and final approval stage.
OUALITATIVE COMPARISONS OF BASIC RESEARCH, ADVANCED
DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCT IMPLEMENTATION
The panel has made a qualitative comparison of the U.S. nuclear power situation
standing relative to the countries visited for status and progress in basic research,
advanced development, and product implementation in the seven categories
studied, namely: control room design; analog-to-digital transition; fault
management systems; control strategies; I&C architecture; instrumentation; and
standards and tools. The specific content of these categories is defined in the
individual chapters of this report.
As shown in Figure Exec.1, Europe is ahead of the U.S. and moving ahead further
in implementation of products in all seven categories, with the possible exception
of instrumentation. In the area of advanced development, Europe is also ahead
except for architecture and instrumentation. In basic research, Europe is ahead
in four of the seven categories; however, for analog-to-digital transition and for
instrumentation, the U.S. is about equal, and the U.S. is ahead in architecture . In
other words, U.S. computers are being purchased and utilized in all countries that
the panel visited, but the development and implementation of the computers for
nuclear power plant instrumentation and control is more advanced in Europe and
Canada.
EVOLUTION OF AUTOMATION IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
There is a move in every country designing nuclear power plants to improve the
plant's availability, safety, ease of operation and/or acceptability by the public and
regulators. For the U.S. to make this transition, it is prudent to look at the
experiences of other countries and to look at where the design evolutions seem
to be headed. The appropriate balance of automation and manual operation is
the subject of considerable debate in the U.S. and Europe today. Most
researchers agree that today's technology would support digital automation of all
of the major systems in a power plant. One of the concerns, however, is how to
verify and validate the software required. Recent Canadian experience at
Darlington showed how AECL, with many years of experience in computerized
protection and control systems, had significant project delays and cost problems
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in the verification and validation of software in their protection system as noted in
the key findings. The French recently have had significant project delays at their
Chooz-B plant due to problems with their newest control system architecture,
although they are very experienced with digital systems in nuclear power.
In the U.S., the transition from today's nuclear control systems to the more
automated future designs is likely to occur in phases, as described in an earlier
JTEC report (Ref. Exec.2). One of our purposes for this study was to determine
where the European concepts were in terms of evolution of I&C. This will be
discussed here. The U.S. transition may be described in terms of four levels as
shown in Figure Exec.2 and described in Table Exec.1. In Level 1, some of
today's analog controllers will be replaced with more reliable digital controllers
performing basic proportional-integral-differential (PID) control. This phase of
evolution is already under way in the U.S. The Electric Power Research Institute
has sponsored some of this work. Generally, digital implementations of control
systems on U.S. reactors have been one-for-one replacements of the original
analog systems and have not taken full advantage of recent technological
developments. Protection systems are also under evolution. Protection systems
with some digital features are currently operational at Arkansas Nuclear One
Unit 2, Southern California Edison's San Onofre Units 2 and 3, Arizona Public
Service's Palo Verde, and Louisiana Power and Light Waterford Unit 3. Level 1
will include essentially automated (computerized) data management at a plant.
This has been implemented to a limited extent now in the U.S. LWI_. As the
chart shows, the panel thinks that U.S. LWRs are in the beginning of Level 1 and
that the French plant Bugey is a little further advanced, but also in Level 1. The
Japanese Tokyo Electric Power Company's Kashiwazaki-1 and -2 are, in the view
of the panel, more advanced and are at the interface with the next level of
transition.
Level 2 of the predicted U.S. transition will include automation of routine
procedures like plant startup, shutdown, refueling, load changes and certain
emergency response procedures. Significant assistance will be given to the
operator through computer-based expert systems and control room displays of
plant status. Control will be implemented with digital technology, using
predetermined strategies selected from several options. The newly completed
Canadian plant Darlington is placed in this level. The newest German plant, ISAR-
]I, was placed in this category; this plant uses analog technology for control and
protection systems while computers and advanced graphical displays are used in
the information system. The very high degree of automation of this plant, and the
lessons learned/intelligence built into the "limitation system" of the ISAR plant,
seemed to warrant placement of this concept on the border of Levels 2 and 3.
Also in Level 2 are the U.S. Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR), as defined in
the EPRI Requirements document, and the newest French plant (the N4 class).
Since neither of these plant types is operational, the diamonds representing them
on the chart are empty, rather than solid, whereas the German plant is operational
and is represented by a black diamond on the figure.
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Level 3 is a significant advance toward automation with the operator interacting
with and monitoring an intelligent, adaptive supervisory control system. Smart
sensors will be expected to validate their own signals and communicate with fault-
tolerant process controllers. At this level, the process controllers will be able to
reconfigure the control logic to meet the operational objectives selected by the
supervisory control system. Control strategies will be adaptive, and very robust
to off-normal conditions. Completely automated plant designs with plant data
bases will be available to the control system and the operator. Operational
experience of all plant systems and components will be tracked in an automated
data base. The information system will recommend maintenance schedules and
outages to the operator. Human performance modeling will have permitted good
allocation of function decisions in a way to keep the operator motivated and
informed about plant status. Advanced LMR (PRISM) concepts and MHTGR
concepts being studied by the U.S. DOE will have these capabilities. The newest
Canadian concept, the CANDU 3, is placed in this category, as is the Japanese
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), under construction now at Kashiwazaki
as Units 6 and 7. Several other countries have R&D organizations working on
individual systems which have some of the characteristics mentioned here, but
have not integrated the concepts into total plant designs.
Level 4 would be characterized as total automation of the plant, with an intelligent
control system aware of operational status and in interactive communication with
the operator to keep him apprised concerning anY degraded conditions, likely
consequences of these conditions, possible (recommended) strategies for
minimizing deleterious consequences. By this time plant designs will have most
functions automated and robotized including maintenance and security
surveillance.
The control and information system will be an integral part of not only the total
plant design, but also the national network of commercial power plants. The
control system computer will learn from the network relevant information
concerning other plants and component operational experience and will alert the
operator if that experience is relevant to his plant. No U.S. design has gone this
far in incorporation of advanced technology and automation. The Japanese
Frontier Research Group on Artificial Intelligence is working on conceptual
definition of a plant of this type.
In the evolution of higher levels of automation, the designers will be trying to
improve all aspects of nuclear power plants, including safety and reliability. The
progress in all countries should build on successes and experiences in other
countries. This report highlights some of the most significant technical
achievements in automation of nuclear plants in the countries visited.
xix
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CHAPTER !
INTRODUCTION
James D. White and David D. Lanning
Control and instrumentation systems might be called the "brain" and "senses" of a
nuclear power plant. As such they become the key elements in the integrated
operation of these plants. Recent developments in digital equipment have allowed
a dramatic change in the design of these instrument and control (I&C) systems.
New designs are evolving with Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)-based control rooms,
more automation, and better logical information for the human operators. As these
new advanced systems are developed, various decisions must be made about the
degree of automation and the human-to-machine interface. Different stages of the
development of control automation and of advanced digital systems can be found
in various countries.
The purpose of this technology assessment is to make a comparative evaluation
of the control and instrumentation systems that are being used for commercial
nuclear power plants in Europe and the United States. This study is limited to
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Part of the evaluation includes comparisons
with a previous similar study assessing Japanese technology.
The panelists involved in this study were chosen to represent a spectrum of U.S.
experts in the area of control and instrumentation. Representatives from national
laboratories, commercial industry and industrial research organizations as well as
from academia were invited to participate. A list of the panelists' names and titles
is provided below. More complete information including biographical sketches of
each panelist is given in the Appendix A.
_. Introduction
James D. White (Co-Chairman)
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
David D. Lanning (Co-Chairman)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Leo Beltracchi
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Fred R. Best
Texas A&M University
James R. Easter
Westinghouse Energy Center
Lester C. Oakes
Electric Power Research Institute
A.. L. Sudduth
Duke Power Company
The procedure for the preparation of the final report consisted of seven steps:
1) A literature search was conducted to assess the recent published
information that was available from each of the countries to be visited.
2) Based on the published literature plus some personal knowledge from
panelists, a listing of places, companies and individuals was prepared for
potential contacts and site visits.
3) Arrangements were made for the panelists to visit European sites; after
initial contacts were made, the hosts in each country were helpful in
assuring that the proper people were contacted to provide the desired
technology reviews.
4) The panel visited 22 I&C sites over a two-week period in December 1990.
s) The panel delivered a preliminary oral report of its assessment at a
workshop held at the NSF offices in Washington, D.C. on January 30, 1991.
6)
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Draft chapters of the final report were prepared and reviewed by the
panelists, and then the draft report was sent to the hosts in each country
in May 1991.
7) Comments and corrections were received from the hosts and were
incorporated into the final report.
Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 indicate the sites visited by the panel. Arrangement and
scheduling for these visits were made by American Trade Initiatives, Inc. (ATI).
The panelists are truly appreciative of efforts by the staff from ATI and of the
gracious response of the hosts who received us in each of the countries. The
scheduling had to be tightly coordinated, and it all went extremely well.
To perform this review and technology assessment, each panelist agreed to take
a particular topical area as a primary responsibility and also agreed to take
secondary responsibility to assist another panelist in his primary area. The report
was then reviewed by the hosts or their representatives for each country.
In the following overview and chapters, the name of the panelist with the primary
responsibility is shown as the author for the chapter.
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Role of the Operator and Control Room Desiqn (James R. Easter)
The Search for the proper balance between the human operator and
the amount of automation is continuing. In Europe, the balance is
moving toward more automation, more information on CRT screens,
and the use of mult/-function controls. Research in analysis of
human error is most advanced in the USSR.
Transition from Analoq to Diqital Technoloc_ (Lester C. Oakes)
The availability of digital systems offers an attractive flexibility for
control system designs, and lack of analog replacement equipment
combines to push all countries toward more use of digital systems.
Computerized Operator Support Systems for Fault Manaqemenl
(A.L. Sudduth)
Interest and research in fault management is widespread, including
signal validation [in use today) and research on fault detection,
diagnosis, mitigation, and success assurance. These systems are
being developed in both Europe and the U.S., but deployment in
power plants is more advanced in Europe.
4 Introduction
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Control Strateqies and Techniques (David D. Lanning)
Automation is already being used over a wider operating range in
Europe than in the U.S., and more implementation of digital systems
for control and safety systems is in progress. There is a surprising
amount of automation in the German Konvoi plants.
An Investiqation of Nuclear Power Plant I&C Architecture
(James D. White)
Distributed microprocessors are being used or designed especially
in France and Canada. These are to be used in control and
information systems with fault-tolerant combinations of programmable
digital systems.
Instrumentation (Fred R. Best)
New developments in detectors and attached instrumentation are in
progress at some research centers, but not many new instruments
have been employed on nuclear power plants. An example of an
interesting instrument is the in-core detector being developed in
France.
Computer Stand_ds and Tools (Leo Beltracchi)
Many tools for software engineering have been developed and
general standards have been considered. However, complete
integration of tools into the development cycle remains an important
but difficult goal to reach. The panel found that the use of tools is
much more prevalent in Europe than in the U.S.
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Figure l.l. Map of Places Visited by the Panel
Introduction
Table 1.1
PLACES VISITED BY THE PANEL
FRANCE
Framatome
CEA-CE
CEGELEC
CF.A, IPSN
EDF
EDF SEPTEN; BUGEY
Training Center
and PWR Power Plants
CEA Cadarache
Merlin Gerin
CORYS
GERMANY
KFK
ABB
KWU-Siemens
GRS
ISAR-II Power Plant
(KONVOD
CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
SKODA
Ministry of Economics
Nuclear Research Institute
Dukov-any PWE Power Plant
U.S.S.R.
I.V. Kurchatov Institute
of Atomic Energy
VNIIEM
Institute of Control Problems
NORWAy
Halden Research
Laboratories (OECD)
La Defense Paris
Saclay
Paris
Paris
Chatou
Near Lyon
Near Marseilles
Grenoble
Grenoble
Karlsmhe
Heidelberg
I_rlstein
Garching/
Munich
Pilzen
Prague
Rez
Near Brno
MOSCOW
MoSCow
Moscow
Ha]den
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ROLEOr OPE TO t
AND CONTROL ROOM DESIGN
James R Easter
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an assessment of the current state of the art in Europe,
Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union in the application of modern computer
technology to control room requirements for the next generation of nuclear power
plants. In addition, this chapter compares nuclear plant control room design in the
countries visited by this panel with that in Japan as reported in the panel report,
Nuclear Power in Japan (Ref. 2.1), and with that in the United States in the
experience of the panelists.
In order to keep the project manageable, the panel visited research and
development establishments in a limited number of countries: France, Germany, the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Norway. The panel's assessment is based upon
a literature review of work performed in these countries; visits to a number of their
leading research and development groups; and study of material provided by
organizations the panel visited.
WHAT ROLE FOR THE OPERATOR?
In order to assess or evaluate the design of a process plant control room, it is
necessary to understand the objectives and the reasoning behind the design.
Critical to the design of any product is understanding the end user and how
he/she expects the product to perform. In the case of the control room of a
nuclear power plant, the end user is the operating staff that will man that room.
How that room is expected to behave and the number of crew members required
to make it happen, however, is usually dictated by the plant's owner or utility.
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Because the nuclear power industry is dealing with a highly concentrated energy
source that can, if mishandled, have disastrous consequences for the owner, the
public, and the environment, the utility industry worldwide is actively seeking to
improve operator reliability. Several analyses of mishaps in the process industry
in genera/show that most accidents can be traced to human error of one form or
another (Refs. 2.2, 2.3). Not all of these are the result of operator error. Many are
the result of faulty maintenance, and some are the result of basic design flaws; all
are human errors none the less. For the designer of nuclear power plant control
rooms, however, the emphasis is clearly on improving the reliability of the operator
in the monitoring and control of the plant's nuclear and thermodynamic processes.
Figure 2.1 is a simple illustration of the three approaches that can be taken for
improving operator reliability in a process plant control room. What follows is a
discussion of each of these approaches and then an examination of which
approach or combination of approaches is being addressed by the control room
research, development, and design organizations in each of the countries that this
panel visited.
Follow Procedures
Traditionally, operator reliability has focused on developing and enforcing strict
procedures and on the subsequent training of operators to know how to follow
them. This approach has been developed by trial and error over several centuries
of human endeavor in the manufacture and use of hazardous materials such as
military munitions. This approach is best used for situations where the timing of
the process is under the direct control of the operator, i.e., a user-paced process.
Here, operator mistakes can be recovered without any amplification by the
process. In situations where the timing is determined by the process, i.e., a
system-paced process, operator mistakes are usually exacerbated by the process
and recovery is much more difficult.
In addition, this approach expects complete knowledge on the part of the
procedure designer relative to how to respond to all of the possible permutations
and combinations of conditions that the process could possibly exhibit. Failures
to perform to this level are discovered after the fact--that is, after a mishap occurs.
Correction is made by reactively modifying the procedure and instituting more
operator training. Until the development of modem electronics and automatic
control theory, this was the only approach available to address the problem of
operator reliability.
Automm sv,rym g
World War II greatly accelerated the development of the equipment and the
understanding for automating real-time processes. Today, modem computer
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technology and control theory make it possible to envision, if not in fact to build,
totally automated plants. This approach attempts to improve operator reliability by
removing the operator from any part of the process control activity. The plant
owners and the public would then depend solely on electronics for process
performance and safety.
Fon_ a Human-Computer Team
The last decade's astounding advances in computer technology have made it
possible for control room designers to envision yet a third approach. This
approach is to establish a human-computer team, allocating cognitive and physical
activities appropriately to each partner. This approach extends the nuclear
industry's traditional "defense in depth" philosophy to the design of nuclear control
rooms and to the treatment of operator error. With a human-computer team, not
only is there some redundancy in the decision-making activity, but also there is
diversity in the decision-makers and in their approaches.
Emphasis is placed upon creating an atmosphere of dialogue between the
partners, each having the ability to cross-check the decisions and actions of the
other, thereby encouraging an interlocking web of support in terms of avoiding,
finding, and compensating for errors and failures.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Three Approaches
The above discussion implies that each of these approaches is unique and
independent; in fact, they are not. Mixtures of any two or even of all three are
more often found than the pristine application of only one. Furthermore, there is
currently scant evidence to indicate that one or the other or even a specific
mixture of these approaches is more effective than another at improving human
operator reliability.
Follow procedures. The approach that focuses on comprehensive procedures and
exhaustive training is the best understood and the most often used. Witness the
major revisions in these areas mandated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) after the March 1979 incident at the Three Mile Island plant.
This is probably the major strength of this approach: people and organizations
know how to do it. Its major weakness is that the responsibility for process
performance is in the hands of the procedure writers, not the plant operators. The
operator becomes, in the extreme case, merely a biological robot who is not
required to understand anything, merely to be able to read the procedure and to
execute the required actions.
Another problem with this approach is that, alone, it is incapable of addressing
the issue that as processes have become more complex, the ability of humans to
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carry them out in a timely manner has become a limiting factor in process
performance. Some form of automation is required to improve the speed and to
handle complex control sequences.
Automate evetTthing. The major strengths of automation are its abilities to be
constantly vigilant, to analyze large quantities of process data, to create more
appropriate control variables from them, and to execute actions and sequences of
actions more quickly than can a human. What it cannot do very well is to reason
about situations for which it was not designed. Humans are better at that.
Again, the questions are what relationship does a human operator have with the
automata in this approach, and how does the answer to that question affect the
design of the automata and of the human interface to it?
As the process becomes more and more automated, the operator clearly has fewer
physical tasks to perform, and the nature of mental activity changes. In the past,
he/she attempted to carry out the process parameter analysis in order to determine
the correct control action, tasks that the automata now performs. With the
automata, the operator's role becomes one of numagmg the activities of the
automata. This change in role implies changes in the required supporting
resources (i.e., the process data being presented, the procedures, the nature of
the process controls, etc.) that the operator uses to carry out those activities;
indeed, it changes the very image that the operator has of the job itself (Ref. 2.4).
While automation and control theory are not new subjects, the realization that
people must still be involved and the effects of automation on their tasks are
subjects only now being addressed by the research and development community.
Form a human-computer team. The third approach can be viewed as an extension
of the previous one in the sense that computers play a very significant role in the
realization of the man-machine (human-plant process) interface, including that of
automating the control of plant processes. However, the central role of the
computers and the relationship between them and the operators is somewhat
different than when designed to independently control the process. The focus of
this approach is to provide a "holistic" environment that coordinates the interface
in such a way that the dialogue between man and machine becomes (from a
human point of view) natural and convenient and covers all of the necessary
perspectives and resources required for monitoring and controlling the processes.
The strength of this approach is that it attempts to remove some of the known
sources of human error. In current control rooms, there is interpretive mental
workload caused when an operator must move from one media of information to
another (such as from control board lights and meters to paper procedures) or
from one representation of the problem space to another (such as from alarms to
procedures or from procedures to process parameter displays). By properly
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computerizing these resources, much of this mental work load can be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated. Also, it is possible with computers to ensure that the
process data is presented in its proper and relevant context, rather than expecting
the operator to mentally synthesize the context.
This approach recognizes that the responsibility for process performance is shared
between the operators and the designers of the computerized systems by creating
an environment that encourages cross-checking and the exchange of data and
viewpoints between humans and computers. The weakness is that while these are
enticing objectives, they are very new. There is very little practical experience
with systems designed and constructed with such objectives in mind. As a result,
there is little concrete evidence to date that such an approach really does improve
operator reliability.
It is within the framework of these three approaches to the roles of operator and
automation in control room design that this panel reviewed and evaluated the
nuclear power plant control room technologies of France, Germany, the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia, and Norway. The summary of the assessment includes a
comparison with the control room technologies of Japan and the United States.
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ASSESSMENT
The Pm_ch Progr=m
A control room with operator workstations and a large wall mural/mimic is being
installed in the new 1400 MWe N4 plant being built at Chooz, France, by the
French national utility, _lectricit_ de France (EDF). A full-scope simulator (Figure
2.2) has been built at the EDF Bugey plant site near the French city of Lyon and
is currently being used for operator training and human factors design validation
tests (Ref. 2.5). Commercial operation of the N4 plant is currently scheduled for
the 1995-6 time frame.
This control room is a most ambitious and aggressive design and is currently the
industry's trend setter. While other countries the panel visited are heading in this
same direction, the N4 control room has by far the most maturity, design work
having begun in the early 1980s. Visually, this control room is markedly different
from any currently existing nuclear power plant control room. Figure 2.2 shows
two workstations joined together. Each workstation can be used to control the
entire plant, or the work can be shared between the two. A third identical
workstation will be used by the supervisor for monitoring and, in case of failure
of one of the other workstations, for control. All process data is displayed on
cathode ray tube monitors (CRTs) embedded in the vertical surface of each
workstation desk, as are the operating procedures and all of the alarm messages.
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Process control is accomplished through the use of touch screens on those CRTs
embedded in the horizontal surface of the desk. In other words, the control board
is completely computerized for all modes of operations. Emergency Safeguards
equipment can also be manually actuated at the systems level through hard-wired
push buttons located on that portion of the desk between the two workstations.
In case of complete computer system failure, a traditional hard-wired analog
control panel for component level safety equipment is located at the back of the
control room.
From an ergonomic standpoint, this control room design is intended to reduce, if
not eliminate, certain types of operator error. The use of state-of-the-art computer
graphic display equipment and multifunction control devices permits the operator
to have an interface with the process by bringing the data and the controls to the
operator in a form that is immediately useful. The computer system can collect
the process data and can develop new, synthetic variables from it. Such systems
can group appropriate data together to form the proper context in order to help
the operator better understand the data, and can also group process data
appropriately with the process controls. All of these tasks in traditional control
rooms required the operator to physically go and find data, mentally perform any
synthesis and/or grouping, and then locate the proper controls. Such a work load
is obviously prone to both physical and mental errors, and it is time-consuming,
thus permitting an errant process to further exceed its bounds, all the while
increasing the operator's anxiety level.
The French view of the operator's role in the control room is that he/she is there
to follow procedures. The design, organization, and navigation of the CRT display
set is based upon the organization and content of the operating procedures.
Similarly, the alarm message display, suppression, prioritization, and organization
are also based upon the procedures.
Currently, the display monitors do not use "windowing" technology, so a display
is created to occupy a full monitor screen. When this author first visited the N4
simulator, in the summer of 1986, EDF had created a library of 10,000 displays.
In the fall of 1990, when this panel visited the simulator, the library had grown to
17,000 displays. At f'LrSt glance this seems like an extraordinarily large number of
displays. However, when one considers that a nuclear power plant can have 3000
alarms (each needing to display a trigger logic and a response procedure) 1,000
or so piping and instrumentation drawings (each of which contains 2 to 4 times
more data than can be viewed on a single monitor display), and several feet of
procedures when in paper form, the number of displays is not so astonishing.
What is astonishing is the fact that they have been able to do it with a reasonable
amount of manpower. This is a tribute to the effort that EDF has put into
14 Role of the Operator and Control Room Design
t._
o.
Z 0
3
=E
0
0
FIGURE 24
E
8,-.
m
James R. Easter 15
computerizing the entire plant database and to their development of computerized
tools for performing the display design and programming process. Only now are
American nuclear power plant manufacturers beginning to adopt such tools.
The C,enmm Prod-am
The Germans have placed a great deal of emphasis on limiting the consequences
of operator action through the use of automation. They have developed and
applied to their current plants a sophisticated "limitation system" that architecturally
lies between the automatic control system and the plant safety and protection
system. (A more detailed discussion of this automatic system can be found in
Chapter 5.)
The German response to the March 1979 incident at the TMI-2 plant has been to
continue to move steadily ahead using I&C to limit the consequences of operator
action with the limitation system and to provide the operator with some additional
systems level automation and with sophisticated on-line diagnostic tools. The
Germans have only recently developed a set of "symptom-based" emergency
procedures such as have been developed in the United States, France, and Japan.
They have yet to develop and install Safety Parameter Display Systems (NUREG-
0696) or Technical Support Centers although the display system for the KONVOI
plants have been analyzed for its SPDS content (Ref. 2.6). They also have not,
as yet, adopted and applied the "human factors" discipline (for example, see U.S.
NRC NUREG-0700 or NUREG-0800) as many other countries have done. The
government-sponsored research facility Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit (GRS),
however, is beginning to pick up the thread of these technologies. This R&D
organization is moving to establish expertise in these areas and is interested in
seeing these technologies applied to German plants.
Figure 2.3 shows the layout or "footprint" of the control room of the ISAR plant, a
1300 MWe plant located on the Isar River near the city of Munich. This control
room, while rather traditional in appearance was licensed on the basis of a
conventional control room design, and currently contains an example of nearly
every I&C product available in the nuclear power plant market today. It has a
large quantity of diagnostic equipment and the component instrumentation to
support it. While the control room process parameter display is still focused on
the traditional analog meter technology, there are a large number of full-color,
high-resolution graphic CRTs. The displays reflect careful thought in their design
and presentation and are aimed at helping the operator understand what all the
automatic systems are doing.
While there does not appear to be a great deal of emphasis in Germany on the
idea of "cockpit" or workstation-type control rooms such as the French N4 design,
the German reactor vendor Siemens_/I_aftw_erke Union (Siemens/KWU) is
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performing research and development on such a design (Ref. 2.7). The research
appears to be focused more on "how do we build such a room" rather than on
'_,hat should we build."
The discussion revolves more around such things as hardware architecture and
building a reliable computer system than around what the operator's role is or how
that may influence the content and organization of the workstation or the displays.
German R&D facilities have been pioneers in the use of computer technology for
the purpose of disturbance analysis and diagnostics. This research is highlighted
by the activities of GRS, beginning with its development and testing of the STAR
System (Ref. 2.8) in the early 1980s and more recently has been generalized in the
direction of on-line realtime expert-systems.
A commercial research and development organization, ABB Corporate Research
Heidelberg, has been performing "cutting-edge" work in the research and
development of knowledge-based support systems for process control room
operators. While the current applications of its work are in fossil power plants, the
research is directly applicable to nuclear plants as well. This project, tiffed
GRADIENT (graphical dialogue environment), is supported by the ESPRIT project
of the European Economic Community (EEC) and was reported to the National
Science Foundation in some detail by Dr. Woods (Ref. 2.9).
Briefly, the GRADIENT project is aimed at investigating the use of knowledge-
based systems and at enabling the operator to conduct an intelligent graphical
dialogue with the machine supervision and control system, supported by a
graphical expert system. Among its many features, GRADIENT includes
capabilities to model user activities and to recognize errors to help improve
operator process control error detection and correction. In addition, its
subsystems are intelligent about how to present data, given the user and the plant
context. The displays are customized "on-the fly" to the context and user-desired
perspective, rather than being completely preformulated and formatted in advance
(Refs. 2.10-2.13). (Additional discussion on the contribution that GRADIENT is
making to diagnostics and fault management can be found in Chapter 4.)
The Soviet Progr= 
The bulk of the information about Soviet work in the area of control room design
was collected in personal communications at a series of meetings at the Kurchatov
Institute in Moscow. The Soviets publish little in Western technical journals, and
what publications are available, including those given to the panel during these
meetings, are almost always in Russian.
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Historically, Soviet work in psychology and applied psychology has been of a high
caliber. Based upon the presentations of Soviet scientists and engineers that
panelists heard at the Kurchatov Institute, their research into human learning (short-
term memory and learning patterns) is now providing a foundation for
improvements in control room design.
In recent years, the Soviets have done thorough work analyzing the causes of
plant problems resulting from I&C and human error. One of their conclusions from
these analyses is that 50 percent of the problems are caused by "high-level
reasoning devices," namely, automatic controllers and/or humans; and 50 percent
are caused by "low-level devices," such as sensors and data acquisition systems.
As an example of Soviet applied research into causes of operator error in nuclear
power plants, a presentation was made to panelists on a series of controlled
experiments with operators on simulators that used statistical methods for the
analysis and the presentation of the results. U.S. investigators have found that this
type of experiment in full-scope simulator tests is difficult to do because of the
very large number of hard-to-control psychological variables that can affect the
validity of the quantitative results (Ref. 2.14). The Soviet studies were augmented
by the more typical methods of examining and analyzing abnormality event reports
and of using sophisticated questionnaires and interviews with operators (Ref. 2.15).
The results of this specific set of tests has led the Soviets to conclude, among
other things, that all of the necessary plant information relative to the operator's
tasks needs to be included in a hierarchial display set of no more than two to
three levels.
Other analyses have led the Soviets to conclude that, for humans, abnormalities are
always surprises, and therefore, the human response tends to exacerbate the
abnormality. This conclusion leads Soviet designers to the position that they want
the role of the operator in the control room to be one of supervision and
management of automatic systems, not one of being an integral element in the
"action-taking" response to the abnormality. This is a similar conclusion to the one
reached by the investigators of the March 1979 incident at TMI-2 (Refs. 2.16, 2.17).
With the exception of the United States, the Soviet Union is the only country in the
knowledge of the panel that has an explicit position based upon or in some sense
derived from scientific evidence as to what the role of the operator in a nuclear
power plant control room should be.
While their fundamental research is of the highest caliber, the Soviets have only
recently begun to apply the results. As far as the panelists could tell, these
applications have been focused upon backfitting improvements into existing,
operating plants. There was no specific evidence of a new control room design,
although panelists did see evidence of design work on very sophisticated
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computer system architectures and networks (see Chapter 6) that would imply that
a new control room design is to be forthcoming.
At the Control Problems Institute (IPU), our Soviet hosts showed panelists
development work on computer graphic displays and voice synthesis that is aimed
at improving the man-machine interface in nuclear power plants. The Soviets are
convinced that not nearly enough attention is being given to using the human
auditory capacity as a means of conveying plant process information (e.g., alarm
messages) to the nuclear plant control room operator.
The equipment being used for this development work appeared to be of a
computer generation that is consistent with the IBM XT personal computer. The
graphics devices appeared to be mostly of the character graphics type, though
some relatively low-resolution graphic CRTs were in evidence. There was no
question, however, that Soviet scientists and engineers were getting the most out
this technology, usually through the use of sophisticated numerical and
approximation techniques.
The panel's conclusion is that Soviet scientists and engineers are laying a solid
foundation in cognitive science and engineering for reducing human error in
nuclear power plant control rooms. Application is being hampered by the
unavailability of modern, sophisticated computer technology.
The Czechoslovaki_ Progn,m
As with the Soviet program, the Czechoslovaldan program is not well published
in Western technical journals. This report is primarily based upon the personal
communication of panel members with representatives o[ the nuclear power
community in the Czechoslovak Federal Republic.
The Czechoslovakian nuclear power program has depended almost entirely on
the U.S.S.R. As a result, until the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, the design
and any improvements have been those of the Soviets. However, since then the
Czechoslovaks have been moving aggressively to establish their own design and,
particularly, their own positions with regard to the application of modem
technologies, including those of the West, to their nuclear power program.
The Czechoslovaks' efforts to improve nuclear power plant control room operator
reliability are currently focused on acquiring or building full-scope plant simulators
for operator training and for performing engineering analyses of plant behavior.
The idea is to subsequently improve plant operating and emergency procedures.
The Czechoslovaks are also moving toward more plant automation, particularly in
the form of systems level automation. They have a very explicit desire to leave
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the expert control decisions in the hands of the operators, based on their view that
the operator is ultimately responsible for plant operations. The Czechoslovaks are
aware of the worldwide efforts to improve operator reliability through application
of modem computer technology; however, they believe that their currently limited
resources can best be focused on better operator training and better
understanding of plant performance, resulting in better procedures. They wish to
pursue these other types of improvements in the future.
The Norwegian Progr'_n (OECD I.ialden Project)
The Halden Project, located in Halden, Norway, is a recognized world leader in
the research of improved human-computer interface design for application to the
control rooms of nuclear power plants. The Halden Project is a research
organization sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and funded by member countries and organizations
worldwide. All members have the right to apply the results of the research in a
manner of their choosing. The results of Halden-developed human-computer
systems are often applied in a "test-bed" sense in the Loviisa plant in Finland.
This provides a level of credibility to the Halden work that is often difficult to
achieve by other advanced design and development organizations.
The emphasis in Halden research is to develop effective computerized operator
support systems that support rather than replace the operator in performing
assigned tasks. In the 1980s, the research focused on individual support systems,
such as an advanced alarm system, a computerized procedures system, and the
development of methods for creating effective graphics. Recently, however, the
focus has moved to the investigation of how best to coordinate such resources
and to form them into an effective control room (Ref. 2.18).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
V_-iththe exception of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, every country that
was reviewed in this study is working on a cockpit style of control room that is
based upon state-of-the-artcomputer technology. To thislistof countries can be
added Japan and the United States. While thisapproach to the hardware of the
operator's workstations seems to be universally appealing, the definitionof the
operator's role in such a design and the subsequent definition of how the
workstations behave in response to that role vary considerably with country and
culture. Figure 2.4 is a repeat of Figure 2.1 with the addition of the panel's
estimate of where each of the countries considered in thisstudy lieswith respect
to its definition (either explicit or implicit) of the operator's role in the control
room.
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The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Scandinavian countries appear to be
the only ones making a concerted effort to include the emerging discipline of
cognitive systems engineering into the design of new control rooms. While the
United States is a very active participant in this area, if not in fact the technology
leader, all of the countries in question but Japan are making contributions to the
academic level of understanding of the issues; Japan appears not to recognize the
discipline of cognitive psychology. However, in the view of the panel, only the
United States, the Soviet Union, and the Scandinavians are actively working at
bringing this technology out of the laboratories and making it useful to the reliable
production of electric power by applying it to the design of control rooms for the
next generation of nuclear power plants.
Finally, the panel observed a definite shifting in the influence that U.S. standards
writing organizations have over the design and construction of control room
facilities. In the past, because the nuclear power plant technology was
fundamentally a U.S. technology, our standards institutions were, in effect, the
writers of international standards. Three changes have occurred in the last fifteen
years in the area of nuclear power plant control room design. The first change
is that the nuclear power plant technology is no longer strictly an American
technology. This is probably to the credit of the United States, which has willingly
shared its expertise with other countries. A significant fraction of the world's
population is now benefitting to some degree from U.S. nuclear power technology,
but the countries that have accepted its benefits have also sought to understand
and to adopt it as their own. This has created experts in these countries
(particularly in the area of plant operations) that are now asking to have an impact
on the standards for the control room designs of the next generation of nuclear
units.
The second change is that because the United States is not currently building new
nuclear plants, the perceived level of practicality of our proposed designs, and
thus of our standards, is much lower now than it was. Worldwide, utilities that are
contemplating new nuclear unit construction are turning from the United States and
are seeking experience from countries that have active nuclear construction
programs such as France.
This has led to the third change; namely that, because we have built no new
designs in the last fifteen years, our standards are obsolete, particularly those
related to the very fast-moving technology of modem computer system design as
applied to nuclear power plant control rooms. Furthermore, without construction
programs, there is little motivation in U.S. standards organizations to update their
standards. As a result, the new standards currently being developed that will guide
the design of the next generation of nuclear power plant control rooms are being
drafted by international organizations such as the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
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INTRODUCTION
When nuclear reactors were being developed in the 1940s, state-of-the-art
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems were of the analog type._ Analog
instruments were at that time being used extensively to enhance industrial
processes such as pulp and paper and petrochemical production. Where
applicable, analog techniques were applied virtually unchanged to nuclear
reactors, especially in the conventional parts of the plant. In the nuclear portion
of the plant, different fundamental phenomena were being measured, but
nevertheless by analog methods. Analog methods have served the nuclear
communities well both in the United States and in other countries.
Soon after power production from nuclear plants began to increase, digital
computer technology began to expand3 By the 1970s, digital technology had
undergone rapid improvement. Reliability, capability, size, and especially cost
had improved to the point where cl/gital technology could begin to replace the
older analog equipment. The commercial process industry has now largely moved
IAn analog instrument is one in which the variable being monitored, such as pressure or temperature, is
continuously transformed into another form, such as current, voltage, or pneumatics. The transformed analog
signal can then be manipulated mathematically or used to provide indication of the variable's instantaneous
condition, such as amplitude or rate of change.
Sin digital control technology, the signal also begins as a continuous analog signal
converted to some binary form much the same as is done in a compact disc (CD) audio system. It is then soon
While in digital
form, the signal is free from the drift encountered in many analog systems and can be manipulated in very
sophisticated mathematical equations. Information in digital form may be used di_,. _tly in man-machine interface
applications, or it may be converted back into analog form for use in actua_ _ _dicators, etc.
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from analog systems to digital systems. For a number of reasons, the nuclear
industries in both the United States and Europe have been slow to move away
from the established methodology. This failure to move with the other industries
in control technology has left the nuclear industry in many countries without a
supporting infrastructure to supply parts and technology improvement for the older
systems.
U 'ade
The nuclear communities in both the United States and Europe are now moving
towards a greater use of digital equipment (Refs. 3.1-3.3) as they upgrade their
instrumentation and control systems. The transition to digital equipment has been
progressing on both a piecemeal basis and through complete change-out of the
analog equipment.
Piecemeal change. Piecemeal upgrades have been made when problems with
analog components have occurred; replacement has been made with digital
components having identical functionality. (This method has been employed in
the United States and the Soviet Union.) The piecemeal approach has the
following advantages:
1. Improved component reliability
2. Replacement parts are available
3. The operator interface remains unchanged
The major disadvantages of the piecemeal approach are as follows:
1. Functionality is limited to that designed to meet the original
requirements of the analog equipment; the method does not permit
utilizing the extended capability of modem digital systems.
2. It retains the man-machine interface familiar to present operators,
but loses the advantages of future technology moving toward more
compact control rooms that present synthesized data to operators,
allowing them to better coordinate overall control strategies.
Piecemeal upgrades will likely result in a control room man-machine interface
(MMI) lying somewhere between the older and the newer, compact versions.
Complete change-out. Total replacement of older equipment with modem digital
systems is the other option for designers to consider (Refi 3.4). This is the
strategy preferred by the French for upgrading their older 900 and 1300 MWe
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plants with the new N4 reactor control room concept (Refs. 3.5-3.7). Therefore,
their retrofit strategy for these plants is to shut them down for a few months while
installing the new MMI. During the shutdown, the operators are to be retrained
on the new system. The Soviet Union (Ref. 3.8) and the United States are still
studying their overall upgrade strategies. However, a number of individual
subsystems have already been changed over to digital from analog.
FRENCH UPGRADE RATIONALE
Si_ficant New Digital Systems
Obsolescence is given as the main reason for implementing new hybrid systems
in France. (This is, of course, the main reason that U.S. nuclear and fossil plants
are considering upgrading their I&C systems.) The second reason given is to be
able to harvest the benefits of improved technologies.
The French have made extensive application of digital technology both in
upgrading the 900 and 1300 MWe control and protection systems, and in the new
design of the N4 1500 MWe reactor concept (Ref. 3.9). The N4 control system is
the P20 developed by CEGELEC. The core protection and control system is the
C03 developed by Merlin-Gerin in collaboration with Framatome and l_.lectricit& de
France (EDF). The C03 consists of three main systems: the integrated digital
protection system, SPIN; the neutron instrumentation system, RPN; and the
regulating rod system, RGL. (The architectures of these control and protection
systems are discussed in other sections of this report.)
The French rationale for leaning more heavily toward digital technology as
opposed to analog in the above hybrid systems is that digital technology offers
a large number of both generic and specific systems improvements.
Genedc Improvements From Digital I&C Systems
.
.
More sophisticated control capabilities. These are provided through
improved calculation of nonlinear algorithms and automatic variable
weighting to meet different operating modes and conditions; the ability to
combine functional units such as signal conditioning and logic units in a
single module expedites wiring and ensures more efficient control.
Lower cost. Advanced digital techniques coupled with local area
networking are economical because they require less space and have less
cabling. They also permit incorporating future changes at low cost.
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3. Improved accuracy. Calculations made with digital systems are more
accurate than analog calculations. This is true because the larger number
of analog modules required to perform more complex functions incur
accumulated errors that contribute to larger overall inaccuracy.
4. Improved operating margins. Settings remain stable over long periods of
time, and inherent noise and drift are reduced: these features permit the
setting of better operating margins, as do more complex plant protection
system algorithms.
5. Ease of operation. Digital technology makes operating and maintenance
actions easier to perform, resulting in less risk of errors.
6. Broader information and data handling capabilities. Distribution of plant
data on buses makes information available for a variety of uses as required
for plant operation, diagnostics, and maintenance information.
7. Long-term availability of parts and service. Unlike analog equipment, which
is usually application-specific, digital equipment can be adapted to a variety
of functional requirements. Therefore, digital system performance
specifications can be prepared that make it unlikely that spare parts will
become unavailable in the near future.
Specific Systems Improvements From Digital I&C Systems (1300 MWe Plants)
Steam Generator Level Control
1.
2.
o
.
e
More sophisticated control capability.
Ease of reconfiguration. A remote loading facility is used to reconfigure
control functions and to program new control strategies during start-up or
if modifications are decided at a later date.
Accurate, drift-free parameter settings that do not require periodic
recalibration.
Failure detection capability that provides a selection of automatic corrective
actions following module failure.
No requirement for a switch-over mode between the high-load and low-
load control modes, since both main and bypass feedwater valves can have
the same controller.
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.
Transition to measured steam flow can be done when the system determines
that measured flow is sufficiently accurate (with old analog systems, switch-
over from estimated to measured steam flow was done simultaneously with
changeover from low load to high load).
Pressurizer Level Control
Because the pressurizer charging nozzle is an area subject to high wear, it is
desirable to reduce temperature fluctuations in the charging line. By using a
more complex algorithm based on hot-leg/cold-leg differential temperatures, the
temperature fluctuations at the charging nozzle have been reduced from 15oC to
5°C during frequency control operation.
Boron Concentration Control
Responding to load changes or frequency changes requires considerable operator
skill when done manually. This is due to the disturbance in axial power
distribution caused by changes in rod position and boron concentration required
by the transient. A digital system has been implemented in one 900 MW unit using
the following system considerations: boron addition and dilution time response,
system fluctuations, and response optimization.
UPGRADE I_TIONALE
Limited Use of Digital Systems
In Germany, the rationale for using digital computers also has an accompanying
rationale for not using digital computers. The German designers have been using
digital computers for certain process functions since 1968 (Refs. 3.1, 3.10). At the
time, the computer was used to calculate power density in the core and percent
burnup from a system of metal balls called the Aeroball System, in which metal
balls are inserted in the core for a period of time, then removed and measured for
induced radioactivity (Ref. 3.11). This system was followed by the application of
a twin computer system to predict, by performing multidimensional simulations,
optimum control rod manipulation strategies (Ref. 3.1). Computers used in the
German pressurized water reactors (PWRs) can calculate three-dimensional power
densities from aeroballs in about ten minutes. In boiling water reactors (BWRs),
the computers can calculate whole-core power density using travelling in-core
probes in about three hours.
Other than in the above applications, very little additional application of digital
technology has been made in the German system. Upgrading of the German
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reactor protection systems by Siemens/Kraftwerk Union has been done with analog
technology. The system, called EDM (Refi 3.12), is similar to the British LADIC
system in that it utilizes pulsed saturable reactor technology in a 2/3 coincidence
scheme. The first application of an EDM-system was in the Obrigheim NPP (1969)
and a modified, enhanced version at the NPP Philippsburg II since 1984.
In the United States and France, one of the motivations for switching from analog
systems to digital systems is the unavailability of replacement components for
obsolete equipment; in Germany, however, there appears to be sufficient demand
for analog equipment to support a supply and technology industry. Thus, the
move in Germany toward digital technology is driven by other considerations.
The Germans plan more extensive use of digital technology in the future (Refs. 3.2,
3.3). Their rationale for moving to digital technology for both nuclear and fossil
plants is embodied in the set of technical and policy goals outlined below. With
some reservations, the Germans expect that digital systems can achieve these
goals.
Technical Goals for Digital I&G Systems
1. Maintain or improve level of safety.
Q Improve plant operation through increased automation and better decision
aids to the operator during both normal and reset conditions.
.
Utilize standard digital hardware to the fullest extent to increase system
reliability, minimize training problems for maintenance personnel, and insure
cost-effectiveness (some of the panel's hosts in Germany said if standard
commercial hardware is not adequate, upgrading with digital equipment is
not feasible).
4. Permit the development of smart sensors and actuators.
5. Support licensing procedures.
Policy Goals for Digital I&C Systems
1. Must be applicable to all new plants.
2. Must be capable of being backfitted to old plants.
3. Must be capable of shortening qualification period for new reactors.
4. Should reduce plant cost and space requirements.
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ReservRtions About Digital I&C Systems
The Germans have set forth some of their reasons for not proceeding too rapidly
toward digital technology:
.
The increased information density in a single device greatly increases the
consequences of" a failure.
.
Cycle times of serial processors cause greater reaction times than for
analog devices.
3. Local area networks cause problems.
4. Equipment environmental requirements are more severe.
5. Data storage and retrieval requirements are of a large scale.
6. Mixing equipment from different vendors is difficult.
7. There is a greater potential for failure propagation.
Other Considera_ons for System Upgrades
Goals for overall digital or analog system reliability are in the range 10 .3 to 10 .4.
The Germans believe human operators have adequate reliability for long-time
response (minutes) but not for rapid response (seconds); hence the emphasis on
more complete automation.
The German designers have emphasized simplicity in the design of their
instrumentation and control systems. However, the limitation system (Ref. 3.1) is
by nature somewhat complicated and is a likely candidate for utilizing more digital
technology.
One of the major advantages the Germans claim for digital systems is that of
obtaining diversity by augmenting directly measured variables with an equivalent
parameter obtained by computing it from other variables.
The German staff at Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) are interested in
developing standards for application to either digital or analog systems, e.g.,
specifications that describe overall system requirements. An interesting idea put
forth by the GRS staff was the possibility of developing generic or universal
software that could be used in either a digital or analog application (Ref. 3.13).
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FI_ENCH UPURADE IMPLEMENTATION
The French are moving toward both partial and complete upgrades of their 900
MWe and 1300 MWe units and toward developing new technology for the N4
1500 MWe plant.
Control System U_ 3
Partial upgrades--1300 MWe plants. Several manufacturers market suitable modular
hardware, but Framatome chose CEGELEC's Micro-Z equipment. Twelve units of
the French 1300 MWe units have been equipped since successful application to
Cattenom 1 in 1986. The system consists of a number of self-sufficient cards, each
including the following:
1. Up to 24 logic inputs
2. Up to 8 analog inputs
3. Up to 4 outputs for auto/manual stations
4. One microprocessor for calculations
5. One microprocessor for data and communication management
.
Bank of random access memories (RAMs) for storing time-dependent
variables
.
Bank of erasable programmable read only memories (EPROMs) for
storing the operating system. The EPROMs contain the algorithm
library logic functions, thresholds, filters, etc.
.
Bank of electrically erasable programmable read only memories EEPROM
storing the user's program and the settings.
As an example of an equipment requirement, implementing a steam generator
level control system requires a total of three cards per steam generator.
Gomplete upgrades. The French say a complete upgrade can be achieved by
using as many Micro-Z cards as necessary. However, a lower-cost system with
improved reliability and operability is available with the P-20 Controbloc equipment
SFor a general discussion of system upgrading in France, see Ref. 3.14.
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manufactured by CEGELEC. This control equipment was chosen for the new 1500
MWe reactors. Some of the main features of the P-20 system are:
1. Use of 16- and 32-bit microprocessors
2. Fault detection capability
3. Redundant functionality
4. Use of high-level programming languages such as C
5. Extensive algorithm library with thorough software verification
6. Can be interfaced with both existing and more modem equipment
Protection System Upgrades
Older 900 MWe plants employed a safety system based on a function of coolant
channel t's or Delta-T. Development of a new protection system was started in
1976. It was based on functions of the departure-from-nucleate-boiling ratio
(DNBR) and the linear power density in the core. This complex three-dimensional
algorithm was made possible by the incorporation of digital computers in the
system and the successful development of a 6-section ex-core detector, a
calculated radial peaking factor, and control rod position to calculate DNBR to the
required accuracy.
Both the axial power distribution algorithm and 6-section detectors were tested
successfully in the Bugey 2 plant in 1979-80. The DNBR algorithm was then tested
successfully at Tricastin 3 in baseload operation and load following operation. In
1984, the new system was installed and tested during the power ascension tests
at Paluel 1 and 2 (1300 MWe units). The French safety authorities have approved
the use of digital technology in safety systems, subject to two conditions:
1. A software quality assurance program is implemented.
.
The safety philosophy includes the condition that any postulated accident
is detected by at least two different functions (functional redundancy).
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has studied the Paluel
experiments and concluded that the French system was as satisfactory as that
used in U.S. reactors. Framatome has proposed that a 5 percent improvement in
operating margins could be obtained by retrofitting the 900 MWe plants with the
same modem protective functions as those used in the 1300 MWe plants.
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The digital central processing unit utilizes a Motorola 8-bit microprocessor.
Advantages claimed for the system over the previous t system include improved
safety and operating margins, better power maneuverability, and better fuel
management. This system had been installed in all 1300 MWe units in France (20
units). Retaining the same architecture and taking benefit from the operating
experience of 1300 MW units, an upgraded equipment has been developed. It is
installed in 1500 MWe units (3 under construction) and incorporates modern
technologies such as 16 bit Motorola microprocessors, local area networks, fiver
optics, and programmation using high level languages.
SPIN system. The SPIN protection system (Ref. 3.6) was developed during the
1980-84 time frame. It was installed in 20 sites over a seven-year period, 1984-
89. Lessons learned are being applied to the new version in the N4 1500 MWe
reactor. Development of the new N4 system is nearly complete (a complete
configuration is undergoing tests). The basic difference between SPIN-P4, the
1300 MWe version, and the SPIN-N4 is the incorporation of diagnostic units, 16 bit
processors and extensive local area networks (LANs).
V_n _
Verification of the French 1300 MWe protection system software was conducted
by Merlin Gerin, manufacturer of the equipment. The development has 8 stages:
1. Software specification
2. Preliminary software design
3. Detailed software design
4. Coding
5. Tests of individual subroutines
6. Tests of the integrated system
7. Validation tests
8. Interconnected tests
4For a discussion of software verification, see Refs. 3.6 and 3.15.
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The tests consist of imposing test vectors into the input and then verifying that
the outputs behave predictably. Merlin Gerin safety critical software development
involves extensive effort in verification. As a rule, the time allocated to verify and
validate the software is 70 percent of the time spent to specify, design and code.
Its software development requires approximately one hour per line of code. Merlin
Gerin uses fault avoidance in writing code but believes that striving for zero faults
is an unachievable goal.
In implementing its digital control and protection systems for the 1500 MW NPP,
the Merlin Gerin group has developed an interactive graphic tool called
Specification of Applications and Automated Generation (SAGA) to cover the
design, programming documentation, and administration phases of the software life
cycle (Ref. 3.6). SAGA is an attempt to reduce errors between the system
specifications and its implementation. Functionally, it automatically generates code
while also producing documentation. It is written as a data flow language.
The University of Grenoble has an automatic programming language, LUSTRE,
that converts the SAGA text to classical Boolean logic. It is then possible to verify
that the Boolean properties are invariant, i.e., to proof that the system cannot give
an unsafe output. Those at the University of Grenoble believe this test is more
useful than the classical approach of converting to Laplacian operators and
applying classical mathematical methods. Their contention is that the fundamental
problem with the classical method is that it does not include some important
aspects of the software such as the validity of the input specifications. The
Boolean approach avoids the problem.
Code Simplification
The code development group at Merlin Gerin believes that excessive complexity
is the greatest detriment to obtaining high-quality codes. It has attempted to
reduce the complexity of each software module by means other than dividing it
into two or more less-complex modules; such division of modules leads to other
problems that result in even less overall reliability.
To assess complexity, a special method has been developed in which complexity
is analyzed by a tool called LOGISCOPE. Several module components that have
quantifiable complexity have been identified. Examples are number of variables,
number of loops, and number of blocks. Each of these components has been
assigned vector space about a circle, directed away from the center as spokes in
a wheel. Each component is examined and the complexity is assigned a number
that is then represented as the length of that particular space vector. When the
complexities of all components are represented by their length on the vector
diagram, an effort is made to circumscribe a circle representing the maximum
allowable complexity of the module about the vectors such that none of them
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extend outside the circle (see Fig. 3.1). If some fall outside the circle, the author
of the software module is asked to attempt to simplify it. If all efforts at
simplification fall, the module may be approved for use but marked with a special
tag that identifies it as an item to be scrutinized more carefully.
Having gone through the simplification process defined above, the choice of using
analog or digital hardware is the designer's. However, the French say that both
their commercial and military data show that digital hardware is more reliable than
analog.
Di2i_ ,_pli_ to E_eztmen_ Reactors
The French have developed a nuclear instrumentation system for application in
the EOLE and MIN_RVE experimental reactors (Ref. 3.16). The system is called
SIREX. SIREX has three isolated channels of nuclear instrumentation. Each
channel consists of one low-level count rate circuit and one high-level
compensated ionization chamber channel. The detectors go through one level
of analog signal conditioning before being convened to digital form for use in the
16-bit microprocessor.
Software verification is given considerable attention in SIREX. It goes through the
usual steps of specification writing, preliminary design, detailed design, coding,
and testing. An independent team is responsible for developing and implementing
test and verification procedures. The standards used for implementation of the
hardware system are the same as those used for the N4 reactor controls. Overall
response time is 50 milliseconds.
GERMAN UPGRADE IMPLEMEI_ATION
Control and Protection Systems
As previously mentioned, improved versions of German analog systems are being
made as needed. No specific schedules have been established for introducing the
first digital system upgrade, but digital systems are now being developed. To
accommodate a gradual transition to digital, the Grafenrheinfeld plant has been
built in modular fashion. By this method small, well-defined increments of the
plant can be converted with minimum disruption of the plant.
The digital system now being developed is the BELT-D (Refs. 3.3, 3.17, 3.18).
Both the operational and safety I&C systems included in BELT-D have redundant
channels of information. Signals are used in both the safety and operational
channels, with the safety system having first priority. The BELT-D has five levels
of architecture. The architecture of Germany's proposed digital system will be
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covered in more detail elsewhere in this report. Briefly, the system consists of
four independent channels of safety working into dual isolated data busses. The
digital control is carried out by dual channels of process data on a common ring
bus (Ref. 3.17).
UNACCEPTABLE COMPONENT
CIRCLE OF MAXIMUM
ALLOWABLE COMPLEXITY
Fig. 3.1. Complexity Paradigm
German designers have identified three levels of safety tasks, S 1, $2, and $3 (Ref.
3.19), defining different levels of action to deal with varying levels of severity of
challenges to the safety system. By this strategy, the most extensive software
verification and validation will be applied to the most critical safety functions, the
S1 levels. Less stringent techniques will be applied to the levels of lower
importance. The designers have also identified two levels of reliability of control
actions, B1 and B2. B2 is for normal process functions, while B1 is for higher
reliability requirements such as control of safety variables and critical diagnostic
tasks.
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Software I_elo_.ent and Verification
Software and verification methods have been developed for the German digital
I&C systems. A tool called Specification and Coding Environment (SPACE) (Ref.
3.18) for deriving formal system specifications has been developed using
computer-aided engineering (CAE). Specifications developed by the reactor
designer are converted to functional diagrams that can be used with any hardware
system. During verification and validation, the functional requirements, reliability
requirements, and performance requirements are converted into a formal system
specification. Codes are first tested using a plant dynamic simulator. Performance
is confirmed by proper dynamic response of the plant. A complete safety system
is then built using the resulting software. This permits the testing of response
time, for noise problems, and for correctness under a range of situations. These
tests are to be carried on for about three years.
COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN & U.S. STATE-OF-THE-ART DIGITAL SYSTEMS
Components for making the transition to digital in the United States are well ahead
of those in Europe. Most of the complex components such as microprocessor
chips used in Europe are all bought from the United States--for example, the
Motorola 68000 is widely used. Also, many of the computers are manufactured in
the United States. There are numerous examples of European installations using
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) and International Business Machines (IBM)
hardware.
However, digital technology in nuclear power plant control and instrumentation
systems is being much more widely applied in some European countries than in
the United States. France has developed the world's most advanced control room
for the N4 reactor. (Canada and Japan are also ahead of the United States in
application of digital systems to nuclear power plants.)
The research and development work that has been done in Europe has required
a large amount of money and manpower. Much of the work has been directed
toward establishing the fundamental requirements of digital systems as applied to
the control and protection of nuclear reactors. Although the environments are
quite different in Europe and the United States, the European work that has been
done will provide a technical foundation from which the United States can begin
its transition to digital when the time is appropriate.
This is so because much of the development has been of a generic nature. For
example, all of the European countries are stressing the need for standardization
of hardware and data highway networking systems to reduce the impact of
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equipment obsolescence; also, many important reliability issues have been
addressed. This point is particularly appropriate in software quality assurance for
sensitive systems. In this latter area, the French have heightened U.S. awareness
of important factors affecting ultimate software reliability such as algorithm
complexity.
In the transition from analog to digital I&C equipment, it would appear that the
nations of this study could be ranked as follows: France, Canada, United States,
Germany, Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia.
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CHAPTER 4
Co n u m D OPv. TOR SUPPORTSYSTEMSFOR
FAULT
A. L. Sudduth
INTRODUCTION
The use of nuclear technology for power generation presents unique challenges
to power station operators. These challenges include the complexity of equipment
and processes, the potential economic and environmental consequences of
malfunctions, and the need to increase reliability and quality of operation in order
to reduce the cost of electricity from nuclear facilities. The complexity associated
with monitoring and controlling a nuclear station is characterized by centralized
control rooms with hundreds of annunciator alarms and thousands of individual
process measurements. Even during normal operation, the operator must survey
and interpret very large amounts of data and draw appropriate conclusions
concerning the state of the many systems. In an abnormal or accident situation,
information conveyed to the operator may increase beyond timely comprehension.
There is a recognized need in the industry for tools that enhance the operator's
cognitive ability with respect to understanding the status of plant processes and
formulating appropriate strategies to cope with abnormal conditions.
This chapter uses the general term fault management for the series of actions that
must be taken in a nuclear power plant in response to an abnormal or upset
condition. Because nuclear stations are provided with automatic protective
systems that are designed to prevent serious consequences for many possible
faulted conditions, the problem of fault management in nuclear plants may be
viewed as a combination of automatic actions by engineered systems and actions
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by the human operator. The human operator, however, has the ultimate
responsibility for safety of the plant and the continuity of its power production
mission; therefore, this chapter will concentrate on how the instrumentation and
control systems in the plant assist the human operator in accomplishing this
responsibility.
With the integration of computers into the gathering and storage of data from
plant measurements, there is an opportunity to increase the effective use of
measurement information by operators, particularly under upset conditions when
the amount of relevant measurement information increases significantly. By
creating a partnership of human and machine and dividing the responsibility for
operation between the human operator and the automatic control system in
appropriate ways, the ability of the operator to assess measurement data and to
take timely and correct actions can be improved, and the operator can become
a more effective fault manager. This survey is concerned principally with the
methods by which the Europeans have begun to incorporate more sophisticated
and innovative computer based technologies to support the operator in the role
of fault manager.
Bac]nazouzu:T: ]_etuzba_oo laudy_a Rosoa.-'oh
Research in the United States and Europe in the early 1980s considered the
problem of what was then called disturbance analysis. This work should be
considered the forerunner of the efforts at formalizing the fault management
problem today. In disturbance analysis, any deviation of the plant from its
expected behavior was defined as a disturbance. It was recognized that
disturbances could be the precursors of serious events in the plant, and that it was
therefore necessary that the operator recognize and respond to disturbances in an
effective manner. Disturbance analysis consisted of a set of methodologies for
recognizing, assessing, and mitigating the effects of disturbances in plant operation.
US specifications for disturbance analysis software. The Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) sponsored research into disturbance analysis that resulted in the
development of a specification and a prototype for a Disturbance Analysis and
Surveillance System (DASS) that would assist the operator to respond properly to
disturbances (Ref. 4.1 and 4.2). The DASS would have the following
responsibilities during abnormal plant transients:
o Signal validation. In this function, the system would attempt to determine
whether data being gathered from the system sensors adequately
represented the values of the measured states. Basic actions would include
elimination of channels in test, channels operating outside of the valid
calibration range, and indications not consistent with operating mode.
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Determination of operating mode. From a set of six major modes and
sixteen submodes of a nuclear station, the current mode of the plant and
any appropriate submode would be identified by pattern matching.
Display of plant status. This display would allow the operator to organize
the vast array of information received from the disturbance analysis system.
The research established that the effectiveness of DASS would be heavily
dependent on an effective graphical user interface.
Configuration verification. This function would determine whether the
current alignment and operability status of plant equipment was consistent
with the regulatory requirements for the current mode, in accordance with
the station Technical Specifications.
Verification of automatic actions. This function would trace the progress
of various automatic control and protective functions to ensure that they
were operating correctly. The operator would thus be relieved of the
burden of ensuring that routine control actions actually take place as
required.
Deten'nination of margin to limiting conditions. This function would monitor
the system states and compare them with preimposed limits, calculating a
margin to exceeding a limit. If a limit was exceeded, then time and extent
of violation would be noted. The limits would be based on those contained
in the station Technical Specifications.
Monitoring of critical functions. The disturbance analysis system would
determine the operability of system functions critical to the safe and reliable
operation of the process, notifying the operator of the impending violation
of the objectives of these critical functions.
A/arm-based system fault detection. Using a symptom based logic for fault
detection based only on patterns of alarms, the system would detect the
presence of faults.
Parameter-based system fault detection. This function would provide fault
detection based on the values of measured states not in an alarm condition,
using parameter estimation.
System fault diagnostics. This function would attempt to identify the root
cause of a disturbance. This function was considered of secondary
importance to providing assistance to the operator in mitigation of
disturbances and returning the system to a safe, stable condition. It was
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based on the concept that diagnosis of the cause of a fault is secondary
to ensuring that the system equipment and humans are protected from
adverse effects of the fault.
11. Determination of mitigating action. This function would provide advice to
the operator on the best corrective action once a disturbance had been
identified. It was expected that operator response based on symptoms
alone, without an intervening attempt to diagnose the situation, would
result in proper operator action in a more timely manner.
12. Monitoring of operator intervention using preestablished procedures. This
function would track the action of the operator in modifying the state of the
process.
13. Prech'ction of disturbance propagation. This function would provide
information to the operator on the expected future manifestations of a
current disturbance. It was expected by the researchers that this function
would be nearly impossible to implement using then-existing simulation
technology, due to the complexity of the underlying models required.
14. Assessment of the future effects of current control actions. This function
would provide the operator with a tool to determine the impact of
contemplated system interventions.
In the panel's review of nuclear I&C systems and the computerized operator aids
that have been developed in Europe, it is interesting to note that many of the
requirements of the DASS have begun to be embodied in software systems
currently being deployed there. Ideas that were developed and formalized in the
United States ten years ago for approaching the problem of making the operator
and computerized monitoring system effective partners in fault management have
begun to be realized in European nuclear research and in plant applications. In
that respect, the panel finds that the Europeans appear to be ahead of the United
States in the development and application of advanced computer-based operator
aids, particularly those associated with fault management in nuclear stations.
OF FAULT MANAGEMENT ISSUES
When an unanticipated and unacceptable deviation in system performance occurs,
it is classified as a fault. A fault is an excursion in the values of system states in
which there is sufficient deterioration in performance or quality to require some
attention by the operator or the supervisory system. The urgency of the response
depends on the nature of the fault. Certain faults require immediate action due to
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imminent danger to the public or to the plant owners' investment; others represent
inconveniences that cost money but do not have such dire consequences that
immediate attention is required. System faults may be broadly classified into three
groups according to the part of the system in which the fault originates: faults
caused by changes in system parameters or structure; faults caused by changes
or inadequacies in control algorithms; and faults caused by failures in the
measurement system. It is the responsibility of the plant monitoring and control
systems, acting either automatically or in partnership with human operators, to
provide appropriate response to faults. The ability of the operator or of the
supervisory control system to provide proper response depends on rapid
recognition of the nature of the situation and the formulation and execution of"
appropriate actions.
Five Components of Fault Management
.
Fault detection--determining that a fault condition exists; that
system states are no longer within allowable limits. The job of
fault detection is made more difficult because a plant may undergo
an expected transient, such as a load change, which may cause
symptoms similar to those of a fault. The fault detection function
may also be misled by measurement failures.
.
Fault diagnosis--localizing a fault and identifying its cause.
Localization is difficult because the actions of automatic control
systems may propagate the effects of a fault across a number of
plant subsystems.
3,
Fault evaluation--determining the proper action to take in the event
of the fault. This implies the presence of some form of fault
classification system that maps identified faults into a set of
responses appropriate to the type and level of severity of the fault.
.
Fault mitigation--taking an appropriate set of actions to counteract
the effects of the fault on the plant, at least to the extent that the
plant remains in a safe condition and damage to equipment is
minimized or prevented.
,
Fault management success assurance--ensuring that the action
taken has been effective in response to the fault, and that critical
functions associated with plant safety enable adequate thermal
margin to be maintained.
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The Need for Computsrlsed Fault Management Assistance
The need for computer-based systems to assist the operator in tasks associated
with proper management of system faults has been studied extensively. Without
specific attention in the design of computerized monitoring systems, the operator
is besieged by information from the computer during a typical system fault, and
by new information that becomes available before the last set of readings can be
discerned and analyzed. This information overload, the so-called "Christmas tree
effect"in the control room, creates sufficient confusion that specific diagnoses
may be delayed significantly, and the operator is reduced to responding to fault
symptoms in an unorganized manner without a clear fault mitigative strategy. This
condition, which is commonly referred to as cognitive overload, is caused by the
lack of sufficient time for the operator to consider all possible causes of a
particular set of observations, to evaluate the consequences of proposed courses
of action, and to execute the needed action. Studies of nuclear operator actions
in casualty situations demonstrate that this time stress is the most important factor
affecting the ability of the operator to respond effectively (Ref. 4.3).
The panel saw in Europe a significant effort to develop the computer to be an aid
to operators in time-stressed situations, relieving them of cognitive loads that were
not required for proper response, providing automatic response where feasible,
and supporting the operator in the task of fault management. The next sections
will discuss some of the specific computerized operator support systems that have
been developed by European researchers and that certain operators of European
power stations are using to advantage in fault management. These systems will
be discussed in categories according to the specific fault management task for
which they are intended. An effort has been made to show as complete a picture
as possible of the fault management systems under development or in use at the
places that the panelists visited in Europe; however, the amount of specific
technical information concerning each system is limited to a high-level functional
description. More technical details may be obtained from the research
organizations identified in the discussion.
FAULT DETECTION
Deficiencies of Conventional Process Alarm Systsme
Monitoring and supervisory systems in U.S. nuclear power stations attempt to assist
the operator to perform the function of fault detection through alarms. Actions for
the operator to take in response are prescribed in the form of alarm response
procedures, usually a set of written procedures contained in a manual in the
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control room. Problems in using conventional alarm systems as the primary means
of fault detection have been well documented. These include the following:
Large numbers of alarms tend to reduce the ability of the operator to
locate relevant information.
Multiple alarms initiate during any significant transient, so that important
indications of abnormal conditions are masked by many less important
alarms.
Alarms occur frequently that are irrelevant to the current mode of operation
or are created by a specific operator action, rather than occurring as a
precursor to the need for operator action.
Alarms remain activated for long periods of time while the associated
components are out of service or under repair, so that a number of
channels are in the alarm condition regardless of the plant operating state.
The most serious problems with conventional alarm systems as fault detection and
diagnosis tools are related to the precedence and timeliness of alarms. Alarms
are generally not received in a predictable order during fault situations. Thus the
first alarm the operator sees may be a secondary consequence, not a primary
indicator of a specific fault. Traditionally, all alarms are equal in precedence,
therefore those that are noteworthy because they add new information about a
progressing situation are not distinguishable from those that are redundant to
previous alarms or are the consequence of an automatic system protective action
rather than of the original fault.
In order to prevent spurious alarm actuation during normal plant measurement
variations, the tolerance band within which measurements are considered normal
has to be made relatively broad, so that expected instrumentation noise and
normal variations during process maneuvering do not create false alarms. A
significant deviation of system states may occur well before the associated alarms
begin to activate.
By the time an alarm has been received, the control system has propagated early
system fault response around the various interconnected parts of the system. The
actions of the control system in the absence of a plant trip are in many cases to
mitigate the system response to the fault, thus obscuring the original fault
symptoms. This expansion of the scope and obscuring of the symptoms of faulted
system behavior creates diagnostic confusion. As a consequence of dependence
on alarms for fault detection, the operator is often notified of an abnormal
condition ambiguously and late.
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One approach to the problem of how to focus operator attention on the most
relevant alarms or other indications of system condition is to segregate a small
number of the system indications and associated alarms on a dedicated panel
specifically for that purpose. This is the approach taken by the U. S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (USNRC) in mandating the installation of a Safety
Parameter Display System in each nuclear station control room. This static
approach to the problem creates a context in which the most relevant indications
are available separately from those unlikely to be relevant, but it falls to provide
priority within that smaller context, and it does not increase the timeliness of the
alarms received. As a result, a significant burden remains on the operator to
ensure that measurement data and associated alarms are converted into fault
mitigative strategies quickly and correctly.
To a very great extent in the U. S. nuclear power industry today, measurement
alarming is the only means provided to the operator for system fault detection,
despite advances in computer hardware and software associated with monitoring
and controlling modern systems.
New Approach_ in Alsrm Management Systems
To improve the effectiveness of alarms in conveying useful and unambiguous
information to the operator, one approach is to attempt to do some form of alarm
prioritization. This has led to the idea that within the set of true alarm signals is
a natural hierarchy for any given system condition: alarms that are primary, those
that are secondary, and those that are irrelevant. The job of an alarm prioritization
system is to establish dynamically where in the hierarchy each alarm belongs.
Knowledge based systems have become candidates for implementing an improved
alarm system, although more deterministic approaches have also been
implemented, including those based on conventional forms of pattern recognition.
The features proposed for knowledge based alarming systems include the
following:
Prioritization of alarm indications in a hierarchy that improves the ability
of the operator to determine proper action. This includes suppression of
irrelevant alarms, such as those that have no meaning for the current
operating mode and those associated with known malfunctions in the
monitoring system.
Development of alarm classification schemes that differentiate between
alarms that represent the primary indication of a particular condition,
alarms that provide confirmatory or secondary indication, and alarms that
are unrelated to the primary cause of the alarm.
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Presentation of alarms in a manner that promotes correct operator
interpretation through the use of human-centered design techniques.
HALO (Norway--Ha]den Reactor Project). One system that performs these
functions in improving alarm system performance is the HALO system developed
at the Halden Reactor Project of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) (Ref. 4.4). Recent refinements to this system, which have
been demonstrated in experiments using operators of a research reactor, have
shown that operator performance in response to a faulted situation can be
improved. It is interesting to note one conclusion of this research is that once a
comprehensive computerized process monitoring system has been installed in a
plant to monitor the major plant systems associated with power production and
plant protection, there is very little reason to continue to use conventional
annunciator alarm panels.
Alarm and Status Management System (Germany--Kraftwerk Union and Gesellschaft
fur Reaktorsicherheit). In recognition of the alarm management problems posed
by significant transients, KWU and GRS developed an alarm management system
for the Phillipsburg nuclear station (Ref. 4.5). Alarm suppression is performed by
splitting the alarms into functional groups then relating the relevance of each
functional group to each of a series of predefined plant transient modes. Alarm
sequences are established based on theoretical considerations of alarm
propagation, and consequential alarms are suppressed once the primary alarm
indications for a particular event have been received.
Electricite de France has no dedicated alarm management system but incorporates
alarm management features into the advanced control room designs. These alarm
management features reduce the number of alarms created by a transient, perform
some alarm validation to eliminate spurious alarms, and allow the operator to take
corrective action directly from the graphical alarm screen without the need to refer
to written procedures or additional graphics screens.
Though traditional forms of alarm systems will continue to have a place in power
station control rooms, particularly for equipment monitoring applications and the
benefit of maintenance personnel, the trend is to find more innovative methods for
indicating the presence of process faults to the operator.
New Methodologies for Fault Detection
In reviewing European nuclear plants, the panelists noted several systems that
have been developed to improve the operator's ability to detect faulted conditions
in power plant processes. There are three basic components of the new
technology of process fault detection.
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.
More robust methodology to determine the normal or reference values
of various process measurements as a function of plant condition. In
traditional alarming systems, these reference values, which may vary
over a considerable range during normal plant operation from startup
to full load, generally result in the establishment of fixed alarm setpoints
relatively far from normal plant measurement values. In the new fault
detection schemes that the panel surveyed, the setpoints are dynamic,
derived by tracking the plant states using some form of parallel
simulation model, thus making fault detection much more sensitive and
timely.
Improved methodology for removing ambiguity from the determination
that a fault has occurred. This is done by developing systematic
methods for determining when measurements indicate a possible fault
by considering the deviation of groups of related measurements as a
symptom, rather than the deviation of individual sensor signals.
New methodologies to isolate measurement failures. Methods for
ensuring the quality of measurement information are used so that
failures in measurement channels are not mistaken for actual process
faults. These methodologies are collectively called signal validation.
l ob t DeterminaUon of Normal or P,eference Values of Meuurement 
One prerequisite for performing fault detection in a process system is the
establishment of what constitutes the normal or reference values of a process
measurement. In many cases, the normal value of interest will be a constant, in
which case a fixed value may be used for comparison with the sensor indication.
In many more cases, the value of normal for a particular process measurement
varies depending on the operating mode of the process and its operating level or
load. In a power station, for example, there are many measurements whose
normal values vary depending on whether the plant is operating or shut down,
and many whose normal value is directly related to the power output of the
station. This situation results in cases where, to perform fault detection, the
operator or the operator support system must constantly determine the value of
normal based on the situation.
The panel observed that many European organizations have adopted a
model-based paradigm for fault detection in which the determination of normal is
left to some type of reference model. Figure 4.1 illustrates the reference model
paradigm that could be used in fault detection, or in a variety of ways to assist in
fault management.
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Use of Patterns of Measurement Response in Fault Detection
Process faults rarely result in the deviation of a single measurement. The causal
paths within a process tend to propagate failure effects through the process and
create multiple sensor deviations. The nature and severity of a process fault may
be determined from the pattern of this propagation, and the fact that multiple
sensor deviations are noted eliminates measurement failure as a source of the
observations.
Use of information from multiple sensors is particularly important when the effects
of feedback tend to compensate for the fault. This feedback may arise from the
self-regulating nature of many processes or from the action of engineered control
systems. If the effect of this feedback is large enough, the effects of the fault
may be masked, and sensor deviations may return to normal. The operator may
then assume that the condition was an unimportant transient, rather than a
potentially serious parameter change.
A model of the process response that incorporates these causal forward and
feedback pathways may be used as a basis of removing ambiguity from fault
detection, then establish a framework for diagnosis and assessment. Alternatively,
patterns of multiple sensor response may be predetermined with simulation and
collected in a database with which comparisons may be made. In either case, the
use of multiple measurement deviations, considered as a group, provides more
robust fault detection capability than single alarms.
Use of Si_l Validation in Fault Detection
Measurement signals obtained from process sensors and associated electronic or
pneumatic equipment are the only path by which information concerning process
status is conveyed to the operator, to the automatic control system, or to a
computer-based operator support system. It is therefore very important that the
quality of process measurement information be high, and that erroneous
information from sensors be quickly and effectively eliminated from consideration
by the operator and by any analysis or control functions performed by the process
computers. The use of erroneous measurement information in an automatic
control function could result in unnecessary process shutdowns or in equipment
damage. Analysis of invalid sensor signals by an operator or computer-based
system, for example, if an invalid measurement is mistaken for a process fault, may
result in misleading or incorrect conclusions and inappropriate responses.
In the typical U. S. control room reflecting the technology of the 1960s, if multiple
measurement channels are available for a particular process state, the operator is
provided with a manual switch to select which channel is to be displayed or fed
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to the control system. If the selected channel fails, the operator moves the switch
to the other channel to avoid an adverse impact on the process. With the new
technology available for control rooms, a much wider range of options can be
employed to improve this situation. This new technology is centered around
signal validation, a collection of methodologies for ensuring the quality of
measurement information.
Signal validation consists of methodologies for distinguishing measurement failures
from process faults and selecting which instrumentation signals to use in control
and analysis functions. The panel found two methods of signal validation that are
used in process monitoring systems in Europe: comparisons among redundant
measurements, and the use of reasonableness checking among multiple signals
having a quantifiable relationship with the measurement being validated.
Use of Redundant Measurements. Comparison methods are based on the
availability of at least two measurements (direct or derived) of a desired process
state. These redundant measurements may then be used to make some judgment
about the validity of the measurement signals. The simplest comparison methods
involve the installation of two sensors at the same location for the same process
state. These redundant sensors are automatically compared with each other;
disagreement between them larger than a specified threshold (related to the
amount of anticipated measurement noise) is considered indicative of failure of one
of the measurements; however, more than two measurements are required for an
unambiguous measurement quality determination. When at least three
measurements are available for comparison, it is possible to make some logical
choice of which to accept or reject, and to form a "best estimate" of the true value
of the process state.
When there are no physically redundant devices to supply redundant measurement
information, it is possible to use analytically redundant measurements. An
analytically redundant measurement can be found when there is a process model
that can be used to derive a representative value of a directly measured state from
measurements of other states. Once three or more representations of a particular
measurement are available, there are methods that may be used to discriminate
failed measurements and select the most representative "true" value of the
measurement.
Use of Reasonableness Ghecldng. The other major method of signal validation is
a more qualitative or symptomatic method based on a comparison between the
measurement value and certain reference values. These reference values are of
two types: estimates of what the measurement should be based on related
measurements, and values impossible for a properly functioning instrument to read.
If a single measurement has an unexpected value, inconsistent with related
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measurements or consistent with known failure modes of the instrument channel,
it is likely a measurement failure.
Reasonableness checking may also be performed using information concerning the
derivative of a measurement. For most measurement situations, it is possible to
estimate the maximum rate of change achievable in a valid measurement, then to
apply this estimate as a limit for the allowable rate of change of the channel. This
technique is particularly useful for measurement channels with relatively long time
constants, such as for temperature detectors in thermowells, or for measurements
of process states with long time constants. A common form of applying limits on
the derivative is to monitor two redundant measurements, immediately rejecting
one whose derivative assumes a high value.
The panel's brief review of signal validation technology in Europe indicates that
it is now routinely applied in computerized monitoring systems. It appears that
reasonableness checks and other knowledge-based techniques are used more
frequently than those based on complex analytical methods. Research into
advanced methods of signal validation continue at several locations, including GRS
in Germany (Ref. 4.6), but these advanced methods have not yet been deployed
in operating plants. GRS has found that analytical redundancy is a very effective
method for generating additional measurement information for use in signal
validation, but its deployment is inhibited by the lack of process models that can
produce the needed analytical results in real time. They are investigating
advanced computer hardware devices, such as transputers, to solve this problem.
New European Fault Detection Systems
Early Fault Detection (EFD) System (Norway--OECD Halden Reactor Project).
One of the developments in fault detection is the Early Fault Detection system
designed at Halden and implemented on the Loviisa power station (Refi 4.7). In
the design of EFD, three important principles are noted:
II
Fault detection consists of determining and assessing the significance of
the difference between the values of process measurements and reference
values for those measurements that would be considered "normal" in the
context of current process operation. It is therefore necessary to
determine the definition of "normal" continuously by the use of process
models in order that adequate sensitivity may be maintained and false
alarms may be avoided as the process load changes.
o The presence of a fault is indicated by input-output inconsistency within
a subprocess, not the absolute value of the subprocess outputs. Fault
effects propagate through a process as a result of feedback and
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feedforward paths through process structure and the action of automatic
controls. One key to localizing and assessing the magnitude of a fault is
to locate the subprocess whose output shows faulted behavior while the
input is normal.
3. Groups of related measurements, examined together, provide much better
fault detection resolution than individual measurements examined singly.
When these ideas are applied in fault detection, as they have been by Halden
researchers on their own research simulator and at the Loviisa power station, a
very effective fault detection system results. This system has been shown by
experience to be much more sensitive in fault detection than conventional alarms
or normal operator process monitoring.
Early Fault Detection (Germany--Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit). Two fault
detection systems has been developed by the German nuclear research
organization Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) for use in German nuclear
stations. The first of these systems derives its basis from disturbance analysis, and
is called the Integrated Disturbance Analyzer (Ref. 4.8). This system is designed
to notify the operator of the presence of a disturbance as indicated by deviations
in plant measurements. The system uses a functional description of the process
to develop a set of advanced graphics that are then presented to the operator to
enhance the operator's understanding of the plant status. Threats to the continued
successful performance of a critical plant function are noted; thus the operator's
ability to take timely corrective action is enhanced. This system has been
demonstrated on a portion of the Biblis nuclear station.
The second of these systems is based on determination of a number of fault
sequences through the use of simulation models (Ref. 4.9). The computer system
attempts to match observed behavior with these predetermined sequences that
represent faulted behavior. When a close enough match is found, the operator is
notified. Likely fault sequences are determined based on the experience of
operators and the opinions of expert process designers. This knowledge is then
coded into the knowledge base of the fault detection system. This form of early
fault detection has been applied at the Phillipsburg nuclear power station.
S1NDBAD (France--Centre d'Etudes Nucleaires de Cadarache). In France,
research has been performed on early fault detection, resulting in the development
of a system called SINDBAD. S1NDBAD is an early fault detection system based
on a function oriented representation of a nuclear station. The fault detection
portion of this system is mainly algorithmic, using reference models against which
the operation of the plant is compared. Investigation of knowledge based fault
detection systems is continuing using plant simulators, until the cost effectiveness
of these systems can be demonstrated.
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EXTRA (France--Electricitede France Directiones, Etudes, et Recherches). One
possible application of model based faultdetection is associated with the action
of plant logical controls. Logical controls are responsible for the automation of
power stations,and include binary devices such as switches, relays, timers, and
programmable logic devices such as overcurrent devices in circuitbreakers. The
detection of faultsin such systems can be based on modeling the logic associated
with automation of specific functions,such as the operation of the electricalpower
distributionsystem.
One such application, developed by researchers at Electricite de France (EdF),
is being applied at the Bugey nuclear power station (Ref. 4.10). This application,
called EXTRA, monitors the performance of the extensive power distribution system
in the plant, consisting of thousands of separate electrical devices. Based on
logical models of how these devices should behave when unfaulted, the system
is able to isolate and identify faulted conditions very rapidly.
One interesting aspect of the EXTRA system is that while it is a very large
rule-based reasoning system, the rules are generated automatically from structural
and functional descriptions of the components and systems of the power station.
This makes the software easier to create and maintain than for a system written
rule-by-rule using a conventional knowledge-based system development method.
Overall, the fault detection systems that the panel saw in Europe represent
significant advances over the use of traditional alarming systems in control rooms.
The use of advanced fault detection methods can lead to a significant reduction
in plant alarms, allowing stations to achieve "dark board" operating mode under
most normal conditions.
FAULT DIAGNOSIS SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Fault diagnosis consists of determining the specific type of failure or event that
has created a detected fault. It might be thought of as finding the correct
mapping from a single indication or a set of indications to the underlying change
in process, control, or measurement system parameter that has caused the failure.
The traditional purpose of fault diagnosis is to provide information that can be
useful in the formulation of mitigative strategies.
Diagnoeil vemue Symptom-Based Fault Response
There is ongoing controversy in the United States and Europe about the role of
diagnosis in fault management. Because it is common in many situations for
mitigative action to be required prior to a complete diagnosis of the nature of the
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fault, it has become necessary to develop mitigative strategies that do not depend
on diagnosis, but only on the patterns of the symptoms of abnormal process
behavior. The action of the operator or supervisory system in this case consists
of the performance of mitigative steps associated with preplanned strategies, which
are in turn based on maintenance of certain critical functions associated with
protection of the system and the environment. The idea of fault response based
on symptoms rather than identification of the specific fault event through explicit
diagnosis is the basis for much of the recent U. S. work in establishing strategies
for mitigating nuclear power station faults.
Where identification of a specific faultevent is considered to be important in the
planning and execution of mitigation, more information is provided by computer
based operator support systems for diagnosis. Diagnostic information then serves
to augment the operator's knowledge in formulating and executing mitigation.
Where fault response is based primarily on symptoms, not much support may be
provided by the computer for the diagnosis step in fault management. In either
case, the operator may be provided with a considerable amount of information
concerning the severity of the faulted condition, by indication of the amount of
deviation of the plant from normal or the closeness of approach of the critical
process states to some limiting condition. The need for diagnosis may be delayed
by mitigative strategies based mainly on response to symptoms, but the information
provided by diagnosis is of critical importance in ensuring the longer term safety
of a faulted plant, and therefore cannot be entirely neglected.
In those countries where diagnostic information is considered to be of immediate
value to the operator in the planning and execution of fault mitigative strategies,
the panel found several organizations that have developed computerized data
analysis systems designed to provide diagnostic information. The approach is to
use knowledge based systems as a tool for developing diagnostic support systems
for the operator.
Use of Knowledge Based Systems in Fault Diagnosis
System knowledge for diagnostic applications may take three forms: structural,
behavioral, and functional. These forms have important implications in the
development of the knowledge base and the knowledge representation
methodology chosen by the diagnostic system developers.
Structural knowledge consists of the physical relationships among the parts of a
process, commonly called connectivity, and the manner in which individual system
parts are constructed. Knowledge of the structure is important because of the
locality property of system faults -- faults affect those parts of the system closest
to the fault first. In order to include structural knowledge in the knowledge base,
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the diagnostic system must model connectivity among process components and
systems.
Behavioral or causal knowledge represents knowledge of how the parts of a
system influence each other through connectivity paths. Such knowledge may be
described, for example, as a set of differential or difference equations. Through
the use of such equations, it is possible to trace a change in a system state to
changes in related system states or parameters that represent the possible causes
of the change under consideration. The causal relationships are particularly useful
in isolating the root cause of an observed system change; in tracing the lowest
level system change that produces multiple or sequential manifestations of system
failure; and in ensuring that indicated system changes are actual system changes
and not instrumentation failures.
Functional knowledge is related to the idea of design intentionality. It is
developed from the consideration of why each part of the system was placed
there by the designer. Such functional relationships may be necessary for fault
diagnosis because certain system failures are caused by deviation from the
intention of the designer, rather than a specific component malfunction.
The application of knowledge-based systems to system fault diagnosis of typical
nuclear station systems has some unique problems:
The information upon which the knowledge-based system acts is not a
static database, but is being continuously updated. This is because the
situation for which reasoning is occurring is itself dynamic.
All of the needed information must be gathered from system
instrumentation; there can be no direct inquiry of the operator during a
dynamic situation.
Reasoning must proceed in the absence of needed information from
unavailable or obviously faulted measurements.
Results must be produced in a timely fashion, that is, soon enough so that
an operator taking action on the basis of the results of the diagnostic
system can have a significant mitigating effect and minimize economic and
safety consequences.
Thus the European systems that successfully address these problems represent
very sophisticated applications of knowledge based system technology, and have
required substantial investment by the sponsoring organizations. In reviewing of
the state of the art in European knowledge based diagnostic systems, the panel
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found that deployed systems with the most experience behind them are mainly
symptom based reasoning systems, using behavioral knowledge. The main form
of knowledge representation used in these symptom based reasoning systems is
that of rules.
Examples of Symptom Based Diagnostic Reasoning Systems
DISKET (Norway--OEGD Halden Reactor Project). One successful symptom based
reasoning system, called DISKET (Nef. 4.11), was developed at Halden in
cooperation with the Japanese nuclear research organization JAERI. It is classified
as a diagnostic expert system, using a knowledge base constructed from
characteristics of system transient responses obtained from actual or simulated
system faults. The data definition portion of the knowledge base contains the
relationships between accident causes and the corresponding system response.
Rules in the knowledge base relate system measurements to other measurements
(for consistency checking); system measurements to accident hypotheses (for
diagnosis); and accident hypotheses to each other. That portion of the system
containing rules to relate system measurements to accident hypotheses uses
certainty factors in evaluating the likelihood of a particular conclusion. Certainty
factors are considered necessary due to the possibility of missing or incomplete
data, as from a failed system measurement.
In addition to the normal findings of spatial pattern of events--all conditions
satisfied or a portion of conditions satisfied--DISKET contains a temporal reasoning
component. This temporal reasoning looks for patterns of the type A AFTER B
AFTER C. It increases the power of the diagnosis by recognizing that system
response to faults has both spatial and temporal components.
Another interesting feature of DISKET is the use of a hierarchical structure for
hypotheses. This use of a hierarchy of accident hypotheses enables the search
space to be reduced at an early point in the diagnosis sequence. This is done
by eliminating from consideration those hypotheses with very low certainty factors
based on a small number of system measurements.
Expert System Based Diagnosis (France--Genter d'Etudes Nucleaires de
Gadarache). In France, although fault mitigation is to rely as far as possible on
symptom-based approaches, work continues on computerized operator support
systems for fault identification and localization that incorporate knowledge based
techniques (Neff 4.12). These systems differ in how the tasks of fault diagnosis are
shared among algorithmic and logical reasoning. In the SINDBAD system
discussed previously, logical reasoning is limited to the processing of high level
information produced by function oriented diagnostic modules. By applying logical
reasoning at this point, rather than to the measurement data stream directly, the
size of the knowledge base is limited to a few hundred rules.
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EDES (Soviet Union--All Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant
Operatior_). Another major symptom based diagnostic system, called EDES, was
developed at the All Union Research Institute of Nuclear Power Plant Operations
(VNIIAES) in the Soviet Union (Ref. 4.13). This system represents the behavior of
the process using a set of qualitative semantics. Experts have identified a series
of likely fault scenarios and a description of the symptoms of these scenarios
using the qualitative descriptive language. Using fuzzy pattern matching
techniques, EDES is able to identify and classify faults on the basis of plant
measurement information. This system is now deployed in Soviet power stations.
Use of Model Based Intelligent Systems in Fault Diagnosis
An alternative approach to rule based reasoning in fault diagnosis is the use of
some form of model based reasoning. The panel found that some successful
research has been done in the use of models that integrate structural, behavioral,
and functional knowledge, reasoning from physical principles rather than patterns
of observations. It is reasonable to conclude that these first principles reasoning
systems, because of the greater depth of knowledge contained in them, will
ultimately result in the most successful applications. The paradigm of model
based reasoning is represented in Figure 4.1, where a model of the process is
used as a source of knowledge from which to reason about the observations that
are provided by measurement information. Knowledge bases that consist of
models can minimize the effort required for knowledge base construction, provide
portability from one plant to another and one process to another, permit modularity
techniques that minimize the process knowledge required to construct the initial
knowledge base, and offer better opportunities for verification and validation.
Diagnostic algorithms that analyze models rather than rules can be made more
efficient, particularly with respect to the handling of dynamic data, a problem
commonly referred to in the artificial intelligence field as truth maintenance.
All models are abstractions adopted as tools for studying the world without the
complication of perceived irrelevant complexity; however, abstraction introduces
error as a consequence of generalization and simplification. The challenge in
producing useful models is to apply abstraction judiciously, to account for the
limitations in applicability and fidelity, and to recognize unreasonable or
nonphysical results when they occur. Models must also be useful in the sense
that results are produced that convey sufficient information in a timely manner, so
that decision making is improved. These goals certainly apply to models used to
represent knowledge of systems and processes for purposes of fault diagnosis.
With increases in computer hardware capability, it might logically be concluded
that our striving should be for more and more precise computer representations
of physical systems. However, the panel found no examples where the use of a
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quantitative model as a predictor of faulted process behavior was used to assist
the operator in diagnosis. It appears that quantitative predictions of faulted
behavior, when developed from complex dynamic models, may not be useful in
assisting humans in assessing system performance. Though the reasons for this
may be associated more with presentation and interpretation, humans appear to
be overwhelmed by data from quantitative models in the same manner that they
may be overwhelmed by data from instruments in faulted situations. Yet, within
certain limits, human beings understand and can reason about the behavior of
physical processes without requiring detailed numerical analysis. This skill is
known to play a major role in disturbance analysis and fault diagnosis by process
operators.
Although the mechanisms of human reasoning about physical processes are
complex and not well understood, cause-and-effect is clearly a basic mechanism
of human reasoning about system behavior. Therefore, systems that reason from
effects to causes, using a knowledge base containing principles of process
causality as embodied in qualitative models of processes, may be a viable
approach for model-based reasoning. The panel found that such systems are
beginning to be developed. Two systems in particular were noted in our review
as being in the forefront of development of these more sophisticated knowledge
based diagnostic systems.
DAIG (Czechoslovalda--Nuclear Research Institute at Rez). In Czechoslovakia,
work has begun on a model based diagnostic system called DIAG. The basis of
this system is the influence diagram, a form of causal knowledge representation
previously applied in econometrics and biology. In developing an influence
diagram, the analyst attempts to derive behavior from observations of the system
response to interesting situations, from whatever scientific knowledge is available
concerning the operation of the system, and from knowledge of the system
structure, so that causal relationships among the various process measurements
and likely process failures may be represented economically.
ALLIANCE (France--Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique). In France, the panel
found that CEA, Cadarache, is working on a new diagnostic system called
ALLIANCE. This system uses qualitative modeling to represent the structure and
behavior of the process. The use of diagnostic models is augmented by more
traditional expert system techniques to represent empirical or compiled process
behavior. It is expected that this approach will provide an improvement in
robustness over previous efforts that were based solely on rule-based expert
systems.
Techniques for model based reasoning have also been researched by the German
research organization Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) resulting in
diagnostic systems installed in the Biblis, Gundremmingen, and Phillipsburg
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stations (Re£ 4.14). The main emphasis in this research work is the integration of
symbolic and numerical reasoning through the development of appropriate
dynamic knowledge structures.
FAULT EVALUATION AND FORMULATION OF MITIGATIVE STRATEGIES
The function of evaluation is to assess the nature and severity of the fault in order
to formulate an appropriate corrective action. The trend worldwide in fault
evaluation and the formulation of mitigative strategies has been largely to
mechanize the operator response. An extensive amount of work has been done
to develop a series of emergency response procedures that are explicit and
complete enough to ensure proper operator response in all situations. In
organizations that permit the operator to take an active role in the evaluation of
faulted conditions, all the operator has to do is to get into the right procedure.
In turn, it has become a goal of the computerized fault detection and diagnosis
systems to assist specifically in this job of ensuring that the correct procedure is
selected.
Reducing the role of the operator in fault evaluation to that of selecting the correct
procedure to follow presents a number of developmental difficulties. The use of
a preprogrammed set of emergency responses relies heavily on the ability of
procedure designers to predict abnormal system behavior accurately and
completely. The required knowledge of faulted process behavior must be
developed by simulating system response to a large number of likely failures, then
representing that abnormal behavior in an appropriate data structure against which
a comparison may be made. This data structure, which is taught to the operator
as a simple mapping exercise, relies on observation of a relatively small number
of plant measurements. There are several difficulties inherent in this method that
tend to lead some organizations to seek alternative approaches.
There is no way to anticipate every failure that may occur in a process.
Of necessity, therefore, the amount of knowledge that can be assembled
concerning the external indication of system failure is limited. Each effort
of this nature is station-specific and must be repeated in its entirety for a
second station.
It is difficult to predict accurately the course of system response in a
quantitative manner because of the limitations of typical nuclear system
models. It was found in the early work on nuclear station alarm trees that
alarms are rarely received in a predictable and repeatable order for a
given fault, and that small parametric changes in the initial conditions of
a fault can produce large changes in the faulted system behavior.
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A procedure-based strategy could be rendered ineffective if there were
multiple faults, unless each possible combination of multiple faults was
simulated and analyzed, or if there was unanticipated operator intervention
with the operation of a process system assumed to be responding
automatically.
Systems to Assist the Operator in Fault Assessment
In light of these difficulties with a preprogrammed fault response strategy, several
European organizations have investigated the implications of providing the operator
with additional information beyond predetermined emergency procedures to assist
in fault assessment and mitigative strategy formulation.
EFD (Norway--OECD Ha]den Reactor Project). The first major aspect of fault
evaluation is that of estimation of fault size or severity. The researchers at
Halden have augmented the Early Fault Detection system described earlier to
provide a predictive model capable of estimating the magnitude of a fault--for
example, the size of a leak (Ref. 4.15). From this information, the operator is able
to formulate an appropriate mitigative strategy that does not overreact to the fault.
This feature does not add to the overhead of EFD, as the predictive model runs
only after EFD has detected a fault.
The second major aspect of mitigation is the actual formulation of mitigative
actions, a planning process. The panel found two examples of systems that are
designed to assist the operator in this planning function.
AGACIA (France--Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique and Electricite de France).
In France at CEA, Cadarache, and EdF, Lyon, a system called ACACIA has been
developed to assist in formulating fault mitigative strategies (Ref. 5.16). The
central pan of this system is a knowledge base containing symptom based rules
for fault mitigation. Implementation of this knowledge base makes use of
distributed artificial intelligence techniques based on the blackboard architecture.
Although such a system could be applied on-line for operator assistance, for which
research continues, the application of ACACIA is currently for procedure design
and verification.
ADVISE (Czechoslovalda--Nuclear Research Institute at Rez). At the Nuclear
Research Institute, Rez, Czechoslovakia, a program called ADVISE is being
developed to assist operators in much the same way as ACACIA. This system
also provides an assessment of the severity of a fault. By monitoring the status of
critical safety functions, ADVISE is able to present the operator with a range of
options for mitigation.
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FAULT MITIC_TION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
The panel found in its review that two major approaches to the fault mitigation
problem are being used in Europe. These include symptom-based response, as
now commonly used in the United States, and event-based response, which
requires some type of event recognition system in order to direct the automatic
control system or the operators to the proper procedure.
Symptom-Bued Fault Mitigative Systems
Symptom-based response has the advantage that the decision-making role of the
operator consists mainly of rule-based reasoning thereby reducing the operator's
cognitive load. The operator is required to follow a prescribed set of procedures
when a certain pattern of faulted process behavior is observed. Symptom-based
fault response is therefore effective only when the complete range of possible
faulted behaviors has been discerned explicitly, a costly and difficult to verify task.
The nuclear industry worldwide has invested great effort in providing for the
quality of symptom-based procedures when it is decided that they will be used.
Once an organization has adopted symptom-based procedures, it is possible to
augment the traditional paper procedures involved in the task of fault mitigation
by the use of computerized aids to operators performing these procedures. The
panel observed several of these systems.
Gomputerized Emergency Procedures (France--Electricite de France). The
approach to mitigation at EdF is that it is the responsibility of the operator to
perform a specific set of actions in response to a fault. In order to support the
operator in the performance of these mitigative actions, the new control room
proposed for the next generation of French nuclear stations contains a
computerized operating procedure manager. The purpose of this system is to
guide the operator through a set of emergency procedures whose steps have
been predetermined and validated.
At the Bugey training simulator where the prototype for this new control room is
located, the panel saw a demonstration of this system. The operating procedure
is presented to the operator as a sequence of logical boxes representing decision
points and pathways, which reflect the progression through the logic of the
procedure. Within each decision block, the operator is provided with information
concerning the nature of the decision required and the source of the measurement
information needed in order to make that decision. The operator's decisions are
verified by the process computer, where possible, and if an incorrect path is
chosen, it is so indicated by a contrasting pathway color.
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GOPMA (Norway--OECD Ha]den Research Project). A computerized operating
procedure support system has also been developed at Halden (Ref. 4.17). This
system, called COPIVL_ contains software development tools that simplify the
conversion of procedures into structured software programs, and a logical
reasoning system that supports the operator in performing procedural steps. A
very effectivegraphical user interfacesupplements the procedural knowledge in
the system.
Event-Based Fault Mitigative Support Systems
The second widespread methodology for fault mitigation is an event-based
strategy. The operator or the computer chooses a specific event based on the
observed process response, then proceeds to take mitigative action on the basis
of that selected event. Typical events include specific equipment casualties (e.g.,
loss of a reactor coolant pump); traditional nuclear station emergency conditions
(e.g., a loss of coolant accident); or external events originating at the plant
process boundaries (e.g., disconnection from the electrical grid). These events
must be recognized by diverse means in order to provide robustness in their
recognition.
Limitations System (Germany--Siemens). Typical of an event-based system for
response to process faults is the Limitations System used in German nuclear
stations designed by Siemens. The Limitations Systems as a portion of the plant
control strategy is discussed more fully in Chapter 5; however, from the standpoint
of being an automatic fault mitigation system, it is worth mentioning as being
typical of the approach that concludes that fault mitigation is too critical to be left
mainly to actions of human operators. When a fault occurs in a plant with the
Limitations System, the analog electronics are designed to map the occurrence of
certain symptoms of faulted behavior to a specific fault event and then to initiate
a set of automatic control actions that are taken in order to minimize the effect of
the fault on the plant and to avoid a reactor trip. The principles upon which this
system operates would most likely be realized in digital hardware and an
algorithmic programming language should it be implemented in the United States.
Evidence shows that this approach is remarkably successful, not only in trip
avoidance, but also in reducing the cognitive load on operators during faulted
conditions. The Limitations System acts in concert with PRISCA, the knowledge
based display system present in the control room, to provide the operator with
the ability to track performance of the automatic controls as the fault is mitigated,
by noting the status of critical parameters. PRISCA thus performs the functions of
a Safety Parameter Display system as currently mandated for U. S. plants, but is
more completely integrated with the plant control systems.
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FAULT MITIGATION SU_r'ESS ASSURANCE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Once the mitigative strategy has been formulated and execution has begun, it is
necessary to track the performance of the process to ensure that mitigation is
effective. This may be done by well designed graphical presentation systems,
such as PRISCA mentioned above, or by knowledge based systems that provide
additional cognitive support for the operator in ensuring that the recovery is
proceeding in the expected manner. The panel observed several examples of
such systems.
AGAGIA (France--GEA) and ADVISE (Czechoslovatda--IVuclear Research Institute
at Rez). The systems mentioned previously under fault evaluation, ACACIA and
ADVISE, provide a framework for success assurance by providing an effective
interface to the operator of the critical parameters that are indicative of the
process returning to a safe condition. In this sense, these systems function like
an augmented Safety Parameter Display System; that is, the display functions are
combined with intelligence, so that the displayed information is prioritized
SAS II (]Vorway--OEGD Halden Reactor Project). Another system that should be
mentioned in the area of mitigation assurance is a system for post trip plant
analysis developed at Halden, called SAS II. In the time immediately after a
reactor trip, the operator is faced with ensuring that the plant is rendered into a
safe state and that the trip itself was sufficient to mitigate the fault that caused it.
SAS II is based on the use of critical safety functions and success paths, both of
which are post trip analysis techniques developed in the United States. The
researchers at Halden have placed within a very attractive graphical user interface,
using analysis tools based on expert systems for assessing whether the plant
critical safety function objectives are being met in the post trip period, and
whether safety systems are functioning in accordance with their specifications.
The system also embodies knowledge contained in emergency operating
procedures that the operator is directed to follow in the post trip period.
INTEGRATION OF FAULT MANAGEMENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS
The panel saw in Europe two instances of research systems attempting to provide
an integrated framework for a series of fault management support systems. An
integrated framework is an important advance because work on computerized
operator support systems for the various tasks of fault management has not
generally been closely coordinated. This has led to the development of a series
of unintegrated fault management tools that need to be put into a cooperative
framework in order to interact most effectively with the operator.
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ISAGS (Norway--OECD HMden Reactor Project). The ISACS system (Ref. 4.18)
being developed at Halden provides a graphical user interface and high level
manager for the Halden-developed suite of computerized operator support systems
previously discussed. The purposes of this integration are to provide a single
access point for plant information to enter the fault management system and to
provide for the cooperation of the various tools in assisting the operator. For
example, when the alarm system HALO detects a fault, control is handed to the
diagnostic system DISKET. If it is necessary that the operator then follow a
procedure, that procedure is loaded into COPMA and presented to the operator
for execution. This integrated framework is implemented within an expert system
shell called G2, a powerful environment for the development of tools to monitor
and manage process operation.
GRADIENT (Germany--ABB and ESPRIT). The GRADIENT project that is being
sponsored by ESPRIT consists of an integrated framework for a set of expert
systems under development at the ABB Heidelberg Research Center. Using Jens
Rasmussen's model of human interaction (Ref. 4.16), GRADIENT establishes a
communications framework for a set of expert system "specialists" that have
various responsibilities in reasoning about the condition of the plant processes and
directing the operator's attention to relevant information. This system has been
applied mainly to fossil station applications, but the technology is relevant to
nuclear power, particularly the methodology for establishing effective
communication among a set of cooperating expert systems.
There is a trend for more widespread research into the integration of fault
management tools to create a comprehensive framework for operator support. For
example, a description of an integrated framework for fault management has been
described recently by researchers at GRS (Ref. 4.19).
OTHER DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS
This chapter has been concerned with process fault management systems. The
panel also observed many implementations of machinery condition monitoring and
diagnostic systems in Europe. These systems monitor such parameters as rotating
machinery vibration and temperature, noise signatures present on the signals from
the ex-core neutron flux detectors, acoustic emissions from high pressure piping,
loose part signatures within system pressure boundaries, and various electrical
parameters. Most of the systems that the panel saw are commercially available
products in Europe, and are similar to systems available in the United States. The
conclusion of the panel with respect to such systems is that advanced condition
monitoring equipment is integrated with plant operation better in Europe than in
the United States, and the Europeans appear to have had more success in
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identifying and avoiding significant mechanical and electrical failures through the
use of condition monitoring.
SUMMAI_
The panel's major conclusions concerning computerized operator support systems
in European nuclear stations may be summarized as follows:
II Operator confidence is increased when the computer acts as a partner in
ensuring the safe operation of the plant. Even in cases where a substantial
amount of the actual mitigative actions have been given over to the actions
of automatic controls, operators can use knowledge based cognitive aids
effectively to track the actions of the system in protecting itself. Knowledge
of the progress of fault mitigation actions either gives the operator assurance
that previous actions are adequate or points up the need for additional
intervention.
1 Knowledge based systems are finding wide application in the area of process
fault management. The robustness that knowledge based systems bring
guarantees a higher level of success for a given investment in fault
management system development.
o A significantly greater effort is being expended in Europe than in the United
States to develop and deploy advanced fault management systems. This is
due in part to the more rapid computerization of European nuclear plants.
It is also due to the much closer relationship between the European nuclear
operating organizations and the organizations that are developing fault
management support systems.
. Much of the technology that the United States needs to support the actions of
operators in faulted situations is available to us in the form of software
systems already in advanced stages of development in Europe. Through
cooperative agreements already in place, U. S. systems engineers can get
access to most of the technology needed to implement these systems in U.S.
nuclear stations. By making effective use of this existing technology,
organizations such as the Electric Power Research Institute and the Institute
for Nuclear Power Operation may encourage the adoption of innovative fault
management techniques by U. S. utilities without large investments in time or
R&D resources.
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CHAPTER 8
CONTROL STRA G, .SAND TECHN OUES
David D. Lanning
INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the control strategies of pressurized water reactor (PWR)
nuclear power plants. These strategies include methods for reactor control in the
normal operating ranges and methods for reactor protection if the reactor or plant
moves toward a limit of the operating range.
Review of Distributed Control of PWR Subsystems
As an introduction, it is useful to describe the PWR plant as a series of
subsystems, each with some independent controllers, and all integrated within the
total plant control. This distributed subsystem is depicted in Figure 5.1. It consists
of the elements and controllers listed in Table 5.1.
The subsystem controllers of Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 can be considered as a
distributed control system, and all PWR plants have these same genera/features.
There are, however, significant differences in the strategies for combining and
operating these features and for imposing limitations on the plant operation if the
system approaches the operating bounds. The PWR plant's system controllers in
the past have been analog systems. Recently in some plants, digital
microprocessors are being used to replace the analog systems.
This chapter describes first a typical control strategy, then a number of control
strategies differences, and finally the progression toward advanced, digital, and
more automated control features in France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and
Czechoslovakia.
76 Control Strategies and Techniques
E
t_
O_t._
to
J
\
8
E_
8 _
)_
O
)_ 8.
__1/,_i._ ,----_ _)_---_._
_° _8
0
,II
,.-i
David D. Lanning 77
Table 5.1
Subayaterns and Controllers of PWR Nuclear Power Plants
Subsystem
Reactor Core
Pressurizer
Steam Generator
Primary Pumps
Turbine Generator
.Controller
Reactor power and thermal feedback reactivity effects
are controlled by using neutron absorbing rods that can
be moved into or out of the core. (Soluble boron, in the
form of diluted boric acid, is also used for slower reactor
control.)
Pressure of the reactor coolant is controlled by
adjustment in the pressurizer using spray or heater
systems to lower or raise the pressure. Water level in
the pressurizer is controlled by the letdown or makeup
system changes to the primary system.
Pressure on the secondary side of the steam generator
is controlled by the turbine throttle and bypass valves,
which regulate the steam from the steam generator. Water
level on the secondary side is controlled by adjusting the
feedwater flow rate to make up and match the steam
removal rate. Feedwater comes from the condenser and
passes through feedwater heaters, all of which have
separate water level controllers.
Primary coolant flow is normally constant for PWR
operation; pump operation is controlled at a steady state.
Electrical power output is a user-demand quantity. The
turbine generator is operated at a constant shaft speed
of rotation. A set of turbine and generator controllers
adjust the electric output, cool the generator, protect
against turbine overspeed, and adjust the turbine throttle
valve to provide the first stage turbine pressure for a
steady power operation at the desired electric load.
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CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR PWR POWER
A _ Control Strs_gy
The distributed control subsystems presented in Figure 5.1 are typically connected
as shown in Figure 5.2. The controllers shown on Figure 5.2 are described in the
following paragraphs.
The pressurizer has two controllers, one for pressure and one for level. Inputs
to these controllers are only from the pressurizer subsystem pressure and level
readings; hence, the system integration is by the effects of the system response
(no anticipatory control information). The output controls the appropriate system
valves.
The steam generator level control has an input from the steam generator level
and also from the steam generator steam flow rate and from the feedwater flow
rate. If there is a mismatch in steam flow or feedwater flow, the controller can
anticipate a level change and thus enhance the controller response. The output
is a control of the feedwater flow control valve with a possible related effect on
the pump speed control.
The reactor power level and power distribution controller have inputs from the
neutron detectors around the core (ex-core), and in some designs, from detectors
in the core. Also, there are input signals from the temperature of the primary
coolant. Within the controller, part of the control integration includes a planned
(i.e., demanded) temperature for the given power demand. In essence, there is
some feedforward control calling for a reactor power increase when the working
power level is increased. The output of the reactor power controller is the signal
to the mechanisms that make the adjustments of control rod positions or the
adjustments of the boron concentration (BRS on Fig. 5.2).
The steam flow to the turbine is controlled by adjusting the turbine inlet throttle
valves and the turbine bypass valves. This controller receives input from the
turbine first-stage pressure and the power demand. Again, the integrated control
includes an established steam pressure and consequently a given steam flow and
temperature for a given power demand. There are other controllers on the turbine
generator system to provide a constant speed for the turbine shaft, the required
cooling for the generator, and protection from overspeed and excessive vibration.
The user can demand a certain electric power production, and there are two
additional control choices that a system designer considers for a given power
demand: the primary coolant average temperature, and the secondary system
steam generator pressure. These two choices are diagrammed in Figure 5.3.
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Primary Coolant Average Tomperature C_0nsidm'aflons
Changing the temperature of the reactor core causes a change in the neutron
chain reaction balance. This is called a reactivity effect, and normally the PWR
systems operate in a boron concentration range such that the temperature
feedback, i.e., temperature coefficient of reactivity, is negative. That is, decreasing
the temperature increases the reactivity, and the power rises until the average core
temperature is raised or the control mechanisms are adjusted. Since increasing
the steam flow to increase the turbine power takes energy from the steam
generator, the first system response is to decrease the primary temperature; this
in turn increases the reactivity. Thus, there is an inherent tendency to cause the
reactor to follow the turbine demand.
Other reactivity effects (e.g., Xenon absorption, Doppler feedback, and system
response time) require adjustments in the control mechanisms to maintain the
desired power. However, if the control strategy is to keep a constant average
primary system temperature, the control of the reactor power is simplified and
changes in the reactor coolant volume are minimized, thus reducing demands on
other controllers such as the pressurizer and makeup system.
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 5.3, holding the reactor average
temperature constant means that the pressure on the steam side of the steam
generator (hence, secondary temperature, since the steam generator is at saturated
conditions) must vary with power, being highest at lower power in order to attain
the heat transfer from the primary system to the secondary system.
Secondary System Steam Generator Pressure Considerations
In general, the system designer does not want to design the secondary and
balance-of-plant systems for the very high pressures that would be required at
low power if the average primary temperature is held constant. This would mean
that the system was overdesigned, since the system operates primarily in the
higher power range. Hence, another control strategy is to keep the steam
generator pressure constant at all power levels. This means the primary coolant
average temperature must be increased whenever power is increased. As stated
previously, this makes the reactor system control more complex and requires a
larger range of preplanned control mechanism adjustments.
Comparison of Control Strategies
In the plants the panel reviewed, variations in the control strategies are largely tied
to the degree of load following capability included in the plant operation. For
plants with no or very slow load changing, the strategy is to hold the steam
generator pressure nearly constant and program the primary system temperatures
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nearly linearly, increasing the average temperature of the primary coolant with
increased power demand. For plants designed to allow more load following, the
strategy is to hold primary coolant temperatures nearly constant in the upper
power range over which the load following will occur, and to hold the steam
pressure constant if operation is taken to the lower power levels. This latter
control strategy (depicted in Fig. 5.3) allows the plant to move through significant
load changes in a rather short time without making large changes in the reactor
control system. It therefore simplifies the assurance that power distributions within
the core always stay within thermal limits.
Comparison of Operating Lira/rations and Salty Systems
It is important to protect the reactor in the event that system conditions approach
the thermal limits (e.g., power too high, flow or pressure too low, or temperatures
too high). The panel's review of control systems included discussion of the
limitation and safety system strategies. Some interesting variations are briefly
described below and summarized in Figure 5.4.
The French PWR safety systems are very similar to the U.S. systems. In these
plants, the operating range is allowed to move closer to the trip condition. Alarms
and information alert the operator if the trip limit is being approached; if a trip
occurs, the control rods are inserted to shut the reactor down. A closer check on
the approach to thermal limits can be made by using the digital system computing
capability. Both the United States and France have developed such systems: in
the United States, an example is Combustion Engineering's Core Protection
Calculator (CPC) discussed further in Chapter 8; in France, the microprocessor
safety system SPIN is used. The French experience base in the technology is
much larger than that of the United States, as the SPIN system is being used in
23 plants.
In the German Konvoi PWR plants, the limitations system is a unique, automatic
control arrangement. If the reactor state enters the limitation region, several types
of control action may be initiated to move the reactor state back into the
acceptable operating regime. (A further discussion of this limitation system is
given in a later section of this chapter.) If the reactor state continues to move
away from the operating regime, then a runback will be initiated, and if this is not
sufficient, then a trip inserts all control rods to shut the reactor down. Almost
always, the early action of the limitation system prevents the system from ever
reaching the trip conditions.
The Soviet safety system for the VVER-type PWR plants is designed to give the
largest existing margin between action limits and the true level of safety concern.
As the system enters these action-limited regions (e.g., if the power rises too high),
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the system first starts a power runback by inserting control rods to reduce the
power. If the power rises higher, rods are inserted at a greater rate. Finally, if
the power continues to rise, the trip point is reached that drops all rods into the
reactor to shut the reactor down. From the panel's discussions (Ref. 5.1), it
appears that the trip point in Soviet plants is set at a more conservative thermal
condition point than in other countries. Thus, although the technology of the
control and safety system seems to be of the older analog type, the strategy for
limitation and protection seems very robust and conservative.
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY &SSESSMENT OF CONTROL STRATEGIF..S
Control Strategies in French PWRs
Modes of control. Because the French generate 70 percent of their electricity in
nuclear power plants, they need to be able to load follow with some nuclear
plants (other countries normally base-load all of their nuclear plants). Originally
the French nuclear plant control systems were based on the same designs as
those used by Westinghouse in its PWR plants.
The Westinghouse control system the French call Control Mode A. By making
certain evolutionary improvements, they have evolved a Control Mode G and
recently a combined Control Mode X. These three control modes are listed in
Table 5.2 (Refs. 5.2, 5.3). The Control Mode A involves use of standard full-length
control rods with some boration concentration changes to avoid axial power
peaking limits. The reactor temperature is programmed for a given power
demand. This system is too slow for satisfactory load following.
For a safe, faster response, the French improved the axial ex-core monitoring
system, going to six monitors. They improved control rod position indicators and
developed special "gray" rods (reduced efficiency rods) that could be moved
without causing large changes in power distribution. This control mode has been
used successfully for load following more than 2500 times over the past few years
(Ref. 5.4).
The new control mode, Mode X, was developed for use on N4 plants. It has
been tested on present plants. This mode provides simultaneously closed loop
control for both reactor coolant temperature (as in mode A) and axial offset by
making use of "black" as well as "gra¢' rods. Temperature is controlled by moving
rods which are inserted at a mid-core position and exhibit a high effect on the
temperature and a low one on the axial offset. Axial offset is controlled by moving
rods which are almost completely inserted or withdrawn, and therefore exhibit a
low effect on the temperature and a high one on the axial offset. The Mode X
Control has been developed for both load following and frequency control.
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Experience with the frequency control has shown that PWR plants can hold to a
7 MWe band within the allowed 100 MWe control band (Re£ 5.4).
Table 8.2
France's Three Control Modes
Control strategies are based on the same principles used by Westinghouse in
U.S. PWR systems.
Control modes have been extended to allow load following.
MODE A The Westinghouse original mode is difficult to use for load
following; rate of power change is too slow, involving changes
in coolant boration.
MODE G Control design includes "black" rods for closed loop temperature
control as well as "gray" rods for open loop power control
allowing load-follow and frequency control.
MODE X Mode X can be used for load following and for frequency
control (using mid-plane control for high reactivity effect with
low axial effect). In this mode, both temperature and axial offset
are closed loop with a combined use of "black" and "gray" rods.
Digital Microprocessor Reactor Protection Systems. French experience in the use
of digital microprocessors for control and protection is the largest in the world.
The heart of their digital protection system is called the SPIN system.
SPIN takes signals from process instrumentation (temperature and pressure),
nuclear instrumentation, and the control rod positions; this information is analyzed
by the digital microprocessors. Global conditions such as pressures, temperatures,
and power level, plus local core conditions such as linear heat generation rate and
approach to departure from nucleate boiling (DNBR), are checked against
predetermined limits. If any limits are approached, the operators are alerted. If
limits are exceeded, then the SPIN output signals are sent to the controller of the
appropriate protection and safeguards function, such as reactor trip (e.g., control
rod drop) systems, safety injection systems, and emergency feedwater system.
This SPIN system has been operating successfully in 20 of the French PWR units,
of the 1300 MWe type. The operating experience amounts to 60 reactor-years.
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In addition to the digital protection system, the recent French integrated control
system utilizes digital processing in its automatic control system (Refs. 5.5, 5.6).
N4 PWR Plant and Advanced Control. France's large experience base in the use
of digital systems is now being used for the advanced system being developed for
the next generation of French PWR plants, the N4 plants. (The first N4 plant,
Chooz B1, is designed for 1,475 MWe.) Some of the panel members visited the
$3C simulator for the N4 plant control room and control system. The simulator
is located at the Training Center on the Bugey Nuclear Plant site, where panel
members were also shown the simulation and actual control rooms of present
operating plants.
The control system simulated by the $3C/N4 is a "Computerized Control Room"
with three workstations, each consisting of three video (CRT) color graphic display
units with three touch panels, a tracker ball, and a function keyboard. The
operator can choose a new display from a menu (and touch panel), or from
tracker ball designation, or from a screen being displayed. Panelists were told
that there are available 17000 displays, roughly 10000 technical screens, 3300 alarm
sheets, and 3000 procedure sheets with flow charts and 700 operation displays
(circuits). The large selection of displays allows specific displays to support each
individual operator task with this CRT-based control system. The plant control
operation can be performed from this console by pointing to the object on the
screen (using the tracker ball) or by entering the label on the keyboard and then
selecting the control on a control menu. Finally, the action is initiated by
validation with a function key. Computerized procedures guide the operator
through the proper sequential steps of any control action, and the operation
enables the procedural step through the touch screen. It takes 1.5 seconds to go
from screen to screen; for screens with realtime data (temperature pressures and
flow rates), the screen can be updated in 50 msec, and the data collection time
may be about 300 msec. The level of automation for the N4 plants will be the
same as in the preceding systems (Ref. 5.6).
The implementation of the advanced digital control system has proven to be more
challenging than originally expected. Recent developments indicate that the
"Controbloc P20" (Ref. 5.7) has not been approved for operation in Chooz B and
may cause a delay in the program (Ref. 5.8). In part, this problem seems to be
due to the added complexity that can easily crop up when designers try to take
full advantage of programmable systems. These problems occur in standardization
as well as verification and validation of the software in order to obtain approvals.
However, our host from France (Ref. 5.4) did point out that the CO3 (core
instrumentation and control) section of the system has been qualified. The CO3
section involves reactor protection, nuclear instrumentation and control, and
incorporates the SPIN system. Work is in progress relative to the qualification or
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design modification and qualification of the remaining P20 system. (More
information on this subject is given in Chapter 6.)
Control Stretches in German PWRs
In the area of control strategies and techniques, the panel's visit to Germany was
focused on the Konvoi-type PWR, a Siemens-KWU 1300 MWe nuclear power plant.
This review also included a visit to the Isar-2 plant near Munich.
Global control. The control strategy in Germany incorporates a high level of
automation (Refs. 5.9, 5.10)) for both the operating range and the marginal region
called the limitation region. The strategy for global control over the power range
from about 40% to 100% is to hold the average primary coolant temperature
constant. That is, the reactor nearly inherently follows the turbine demand, and
control is such that the average primary coolant temperature is constant, and the
secondary system is designed to operate at higher pressures during part-load
conditions (see section above on operating limitations). Below 40% power, the
control strategy changes to a programmed primary coolant temperature such that
the pressure from the steam generator is held constant. The global control
includes ex-core neutron detectors for neutronic power information.
Local control. To assure that local conditions within the reactor core do not
exceed thermal limits (i.e., linear heat rate), DNB, or PCI (pellet-clad interactions),
there is also a local power control. Local power information is monitored by use
of an in-core realtime monitoring system consisting of cobalt prompt-responding,
self-powered detectors. Periodic calibration of the in-core detector system is
provided by a sophisticated "aerobalr' activation measuring system. The aeroball
system pneumatically inserts vertical columns of small metal balls into tubes in the
core. These balls are irradiated for three minutes and then pneumatically removed
to an automatic counting array. A core power distribution map is generated in
about ten minutes.
The combination of global and local core monitoring allows the control strategy
to include "full load-follow" capability; that is, it allows for fully automated load
changes and operation in the power range from 25% to 100% of full load (Refs. 5.9,
5.10). Information on this controller indicates that frequency control has also been
demonstrated, that is, the plant was allowed to automatically respond to frequency
changes by changing the generator output. Frequency control involves rapid
power response with limited load changes (<100 MWe) over a time frame of
minutes, whereas the load follow involves rates of change of load preset by the
operator in the range of 2% per minute to 10% per minute and a new target power
setting in the range of 25-100%, with a time frame of hours.
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Limitations system. The Konvoi type control and protection systems are much
more integrated than any other system in the United States or Europe that the
panel reviewed. An important part of the automatic operation is incorporated with
the "limitations system." This layered operation and protection strategy (shown in
Fig. 5.4) is unique in that the limitation system takes control away from the
operator or away from the normal automatic controller if any limit is being
approached. The automatic action to move the plant condition back to the
acceptable operating range is less stressful than a complete reactor trip. The
closer the plant approaches limits, the more rigorous the limitation control takes
automatic action until at the limit a reactor trip is taken. The limitation systems are
fault tolerant through multiple redundancy (four power trains). The general
strategy of this integrated control has been in operation for more than 15 years,
and successful experience has developed to the extent that load change operation
by remote control from load dispatching center (secondary control) can be
allowed for load following.
The panel was able to observe the capability of this system in a simulator
demonstration in the Siemens office at Karlstein. A series of transients were
successfully handled, including dropping full off-site load and lowering power to
house load without a plant trip.
Information displays. The operator's role in the German strategy becomes more
that of a plant manager and accident manager. The operator needs in-depth
knowledge of the plant operation and control status; therefore, information displays
are an important part of the system. Special graphics are displayed on an array
of color monitor video screens that present the status of the plant in terms of the
normal operating range and the limitation region.
An example of one of these screens is shown in Figure 5.5. This figure shows
the primary coolant pressure and temperature condition. At startup, the pressure
must be kept low when the temperature is low to avoid the brittle fracture
condition (NDT limit), but also the temperature cannot be too high at a given
pressure to avoid boiling condition or pump suction head limitations (NPSH limit).
Thus, a given normal operating band is plotted, surrounded on either side by the
limitation band. The operating status is shown with a white dot, and a historical
trend is plotted. Other pertinent information and prompts are indicated beside the
main plot.
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The present operating systems with this integrated control strategy are primarily
based on semiconductor equipment for analog (relays) and binary (on/off switch)
functions. Although the operating experience has been very successful, the four-
train design involves a very large array of racks (hundreds), each containing
multiple replaceable cards, so considerable maintenance is required. Work is now
in progress to implement these systems by using a new generation of digital
instrumentation and control systems (Ref. 5.11). The same functionality and
philosophy of fault tolerance with layered control strategies will be utilized.
Control Strategies in Soviet and Czechoslovak VVER-type PWRs
The panel divided into two groups after visiting Germany. One group went to
Moscow and talked to the Soviet experts in nuclear power plant instrumentation
and control. The other group visited Czechoslovakia, where it met with I&C
experts in Prague and visited several sites, including the Dukovany nuclear power
plant (four Soviet-designed 440 MWe VVER units of the 213 series) (Ref. 5.12).
The Czechoslovak control strategies described below are essentially Soviet
strategies, based on Soviet VVER-type PWRs and Czechoslovak for the balance
of the plant.
F-VER-440 strategies. The control strategy for VVER plants in Czechoslovakia is
primarily based on use of these nuclear plants for base load and not for load
following. This is in part due to rate-of-change limits imposed by the fuel design.
In the VVER-440 (213 Series), the control strategy is the turbine follow type, where
the reactor follows the turbine demand; however, the control is established for a
constant throttle pressure in the operating range (Refs. 5.1, 5.13). These plants
use a Soviet-designed reactor power controller called ARM, which has a variable
structure that depends on the plant status. Component control systems are of the
standard proportional-integral-derivative (PID) type. The present control system
is not a complete closed loop, and well-trained operators are required.
VVER-1000 strategies. For the 1000 MWe type VVER, the Czechoslovaks are
working on a control strategy that includes a constant average coolant temperature
from 70% to 100% of full power; below 70%, they use constant throttle pressure.
Thus, theirs is a combined strategy as described earlier. In the 1000 MWe plant,
the advanced ARM-5 controller includes local control based on distributed in-core
detectors, and automatic load following is possible.
As described previously and shown in Figure 5.4, the Soviet VVER systems are
operated with a large margin to nucleate boiling. Also, the cores operate with a
large negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, even with the maximum boric
acid control. Thus, the control and safety systems are robust with large margins
to safety limits.
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The VVER-440 safety system is a type of limitation system: Level 1 is a reactor
scram (rod drop times of 7 to 10 seconds plus I&C delay; for the 1,000 MWe the
rod drop time is 4 seconds); Level 2 is a rapid rod insertion; Level 3 is rod
insertion at normal rate ( 2 cm/s); Level 4 is a rod inhibit preventing withdrawal.
For the VVER-1000 MWe, the system is similar but consists of three levels, omitting
Level 2, the fast rod insertion. Safety and control rod systems axe completely
separate and have no need for signal isolation. The present technology for control
implementation on VVER plants is primarily analog and binary, with very little use
of digital systems.
Czechoslovak upgrade plans. As noted above, the Czechoslovak VVER plants
use Soviet technology for the reactor control and safety systems and Czechoslovak
technology for the control in the balance of the plant. Panel members were given
an excellent tour of the control room and auxiliary control areas at the Dukovany
Plant. The unit visited was in full operation. The control technology looked older
than the plant (started 1986), and the panel was told that the I&C is the weakest
(as well as the oldest) part of the system. There are high-priority plans to
upgrade the equipment. Our hosts indicated an interest in Western equipment, but
there would be difficulties with compatibility, new wiring requirements, and differing
philosophies.
Czechoslovakia recently made an agreement with Siemens-ICvVU for some
instrumentation on the Mochovice Plant (Ref. 5.14). The panel was informed that
this will be control and instrumentation of the Konvoi type, except for the safety
system. In order to retain fuel warranties, the plant will continue to use the Soviet
safety system and will use essentially the Type 213 hybrid logic rather than digital.
The turbine control system will be from Skoda in Czechoslovakia. Digital systems
axe being planned for the future (Ref. 5.1).
GENERAL ASSESSMm_T AND CONCLUSIONS
Degree of Automation
The degree of automation is higher in European PWR plants than in present U.S.
plants. This is true for both control and safety. In control, the capability to load
follow has evolved most in France and Germany. In the safety area, Europe has
added more margin; for example, there is a design rule that requires automatic
action to take care of the reactor safety for 30 minutes after a reactor trip without
operator assistance. This rule applies over the spectrum of accidents including
loss of coolant. The panel was told that this rule applies also to VVER designs.
In the United States, the time before requiring operator action is shorter, on the
order of 15 minutes.
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The panel was informed during the discussions in the European countries visited
that, in general, the trend is expected to be toward even greater automation of the
control systems. The role of the operator will become more that of a plant
manager, requiring a higher level of education and deep knowledge of the systems
through both education and simulator training.
The Arguments for More Automation
The panel heard the following arguments in Europe in favor of greater automation
in the control and safety systems of nuclear plants:
Automatic systems remember routine, detailed procedures and
sequences better and faster than human operators.
In periods of stress, operators do not have to make decisions but
can check to see if the automatic system decisions are correct.
Maintenance of the fault-tolerant automatic system can be made
during periods of less stress.
Together with these arguments for more automation, the panel also heard concern
expressed that with greater automation the operators will be less in touch with the
real condition of the plant and may not be properly prepared or attentive if an
emergency beyond the capability of the automatic system should arise. Further
study on this aspect of the man-machine interface is in progress (see Chapter 2).
Outstsnding European Control Strategy and Implementation Features
France has the most advanced use of programmable digital microprocessors in
nuclear plant control and safety systems. Its digital systems include the
implementation of step-wise operating procedures completely controlled through
the digital systems but only enabled by operator demand, with information
available through menu selection from 17000 video displays. The displays give
realtime system status information and procedures with operator prompts.
Germany's PWR control and safety system for the Siemens-KWU Konvoi series is
the most automated system of integrated control and protection function for
nuclear power plants. The combined automatic controller, limitations control, and
safety control move the operators the most toward being managers, observers, and
maintenance coordinators. This system requires deep knowledge; such information
is provided to the operators in terms of video displays of system function for
integrated realtime functional analysis.
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Soviet VVER-440 MWe (213 Series) and VVER-1000 MWe plants operate within
robust control and safety regimes with large margins to limits. Soviet research
into control theory is analytically advanced as compared to control theory studies
in other countries (e.g., Ref. 5.15).
Future Control Strategies
In all of the European countries that the panel visited, the control strategies for the
PWR plants are very similar to each other and also similar to the normal operating
control strategy that is used in the United States. The move to the use of digital,
programmable microprocessors has opened the possibility for future changes in
control strategy (Ref. 5.16). Studies and research projects related to the
development and use of accurate "realtime' simulation models are in progress in
all countries. Simulation modeling has been used for several years in the
production of full-scope training simulators. The possibility is now recognized that
use of such realtime or faster-than-realtime models can be made to give improved
control strategies that can cope with the nonlinear nature of nuclear power plant
control.
In discussions with members of the European nuclear community, panelists heard
about several research projects and plans to incorporate the results from
calculations with realt_ne models of components and of the power plant for the
following purposes:
Analytic redundancy. This method provides a comparable estimate
of a sensor signal for sensor fault detection and estimation through
consistency checks.
Fault diagnosis. The deviation from expected behavior might be
quickly identified and diagnosed by comparison of the plant response
with the accurate analytical model response.
Model-based controllers. The use of fast, accurate analytic models
to guide the control action can overcome nonlinear control problems
and can be developed in a hierarchical system to be self-protecting,
hence never approach the trip points.
Logic-based information to provide operators with suggested best
procedures for a given plant status. The computer model can be
used to generate graphic displays for deep information, and systems
might also be developed with logic to interpret the information, thus
further assisting the operators or providing very advanced control.
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Some interesting specific examples of these developments were observed in
France at the CEA-Cadarache Research Center and in Norway at the Halden
Research Center. At Cadarache, successful tests of a model-based controller
have recently been demonstrated on a simulator (Refs. 5.17, 5.18), and advanced
research is in progress on the possibility of developing emergency procedures in
realtime by using the combined computer-gathered plant status and the
symptom-based emergency operating rules (Refs. 5.19, 5.20). At Halden, the use
of model-based information is being studied with emphasis on the man-machine
interface (Ref. 5.21). In Russia and in Czechoslovakia, work is in progress on a
wide scope of realtime models with emphasis at this time on development of
accurate training simulators (Refs. 5.22 - 5.24).
In the United States, there is research in progress at national laboratories
(Ref. 5.25) and at universities (Ref. 5.26) in this area of realtime models for
advanced control. However, there is very little interest on the part of utilities in
changing the present system of control or control strategies, even though some
changes to digital systems have been made when commercial analog systems
were no longer available. If new nuclear plants are purchased in the future, more
consideration for commercial implementation of the advanced control strategies
and automation is expected to occur. Thus, at present, the U.S. utilities operate
their nuclear power plants primarily as base load plants. The United States
depends heavily on highly trained operators. France and Germany are more
advanced in the use of automation and in the development of future digital
microprocessor systems for both control and protection.
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INTRODUC_ON
The architecture of a nuclear power plant's control and instnunentation (I&C)
system is a vital contributor to the success of the plant's design. This is now a
very important subject in the field of nuclear power because new developments
are being incorporated in architecture designs in many countries, including the
United States. In some cases, these developments are only minor advances
technically, whereas in others, these new developments may represent significant
changes. The development and testing of the I&C system's architecture may be
much more expensive than the cost of the system hardware; therefore, the
successes and difficulties experienced by colleagues in the use of new designs
warrant a designer's careful attention.
Definition of Architecture of I&C Systems for Nuclear Power Plants
In the case of control and information systems, the term architecture means the
arrangement of control components, sensors, display devices, and communication
devices. It also includes the arrangement of the information (or data) and the
arrangement of the software in the case of digital systems.
For those readers who may not be familiar with architectures, some simple,
generic examples of hardware architecture are given here. Shown in Figure 6.1a
is a diagram of a very simple control architecture in which there are one master
controller and several slave controllers. The master is at the top level of the
control hierarchy and the slaves are at the second (and last) layer of control. The
master communicates with the slaves by sending commands onto a communication
network shared by all of the slaves. Figure 6.1b shows another type of
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architecture in which one master communicates directly with each slave controller
on individual communication channels.
In Figure 6.2a, an architecture is shown that uses communication bus masters on
several communication channels, or buses. For each communication bus, one
master controller commands the slave units attached to that bus. A different type
of architecture, shown in Figure 6.2b, uses a ring arrangement of components in
which each component puts information onto the ring and takes information from
the ring.
Master/Slave
6.1a
Master/Slave Star
6.1b
Figure 6.1. Simple Examples of Hardware Architecture
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Communication Bus Masters
6.2a
Ring
6.2b
Figure 6.2. Other Basic Types of Arahitecture
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Archim_ __
Each of the types of architecture shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 has advantages
and disadvantages for particular applications. The designer chooses the
architecture that best satisfies all of the requirements of the system. Architecture
designs must address several types of issues; as a result, the architecture of a
power plant control or information system generally is a combination of several
types of simpler architectures into a larger, complex whole. For purposes of this
discussion, the design issues are grouped into seven categories:
le User. The first category includes questions about user interaction with the
architecture, ease of understanding, ease of analysis of failure modes, and
security.
.
Allocation of requirements. This category includes selection of networks,
hardware, and software that will fulfill the overall requirements in an efficient
manner. This involves choosing which requirements are allocated to which
parts of the architecture and which parts are backups for other parts. A
distinction is made here between "distributed computers" and "distributed
computing." The term distributed computers means a hardware arrangement
where only computational results or end points are shared. It does not
consider distributing the computational functions.
. Database. This category includes data management, sharing (or isolation),
and storage of information. Reliable, high-capacity databases are required
for good information engineering designs.
.
Standards. There is no one standard for a power plant architecture. The
designer must choose which parts of which standards are applicable to
each part of the architecture.
.
Performance. The requirements of the architecture must be met in a
reliable, timely manner. The designer must decide how to get satisfactory
throughput, response time, reliability, and fault isolation. Fast communication
buses are necessary to handle the increased amounts of data and control
signals. If the designer increases information density within single devices
of the architecture, there may be greater consequences of device failure.
An in-depth analysis has to be done to determine which tasks have to be
implemented independently. If the designer includes a great deal of serial
processing of programs, the reaction time of the system will be impacted.
. Adaptation. As the plant ages, requirements for the control and information
system will change. For good long-term economic performance, it is
essential that the architecture remain open to evolution. Design lifetimes of
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60 years and more are being proposed by reactor designers. The
technology is moving fast. It is probable that some new technology will
give added capability with significant improvements in safety margins and
economics. The designer would like to choose an architecture which will
allow future upgrading and modification.
This issue also involves the question of open architectures. Computer
vendors are beginning to design systems that are easier to interface with
systems of other vendors than in the past; this tendency is expected to
continue. An architecture may be described as open if products from more
than one supplier can easily be integrated. Although this does not seem to
exist today in nuclear power plant architectures in the strict sense of the
definition, it is a desirable feature that some U.S. utilities are beginning to
request in meetings with the Electric Power Research Institute.
. Management. Of course, one of the most important issues is cost. Trade-
offs between layers of redundancy (for increased fault tolerance) and costs
are difficult design decisions. How much the control is decentralized or
centralized is another important design question. Centralized control may
be simpler and cheaper, but decentralized control may be more fault
tolerant and more amenable to modification. Maintenance requirements are
affected significantly by the choice of architectural design and are an issue
facing every designer.
As an example of some of the challenges associated with design of architectures,
the reader is referred to the latest problems faced by the French in the design of
their newest plant. "Development woes force EDF to abandon I&C System for N4,"
states Nucleonics Week of 3 January 1991 (Ref. 6.1). The latest design for French
nuclear plants, the N4, is expected to carry the French nuclear industry into the
leadership position in the use of computerized control rooms and man-machine
interfaces. According to Nucleonics Week, the French utility _lectricit_ de France
(EDF) has decided to abandon the Controbloc P20. This is an architectural
feature that includes a decentralized plant supervisory controller developed by the
French supplier Cegelec. The article quotes an EDF official as saying that
Cegelec had been having "major difficulties in perfecting the new product." The
resulting delay in design of the I&C system will likely result in a delay to 1995 in
fuel load at the newest French plant Chooz B1. Fuel load was originally
scheduled for 1991, then pushed to late 1992 because of a voluntary stretch-out
plus other general I&C problems in 1988.
A fallback system may have to be used in the N4. A change in architecture of
the I&C system at this late date will impact the next four N4 plants, according to
Nucleonics Week. This also could impact the use of the N4 control room concept,
a cockpit design considered to be very helpful in improving operational
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performance. The Cegelec system also was planned for the English SizeweU B
plant. Cegelec was to provide all of the control system for Sizewell B, whereas
it was providing only the lowest level of N4's I&C system (Ref. 6.2).
Scope of Study
For this chapter, the scope is limited to selected elements of the architecture of
safety, control, and information systems. Not discussed are control room, auxiliary
control room, and man-machine interface architectures. These subjects are
discussed in other chapters of this report.
Most of the discussion concerns developments in France because, in the view of
the panel, the French have the most advanced digital systems. There are briefer
discussions of the German developments and Russian and Czechoslovakian work
in I&C architecture.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I&C IJRCHITECTURE IN FRANCE
The French nuclear industry has been very successful in the application of
computer-based safety, control, and information systems. The architectures they
have used are discussed here as examples of some of the best results to date in
the application of digital technology to European nuclear power plants. The
architectures have had to handle increasing amounts of information, as shown in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1
Amounts of Information Processed in French Power Plant Architectures
Fessenheim Creys-MalviUe Chooz-B1
Starting Year 1970 1977 1984
Digital Entries 1500 8000 60000
Analog Entries 600 4000 2500
Graphic Images - 500 17000
Volume in Mb/s 0.5 4 200
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Upgmdu on French 1300 MWe Plants
_lectricit4 de France, the French NSSS engineering and construction company
Framatome, and the I&C equipment manufacturers Merlin Gerin and Cegelec have
acquired a great deal of experience in digital I&C systems over the past ten years.
Cegelec provided a tabular summary of its efforts in I&C architecture in the
French, British, and Belgian nuclear programs, shown as Table 6.2. According to
Cegelec, there has been an evolution which has resulted in a system architecture
being structured in layers of homogeneous processing, leading to a "durable"
communication architecture (Ref. 6.3).
lVldcro-Z. Since Cattenom 1, which started in 1986, Cegelec's Micro-Z equipment
has been used in 12 units of 1300 MWe, as shown Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3. The
Micro-Z equipment uses self-contained cards, each of which includes up to 24
logic inputs; up to 8 analog inputs; up to 4 outputs for auto/manual stations; one
microprocessor in charge of applications; one microprocessor that manages
communication dialogue through two serial links; a set of RAM; and a set of
EPROM memories containing the operating system, library, program written by the
user, and the settings. Each card is equipped with a watchdog that detects
failures and forces the auto/manual stations into manual mode when failures are
detected. The Micro-Z card structure is shown in Figure 6.4 (Ref. 6.4).
Newest French Nuclear Plant I_C Architecture
The French are working hard to take advantage of lessons learned in the operation
of their older nuclear power plants (Ref. 6.5). According to Framatome, its primary
goals for I&C architecture are as shown in Table 6.4.
N4 I&C arc/'fftecture. A new architecture has been designed to accomplish these
goals in the newest French plant concept, N4. Construction of the first of the N4
plants, Chooz B, Unit 1, is nearly complete. Components of the N4 plant
architecture are shown in Figure 6.5. The lowest level (Level 0) includes the
sensors and actuators. The next level (Level 1) includes the automatic control and
protection systems. It handles all automatic actions of the elementary systems and
also performs automation of the wall synoptic diagram in the control room. It
receives safety and protection manual commands directly from the control room
and from the auxiliary panel. Level 1 receives from Level 2 all commands issued
by the operator stations and transmits to Level 2 almost all of the information it
acquires and processes. Level 2 handles installation control and operation tasks,
processes information from a high synthesis level, and handles the interface with
the operators. It has a centralized structure, with a centralization of information
into a single database. Level 3 interfaces with technical management and
maintenance functions. This highest level includes the computer-aided man-
machine interface.
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Table 8.4
lessons Learned in French Nuclear Power Plant I&C Architecture
.
2.
.
4.
Goal
Eliminate effects of I&C failures
Increase reliability
Increase computational capability
Simplify interfaces
Approach
Redundancy
Local area networks;
new technology to eliminate
connectors, relays, etc.
Modem microprocessors
Local area networks
As Figure 6.5 shows, there are two subsystems in Level 1: the reactor protection
and control system (CO3) manufactured by Merlin Gerin, and the logic and control
system (P20 Controbloc) manufactured by Cegelec.
GO3 system. The CO3 system has as its main function core protection and
control. It has three subsystems. The first subsystem is the rod control subsystem
(RGL). This subsystem regulates the core in three possible modes, similar to its
Westinghouse counterpart. The second subsystem is the core protection
subsystem (RPN), which takes information from the nuclear flux detectors and
other sensors. The RPN includes a class 1E portion that provides signals to the
protection system, and a nonsafety portion that supplies signals to the control
system and a surveillance system described below. The third subsystem is the
reactor protection system, "Syst_me de Protection Int_gre Num6rique" (SPIN).
Protection System Upgrade for French PlanW-SPIN
The French decided in 1976 to develop an entirely new protection system to
improve the operating margins and safety levels of their 1300 MWe plants. The
use of digital technology was approved by the French safety authorities because
an enhanced safety level could be demonstrated analytically. This is the SPIN
design. Merlin Gerin in France was chosen as the manufacturer.
There are four protection channels powered by two electrical trains. Every
accident must be detected by two different protection functions, which will be
implemented in different functional units. There is one ex-core neutron detector
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with six channels in each quarter of the core, as shown in Figure 6.6. According
to Framatome, the approach is very similar to the Combustion Engineering core
protection calculator (4 levels) of the early 1980's. FRAMATOME, Merlin Gerin and
Electricite de France decided to develop a more modem version of the SPIN.
This version is being installed in 1500 MWe units. There are two local area
networks (hANs) in each channel, for a total of eight LANs. The eight protection
LANs are transformed to optical for improving data transfer rates and providing
electrical insulation. The LAN speed is approximately 2.5 Mb/s. Fiber optics give
more band width. Some U.S. hardware and software are used. There is
generalized use of 2/4 logic, with graceful degradation to 2/3 and to 1/2, when one
channel is failing or undergoing periodic tests.
SPIN acquires significant measurements, makes calculations in real time, compares
with thresholds, and finally, drives emergency shutdown and safeguard actions.
These complex processes require the cooperation of several processors working
in parallel. The modification to the older protection system consisted of adding
four data acquisition and processing units and two core monitoring units as shown
in Figure 6.7. The System of Process Instrumentation (SIP) ensembles are
implanted in four redundant and physically independent units, each of which is
connected to four process units of the protection system. Each Acquisition and
Processing Unit for Protection (UATP) is an ensemble of two acquisition units and
five functional units (UF). Each functional unit is built around a Motorola 68000
microprocessor. The hardware is Motorola 68000, 68881-based, with a speed of
10 MHz. A faster version is available with a speed of about 16 MHz. Stations
connected to networks use a deterministic protocol. Every station is authorized
to speak only when it has received a token. This is done in a cyclic manner, in
which cycle time is constant.
Cabling in the SPIN system is coaxial or optical when decoupling is needed.
The communication is 2.5 Mb/s, with a margin of 50-60%. All equipment is 1E
qualified. Compliance with IEC 880 and U.S. DOD 2167 standards limited the use
of interrupts.
SPIN develops PPS logic from the RGL and the RPN inputs, provides diagnostics
and monitoring, and provides an operator interface. The entire protection system
is 1E qualified. The SPIN-P4 has accumulated five years of use at twenty units.
SPIN has approximately 40,000 lines of assembly code. The P-4 version of SPIN
software was developed in the 1980-84 time frame. There have been nine
successive software versions.
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Newest French Control System Architecture-P20 CONTROBLOC
The newest control system concept and design is Cegelec's P20 Controbloc
equipment. The P20 is organized around a redundant serial local area network
(LAN). It is designed to be an improved version of Cegelec N20 equipment. The
major difference is in the sophisticated hardware: the P20 uses modern 16/32-bit
microprocessors and transputers, while the N20 uses 8-bit machines. (The N20
system was developed from 1978-1988. Its main advances over older Cegelec
equipment were self-testing, improved control room, and fewer annunciators. This
system replaced relays with 8-bit microprocessors.)
The P20 was designed for higher availability and reliability. It uses extensive self-
checking and dual redundancy. Use of high-level programming languages (C for
microprocessors, Occam for transputers) will allow easier useability. A high-speed
data highway of 2.5 Mb/s is used. A traffic manager is used to provide a
deterministic system. 1E is separated from non-lE by optic fiber. Datalinks
provide communication with other systems. Intercluster controls are used to
provide synchronization. CRTs are used for maintenance and testing. In one
cubicle, there may be 1000 inputs/outputs. Terminals are provided on backplanes.
The software common mode failure requirement is addressed in the P20 by
functional diversity. Application software is separated from system software. The
French are moving to ADA for specification; at present, ADA is used in the control
room only. Software costs were estimated to be partitioned as follows: 50-60%
for test phase, 30% for software specification, and 10% for coding.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IaC ARCHITECTURE IN O'EI_M,ANY
According to the Siemens-KWU personnel with whom the panel met, there has
been a special combination of factors in the German nuclear industry which has
allowed the Germans to be very successful to date in their plants. Five factors
are (1) turnkey contracts, (2) common rule making, (3) high automation level of
conventional power plants, (4) very low turnover of operations staff, and (5)
requirement from the start of the nuclear program for full load following. Due to
these factors, a great deal of empirical knowledge has been factored into German
designs, and lessons learned throughout the nuclear industry have resulted in
positive changes in all of the German plants.
Limitation System. Out of this unique environment has grown a unique element
of nuclear plant I&C architecture, the "Limitation System." This system fits between
the normal control system and the normal safety system known to U.S. designers.
The functions of the limitation system are to: 1) automatically minimize the number
of scrams; 2) minimize stress to the big mechanical components by smoothing
most transients; and 3) give more time to operators for information gathering and
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diagnosis. Although this system has been described several times in the literature
and has been very successful, there is very little discussion of it in the United
States. According to Mr. Werner Aleite of Siemens-KWU, this system grew out of
unique requirements in Germany for full load following and for rapid recovery from
operational upsets (Ref. 6.6). This limitation system was control system grade in
the Biblis type reactors. Since Grafenrheinfeld, it became protection grade. Now
the limitation system is the biggest I&C system in German nuclear power plants.
The latest I&C design in a German plant can be found at Isar-II, operating for
more than one year. As is the case for France, the number of signals fed to the
control room has grown dramatically, as shown in Fig. 6.8 (Refi 6.7). Brokdorf,
commissioned in 1986, had 2000 analog and 13000 binary signals (Ref. 6.8).
The German reactor protection system is of analog design but has used digital
(pulsed) signals to detect and announce failures. The Germans have used this
type of system for 20 years. They also have used it generally for other protection
systems besides the reactor protection systems. Eventually, Siemens-KWU is going
to digital protection systems; a digital safety system is under development now.
Interesting features include use of TCP/IP, ethernet, and optic cables in some
places. There will be no token; the system will be deterministic by cyclic
communication and there will be no main bus. To improve reliability, there will
be a free repair channel. Effectively, this provides 2/4 logic. There will be ring
storage of the last 2000 values.
In discussions with the Siemens-KWU personnel, panelists were impressed by the
amount of knowledge which they had about the architectures of the U.S. designs
and the designs of other countries. There were a lot of references to
Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, General Electric, and Babcock & Wilcox
designs. The requirements developed by the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) for the next nuclear plants to be built in the United States are considered
seriously in the design of German plants. In these discussions, for example, the
panel learned that the new Siemens-ICWU protection system is envisioned to be
like that in the British plant, Sizewell B. Our hosts indicated that the SizeweU B
requirements were very similar to what KWU has learned from its experience.
Information System Architecture for Siemens-KWU PlanW-PRISCA
A very interesting information system seen by the panel was the PRISCA, a
computer-aided process information system (Ref. 6.9 and 6.10). Computers have
been used in German plants for many years, but this system is the most advanced
use of computers to date. The PRISCA system is used as an additional system to
get personnel acquainted with the plant. The operator does not need PRISCA to
operate the plant safely.
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Fig. 6.8. Increasing number of signals fed to the control room in German nuclear power plants.
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PRISCA's main functions are shown in Figure 6.9 (Ref. 6.11). This system
integrates functional connections from plant processes and I&C systems in addition
to performing most conventional functions like alarm annunciation, nuclear
computation, and log printing. (An example of a PRISCA overview display is
shown in Chapter 5.) The PRISCA design is already in operation in six KWU
plants. This system is different from other information systems seen by the panel
with respect to the output formats, which require a great deal of data synthesis.
The hierarchic architecture of the I&C system is shown in Figure 6.10. Redundant
communication buses independently connect the automation devices to the process
information system PRISCA and the operating processor system for manual control.
Priority drive control modules process the signals from the I&C safety modules.
A separate interaction line for manual control via conventional desk tiles is
provided for safety system components.
NUCLEAR POWER PLRNT I&C _CTURE IN THE SOVIET UNION
A lot of activity is present in the U.S.S.R. in the design of I&C for nuclear power
plants. Especially since the Chernobyl incident, the nuclear industry is very
aggressive in the development of improved systems to prevent operator error, to
improve the ability of the safety and control systems to survive operator error, and
to improve safety margins. Many results are still of the pilot type since new plants
are not being ordered. At the workshop on Instrumentation and Control held in
Washington, D.C., Mr. Rakitin of the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy,
Moscow, indicated that a significant capability for simulation of the performance
of I&C is being developed. The Kurchatov Institute feels that simulation of I&C is
essential to the verification and validation of design before construction.
A very important program in the U.S.S.R. is the modernization of existing systems.
On several occasions, the panel was told of the need to upgrade I&C to improve
safety related aspects in the near future (Ref. 6.12). The nuclear community,
worldwide will be very interested in how the Soviet go about this upgrade.
For new designs, high goals are being set. The Soviets are designing a
conceptual I&C system with a failure rate goal (for core melt) of 10E-9 for the
1E functions and 10E-1 or -2 for auxiliaries and noncritical functions. Some
components must survive earthquakes of 3 to 8 on the Richter scale. As is the
case in all other designs, significant use of functional diversity is planned. This
system may be much more expensive than the current 20-25% of cost of plant.
The main features of the system are under development now. There is a main
local net. Local area networks include programmable logic controllers, actuators,
and sensors. To get high reliability, Soviet designers are considering triple
modular redundancy, 2/4 logic, and built-in diagnostics.
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After Chemobyl, there is an emphasis on the unreliability of the human operator.
However, at present, there is in the control room about 10 Mbit of information
presented to the operators, and in accident situations, the operators may have little
time for decisions. Because of these considerations, operator support systems are
considered a very high priority. Some of the technological possibilities envisioned
by scientists are still difficult to implement in the U.S.S.R. because of limitations in
computing power at the nuclear plants. This is especially true for upper levels of
the I&C hierarchy, where a great deal of information needs to be integrated and
presented to the operators or the systems that would replace some of their
functions.
The main problem, according to our Soviet hosts, is the need for very powerful
computers, ones with a capability of 10 million operations per second and with
high external memory. The nuclear industry in the Soviet Union does not at this
time have access to this capacity. (At present, designers believe they can
implement lower level requirements easily.) Soviet I&C designers are laboring
with inadequate computer resources. While in the United States we are using
32-bit Gould SEL machines along with newly emerging pixel graphic display
generators, the Soviets are trying to build full-scope simulators (5000 equations)
and sophisticated graphics with PCs of the IBM-XT generation (it seems) and
character graphics display generators.
Several Soviet organizations are working on I&C for nuclear plants. The Leningrad
Atomic Energy Institute designed the I&C for the Finnish Loviisa power plant.
Design implementation included some Siemens equipment. Other organizations in
Leningrad are also working on new I&C. The latest defense achievements, if
promising, are being examined for application to nuclear power plants.
Another organization working on I&C is the All-Union Institute of Electrical
Mechanics, VNIIEM. Interestingly, this institute reports to the Ministry of
Electromechanical Engineering, not the Ministry of Atomic Energy. Its main
concern is satellites, but it has experience in computer and control systems in
manufacturing, metallurgical processes, and nuclear energy. Because of its
demonstrated capabilities in several fields, it has been given responsibility for (1)
development and integration of the control system for RBMK plants, and (2) the
control and protection system for VVER plants.
An example of Soviet I&C architecture is the Skala for RBMK installed in 1971 in
the Leningrad power plant; VNIIEM developed the plant's information system.
The system has 11000 control points with a period of control of one minute. This
reactor type has 2000 channels; it is necessary to monitor flux distributions in each
of these and to represent this information to the operating staff. An expanded
system will be operational in two to three years. The ultimate objective is control
operation of 5s with improved information supplied to the operation staff. The plan
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is to connect to the old, obsolete computer system a multibus system based on
the microprocessor INTEL 8086 or 8087.
Some of the problems in existing plants are related to the slow rate of monitoring
and registration. Others are related to new safety requirements introducing new
computational functions. The 1960s machines in use cannot perform satisfactorily,
particularly in transients. Furthermore, the system is aging and the Soviets are
worried that there may be a reliability cliff not far away from their present position.
As in most countries, complicated algorithms requiring complicated or expanded
architectural features are tried first in information systems, whose speed of
response and performance are not strong direct factors in safety CRef. 6.13). Other
problems of concern in the Soviet plants are associated with cable aging (Ref.
6.14). The U.S.S.R.'s Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering is
working on this problem. This is also a significant concern in the United States;
EPRI is working on this problem.
NU_ POWER PLANT I&C ARCHITECTURE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
There are eight VVER units operating in two Czechoslovak plants. These are of
the Russian 213 type (more advanced safety features than the 230 type). An
additional four units are under construction for a third plant site. These plants use
Soviet technology for safety and control, and Czechoslovak technology for the
control system of the non-nuclear part of the plant (which produces steam). At
present, these plants use only hard-wired systems, not computer-based systems.
In recent agreements with KWU, the German Konvoi I&C system will be used for
upgrade of I&C at the Mochovice-1 and -2 plants, both model V-213s (Ref. 6.15).
The safety system will remain Soviet and will be essentially type 213 hybrid system
logic rather than digital so that the plants retain their fuel warranties. The turbine
control system will be of Skoda design.
SUMMARY OF ARCIEI'ECTURE STUDY
1. Activity in R&D, design, and implementation of new I&C architectures is a little
more intense in Europe than in the United States, due to the real-life problems
being faced there now. The French were facing tough issues in deciding whether
to qualify the P20 Cegelec design for Chooz-B1 or to use an older well-proven
architecture. The Germans are trying to digitize the noncomputer-based enlarged
intelligent protection system that has functioned well for several years in their
plants. The Soviets are undertaking significant development efforts to utilize
computer-based architectures to improve their plants. The Czechoslovaks are
looking harder at non-Soviet technology to see if there exist products that can
significantly improve their nation's plants.
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2. Designers of new concepts are trying to rely only on technology already
proven. All countries are moving to digital technologies, but only deterministic
architectures and classical algorithmic approaches are being incorporated.
Whereas in the United States fossil plant technology is being proposed for nuclear
plants, the Europeans are a little more aggressive. The West Europeans are
planning to include fossil and industrial experience. In the U.S.S.R., defense
technology is being looked at for possible application to nuclear power. These
countries do not seem to be considering very advanced networks (optical); this
is also the case for U.S. designers. No triple modular redundant (TMR) systems
were discussed, but some are used in United States.
3. Europeans seem very aware of U.S. nuclear technology. Their past
architectures have been patterned after U.S. designs, except for the German
Limitation System, which seems to be totally different in philosophy as well as
application.
4. New concepts are not relying as much on U.S. nuclear industry, although the
DOE/EPRI ALWR Requirements Document was mentioned in several of our
meetings. The impact of the U.S. computer technology, however, is undeniable.
Almost all of the designs include U.S. computer hardware technology.
5. Standards development in Europe is not keeping up with technology advances
in architectures (existing or planned). This is also the case in the United States;
however, the Europeans seem to be working harder in this area. Europe is moving
toward use of standard off-the-shelf components.
6. The German Limitation Control System adds another layer to power plant
architecture. This seems to be a unique development of intelligent control.
Although it has been implemented using analog technology, the system logical
architecture seems advanced compared to other U.S. and European designs. The
U.S. nuclear community is relatively unaware of this development.
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INSTRUMENTATION
Frederick R. But
INTRODUCTION
The panel's objective in reviewing European nuclear power plant instrumentation
was to discover devices, approaches, or phenomenology that could be usefully
employed in the U.S. nuclear power industry, particularly in light water reactor
('LWR) plants. In order to achieve this objective, the panel first searched the
literature to identify individuals and organizations carrying out research pertinent
to the objective. Site visits were then arranged within available time constraints
so that state-of-the-art information could be gathered.
This chapter summarizes the instrumentation information collected from site visits
and the literature; evaluates the technology relative to that in the United States;
and indicates which areas may be of interest to the United States. The
technologies of France, Germany, and the Soviet Union are described, and these
are compared to technologies in the United States. Nuclear instruments and then
temperature, pressure, flow, and other devices are discussed for each country.
Throughout this chapter, the major emphasis is on instrumentation that is in
commercial service or has been tested in-reactor, except for devices that seem to
have exceptional potential for enhanced performance.
FRENCH INSTRUMENTATION
The French PWR industry is founded on the Westinghouse plant design, but there
are significant evolutionary improvements.
Nuclear Detectors
The N4 plant design operates with six axial section, ex-core power detectors for
both overall power level and axial power distribution determination. These
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detectors operate in conjunction with the rod control system to provide three
progressively more complex plant operating modes culminating in Mode X--the
simultaneous temperature and axial power offset control.
Advanced cores are being designed with reduced neutron leakage to mitigate the
reactor vessel embrittlement problem. However, this also reduces the flux at the
ex-core detectors, which has impelled the French to develop improved in-core
detectors. Ten sets of nine-chamber, in-core detectors are to be tested in an
_lectricit_ de France (EDF) power reactor in late 1991. These detectors use
gallium arsenide electronics in containment, near the vessel to multiplex the signals
and reduce containment cabling and penetrations. Fiber optics are used as optical
isolators, not for increased bandwidth.
A variety of miniaturized in-core fission chambers have been developed and tested.
Table 7.1 (Ref. 7.1) lists the principal characteristics of these detectors.
Table 7,1
French Fission Chamber _tica
Name CFUZ 53R CFUZ 43 Prototype
Sensor 90% U235 90% U235 90% U235
Fill Gas, Argon (kPa) 800 110 250 (+N2)
Insulators Alumina Alumina Alumina
Location In-core In-core In-core
Geometry
Diameter (ram)
Length (ram)
Sensitivity
N/cm2-S
Range
N/cm=-S
Max Operating
Temp. (°C)
1.5 3 not available
10 13 not available
3xl 0 .20 3xl 0-18 not available
lxlOi_-lxlO _4 lxl0n-lxl0 _4 lxlO°-lxlO H
350 350 not available
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Figure 7.1 is a photograph of the CFUZ 53R detector. Figure 7.2 is a schematic
of the detector internals together with two other more conventional detectors.
Note that this detector is only 1.5 mm in diameter.
In addition to the above detector, a prototype fission chamber capable of eleven
decades of neutron response is being fabricated for the REP 2000 and for
backfitting in older plants. This detector has multiple internal electrodes: one
large for source range sensitivity, and two other, smaller electrodes for the
intermediate and power ranges. This one detector is to replace three separate
detectors.
Temperature and Pressure Sensors
No new temperature or pressure sensor technologies are being developed for
reactors through the N4 plant (Ref. 7.2).
Figure 7.1. CFUZ 53R Detector
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Figure 7.2. Comparison of Internals of 3 Detectors
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Other Sensor Technologies
Fiber-optic networks are being considered for in-containment instrumentation
systems. Breuz_ (Ref. 7.3) has carried out experiments for reactor instrumentation
systems, showing that silica fibers can sustain 600 Gy of gamma dose and function
properly for links hundreds of meters in length.
The French electrical power grid is so highly dependent on nuclear generated
capacity (>70%) that load following with nuclear plants is required. Tailec
(Ref. 7.4) has developed control algorithms that synthesize core exit thermocouple
and ex-core neutron power readings to simultaneously control core average
temperature, axial power offset, and coolant enthalpy rise. Leroy (Ref. 7.5) has
demonstrated that a PWR can simultaneously load follow and maintain optimum
power distributions without boron concentration changes by the use of "gray" and
black control rods. In both systems, plant measurements are compared with a
three-dimensional power distribution computed in real time. Optimal rod positions
are computed using a statistical minimization technique called "simulated
annealing" where the core may continuously be burned most efficiently in a way
an operator could not duplicate simply by control room indications.
INSTRUMENTATION
Felkel (Ref. 7.6) has noted that the German PWR industry has not found sensor
technology to be limiting as to plant operation or design and that there is no
fundamental sensor technology development program. Nevertheless, sensors
developed and proven in other industries (e.g., aeronautical, chemical, medical)
may be adapted for the nuclear industry. The German nuclear industry seems
to have developed several synthesized signal devices that monitor various plant
parameters to predict and project fault conditions. These are described below.
Nuclear Detectors
No major nuclear detector programs are underway, although systems that use
nuclear detector outputs to synthesize new indications are being developed.
Temperature and Pressure Sensors
Felkel (Ref. 7.7) has indicated that no new temperature or pressure sensor
technologies are being developed solely for reactor applications. Fiber-optic
sensors, multiplexing, and distributed processors developed for other industries
are being adapted for the nuclear industry.
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Other Sensor Technologies
German nuclear power plant guidelines and safety standards require monitoring
and recording information on vibration, loose parts, and leakage. KWU has
implemented systems to carry out these functions, as well as a fatigue monitoring
system installed in the 'Convoy' plants. Table 7.2 lists the principal features of four
systems. Streicher (Refs. 7.8-7.11) has described the four systems taken together
as the "Series '86." The Series '86 systems are autonomous, modular systems in
which event detection, alarm, data acquisition and evaluation, documentation, long-
term statistics, test routines, and status checks are all performed automatically.
For analyses exceeding the systems' capabilities, compressed data records are
transferred to a host computer at a remote site if necessary. Operating personnel
work load consists only of initial system adjustment and man-machine dialogue
evaluation.
Table 7.2
German PWR Monitoring Instruments
Name FAMOS K'US SOS ALUS
Monitoring Fatigue Loose parts Vibration Leakage
Sensed Temp., Acoustic Neutron noise, Acoustic
Parameters Pressure, Structure Pressure, Structure
Flow Acceleration
Frequency 0.25 Hz 1-10 kHz 0.1-200 kHz 100-600 kHz
Deployed 1987 1985 1987 1988
The FAMOS Fatigue Monitoring System monitors plant component temperatures,
as well as primary coolant temperature, pressure, and flow. FAMOS computes
stresses based on mechanical conditions and thermal history, and compares the
computed stress with a precomputed three-dimensional stress calculation. System
output includes crack initiation prediction, crack propagation projections, and
component lifetime evaluations.
The KUS Loose Parts Monitoring System detects and localizes loose parts by an
analysis of the structure-borne burst signal which accompanies such conditions.
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KUS uses pattern recognition of time, amplitude statistics on rise time, amplitude,
etc., of the burst signal in the 1-10 kHz range.
The SOS Vibration Monitoring System detects changes in mechanical integrity
such as loosening of bolts, broken springs, or vibrating pipes. SOS monitors
mechanical vibrations, pressure fluctuations, and neutron flux noise, based on
coherency function and frequency spectrum analysis in the 0.0-200 kHz range.
The ALOS Acoustic Leakage Monitoring System detects, localizes, and sizes leaks
in pressurized systems. The system measures high-frequency structure- borne
leakage noise in the 100-600 kHz range. The parameter of interest is the RMS
amplitude of the noise as a function of time and position.
Related to the Series '86 system, Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit (ORS) mbH in
Garching Germany has developed the COMOS and RAMSES system. COMOS is
used in 50% of German PWRs for (quasi)-continuous monitoring and trend analysis
of the signals provided by SOS. RAMSES is a portable modem-based, computer
controlled system for operator support of acoustic signature interpretation. Data
are transmitted by RAMSES to a GRS laboratory for detailed analysis.
The Nuclear Research Center at Karlsruhe has developed a number of "smart"
sensors and intelligent signal processing methods for reactor monitoring
instruments. Many of these have been tested on the KNK II reactor there. The
KNK II is a 60 Mwt sodium-cooled fast reactor; therefore, only the intelligent signal
processing methods of the devices might be applicable to PWRs. Schleisiek (Ref.
7.12) has described several devices that use existing plant information but also use
enhanced signal processing and analysis algorithms to synthesize new types of
plant indications. Several of these synthesis instruments are summarized in Table
7.3 and described below.
Table 7.3
gsrlsruhe Smart Sensors
Name DND LFT FK/IRB
Monitoring Fuel failure Fuel failure Cooling upset
size location
Sensed Sodium activity Sodium activity Temperature
Parameters Power Temperature Flow
Flow Delayed neutrons Delayed neutrons
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The DND and LFT instruments take signals from existing plant temperature, flow,
and power instrumentation. Sodium activity and delayed neutron precursor
concentration in the sodium are also measured. The DND and LFT instruments
generate small amplitude control rod drive signals that produce changes in the
monitored parameters. Using this information, the instruments calculate the
absolute size and location of a fuel failure without operator action.
The KFKARB cooling upset device uses existing plant temperature and flow
instruments. An algorithm computes the root mean square of the time average
of the ratio of temperature and flow fluctuations. This parameter is a sensitive
indicator of core cooling conditions. (There is no conventional name for this
parameter, which is supposed to describe the overall state of core cooling.)
References 7.13-7.17 give several examples of the strength of combining signals
to form more powerful predictors. Note especially the work of V£ith et al. on
detecting fuel element vibration and gas entrainment by reactivity effects and
Gmeiner's report on a microprocessor-based integrated core surveillance system.
The systems described above fit into a larger class of systems being developed
in Germany, the Diagnostic Expert System for Surveillance (DESYRE). DESYRE
is to be an intelligent system using pattern recognition and knowledge-based
approaches to formulate hypotheses about the state of the plant and to make
recommendations to operators. DESYRE is to serve as an early warning indicator
by combining so-called weak indicators of plant problems together to form a more
powerful prediction. A DESYRE prototype is running on KNK II with 300 rules in
the knowledge base and a preliminary man-machine interface.
Lastly, the Germans have developed a refinement of the traditional flux wire
mapping technique in which small balls are pneumatically moved into the core
and out to a detector. The system allows an operator to determine the power
profile without a movable detector and associated wiring in the core.
SOVIET INSTRUMENTATION
Soviet sensor technology is based on the same phenomenologies as is U.S.
technology; however, because of differences between the two countries' reactor
systems, Soviet sensor technology has evolved to meet different requirements.
Nuclear Detectors
Table 7.4 lists the characteristics of one segment of a Soviet rhodium self-powered
neutron detector (SPND). The VVER system uses seven of these segments as one
detector in a fuel assembly, and it has 64 such monitored assemblies in a core.
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The SPNDs, together with 95 in-core therrnocouples, are used to measure the core
power and power distribution. SPND calibration is based on a calculational model
of detector performance and a large body of test statistics but no in-place
comparison with movable neutron detectors.
Temperature and Pressure Sensors
No new pressure or flow sensors were presented to the panel. Nikolayenko _Ref.
7.18) described an off-line temperature-sensing technique based on measuring a
change in crystal structure as a function of peak temperature. Neither the material
nor the nature of the change was disclosed; however, the basic process first
begins by preparing the sensitive material for a particular temperature range. The
process is good to 1400oC with an accuracy of _+10oC. The material for a
particular temperature range is encapsulated in rods 1 rnm in diameter and 5 rum
long, then installed in the object whose temperature is to be measured. Once the
Table 7.4
Soviet Detector Characteristics
Type
Active Element
Geometry
Wire diameter (ram)
Casing diameter (ram)
Length (mm)
Insulator
Sheath
Linear response upper
limit (N/cm2-s)
Response time
Power distribution
Protection
Self-Powered
Neutron Detector
Rhodium
0.5- 1.3
3.0
250
MgO
Stainless steel
1 x 1017
1 minute
1 second
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object has experienced its maximum temperature, the sensitive material is returned
to the laboratory to be analyzed. The maximum temperature the material
experienced is determined by a type of x-ray analysis. This technique is used in
situations in which standard temperature measurement techniques are difficult or
impossible to apply. Examples of such an application included temperature
measurements of moving or rotating machinery.
Senior Teclmolc_
Yakimov (Ref. 7.19) is conducting a research and development program to measure
gas concentration using semiconductors. Figure 7.3 is a schematic of a tin or zinc
oxide device for measuring hydrogen concentration. The metal-oxide-resistive
semiconductor sensor consists of a 0.2 mm dielectric sapphire substrate 2 x 0.5
mm with a gas-sensitive SnOrZnO metal-oxide layer on one side and a platinum
film 0.2 mm thick on the other side. The gas-sensitive layer may vary from 0.05
to 0.2 microns thick, depending on the device. Gold contacts 0.5 microns thick
are formed on the heater and the gas-sensitive layer, and gold wire 30 microns in
diameter is welded to the contacts. The sensor is mounted on a standard seven-
pin base. The heater, having a resistance of 5-10 ohms, receives 0.3-0.4 watts and
produces a sensor working temperature of 300-400°C. Detector sensitivity and
response time are strong functions of temperature.
The conductance of the SnO2 or ZnO layer increases with hydrogen concentration
due to surface heterogeneous catalytic reactions of hydrogen reduction-oxidation
with oxygen chemisorbed on the semiconductor surface. The semiconductor film
is a catalyst for this reaction. The sensitivity of the detectors for hydrogen in air
is 0.005-0.01 volume percent, with response time constants in the order of minutes.
These detectors are being developed for use in the nuclear industry and are to
be deployed in reactor containments to measure hydrogen concentration for the
purpose of controlling combustors. The sensors require that the hydrogen be
carried in a dry gas stream, and this has been arranged for several systems. They
have been used to measure the hydrogen concentration in the coolant of PWRs
and are to be used in measuring gas concentration during fuel fabrication. Using
a nickel barrier through which hydrogen can diffuse, the detectors have been used
to measure hydrogen concentration in sodium.
COIVlPARISON WITH U.S. INSTRUIvIENTATION
All U.S. commercial plants operating or under construction are essentiallybased
on designs and technologies available prior to 1977, although some backfits have
been carried out. Notable among these are changes resulting from lessons
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Figure 7.3. Sketch of the Oxide Sensor
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learned in the Three Mile Island accident. A useful indicator of the pace of
change in the U.S. nuclear industry is the observation that today, twelve years after
TMI, not all plants have completed their changes. Thus, the following discussion
is a comparison among snapshots taken at different technological times.
Nuclear Detsatc_
U.S. and European nuclear detectors all operate on the same principles, but they
have been designed to meet slightly different requirements. The nominal plant in
the United States would not have a nine-section in-core power detector as do the
French. The decision on how many detector sections to use is based on tradeoffs
specific to each country and not on technological breakthroughs.
Nevertheless, the French program to develop one neutron detector to cover all
power ranges does offer the significant advantage of reducing the number of
detectors, cabling, and penetrations, thus producing significant economic saving.
Similarly, the French development of in-core fission chambers with dimensions
similar to SPNDs would eliminate the need for the in-core calibration guide tubes,
vessel penetrations, and movable detectors presently in use.
The Soviet decision to use a statistical algorithm rather than movable fission
chambers to calibrate SPNDs is interesting, especially since MgO is used as the
insulator. MgO is known to deteriorate under irradiation, as compared with A1203.
The calibration algorithm must not only correct for unavoidable changes in emitter
burnup and self-absorption, but also for insulator resistance changes. This
complicates the correction calculation and must increase the uncertainty
associated with the calibration. Ultimately, the required accuracy of the calibration
depends in part on the thermal hydraulic design margins used in the core design,
and these are different for Soviet versus U.S. reactors.
No new German nuclear detectors were reviewed.
Temperature and Pressure Sensors
The Soviet off-line crystalline temperature detector is not applicable to plant
monitoring and control, although it may have application to long-term monitoring
akin to in-vessel metallographic specimens.
No new French or German temperature/pressure sensor technologies were
reviewed.
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Other Sensor Technologies
The French synthesis instruments for core temperature and axial power offset
control by rod position are a developed technology but not a conceptual leap in
instrumentation. (These systems are also discussed in Chapter 5.) The French
have also developed combined diagnostic instruments as described in Papin (Ref.
7.20).
The German Series '86 instruments are systems which are similar to U.S. systems
in terms of primary sensor input, although the autonomy of the German systems
seems to be much greater than that of U.S. equipment. The FK/IRB cooling upset
instrument seems to be akin to a noise analysis approach to monitoring plant
conditions, in that it produces a signal that is not a convolution of traditional
parameters, e.g., power-to-flow ratio. Exactly what this instrument tells the
operator or what action the operator should take based on its signal is not clear
to the panel. It seems to be a precursor indication of deteriorating core conditions
and thus may be useful in the future because sensitive indications of core
conditions are always being sought.
Fiber-optic sensors are an important part of the French instrument development
program. U.S. utilities, both directly and indirectly via the Electric Power Research
Institute (Refi 7.21), support a fiber-optic sensor development program. Point and
distributed temperature and pressure sensors have been developed in the United
States and are available commercially. Programs using fiber optics are underway
to measure strain, process water chemistry, and almost every parameter important
to plant operation.
Post-Accident Instnm_nt Development
The Three Mile Island, Unit 2, accident is the most severe reactor accident that
has occurred in the United States, and the Chemobyl accident occupies the same
place in the U.S.S.R. Both these countries have developed reactor instrumentation
specifically for such severe accidents. Major references for this topic are the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission publications, NRG Action Plan Developed as a
Result of the TMI-2 Accident (Ref. 7.22) and Implications of the Accident at
Ghemobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United
States (Ref. 7.23).
Significant instrument development programs were begun in the United States
following the TMI accident. Instruments for measuring exhaust gas stack activity,
containment activity, and area radiation were hardened, and their measurement
ranges were increased. A safety parameter display panel was developed to show
important plant conditions. A reactor vessel water level monitoring device was
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mandated for PWRs. This device required a significant development effort, as each
of the vendors sought to satisfy the NRC requirement.
In Implications of the Accident at Chemobyl, the NRC concluded that no additional
instrumentation needed to be developed in the United States as a result of the
Chernobyl accident. The U.S.S.R. has, of course, enhanced its radiation monitoring
and power level measurement instruments as a result of Chernobyl.
The panel saw no new devices in Europe that were developed specifically in
response to the TMI or Chernobyl accidents.
SUMMARY
Table 7.5 summarizes the major findings of the instrumentation review. A "+" in
a position in the table indicates some development that may offer improvements
in simplicity, reliability, and/or cost over U.S. instrumentation. The panel found no
evidence of fundamental instrumentation differences between Europe and the
United States.
Table 7.5
Comparison of European with U.S. Instnnuentation Technology
France Germany USSR
Pressure
Temperature
Neutron flux
Flow
Level
Gas
V'fl_ration
Gamma
+ - +
+
Indicates a comparative advantage over U.S. technology
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Instrumentation technologies are evolutionary. Although several European
technologies seen by the panel offer enhancements over U.S. technology, no
enabling technologies were apparent; however, several devices seem to warrant
further investigation. These include (1) the French enhanced power range neutron
detector, (2) German plant performance indicator synthesis, and (3) Soviet SPND
calibration by calculation.
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CHAPTER 8
COMPU R STA  ".DS AND TC  .S
Leo BeltraccM
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the panel's assessment of computer standards and tools
used in the control and information systems of the European nuclear industry.
The survey covered the primary topics of software engineering, databases, and
user interface management systems, and the following subtopics:
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
Standards
Tools
Design and Test Research
Engineering Simulators
DATABASES
USER INTERFACE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Graphic Languages
Design Tools
Design Techniques
Auusment Process
The assessment process included a literature review of European work in the
subject areas, a visit to the leading research groups and institutions in Europe, and
an analysis of technical papers and information provided by the panel's European
hosts. The literature survey identified standards and technical papers on software
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engineering design, test techniques, and tools, as well as technical papers
describing human-process interface models and design methods. After reviewing
this material, the panel prepared a survey instrument (Appendix 8.A) as an aid in
conducting technical interviews.
In its survey of computer standards and tools, the panel visited organizations in
France, Germany, and the Soviet Union from 26 November to 5 December 1990.
The French organizations surveyed were Framatome, _lectricit6 de France (EDF),
the Centre d'_tudes Nucl6aires de Saclay, and the CEA Institut de Protection et
de Sfiret6 Nucl6aire. The German organizations surveyed were Siemens AG,
Gesellschaft ffir Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, and the ISAR 2 nuclear power plant.
The Soviet organizations surveyed were the Kurchatov Institute and the Institute of
Control Problems. All of these organizations were very gracious hosts and
provided access to their experts in support of the survey. Technical discussions
with these experts were extensive, deep, and open.
Survey Objectives
The panel investigated the topic areas of this chapter in light of the following four
objectives:
.
Evaluate and describe the state of the art of computer standards and
tools in the European nuclear industry
2. Compare the European state of the art with that in the United States
3. Extrapolate from the current state of the art to future states
.
Evaluate the impact and implications of European research and
accomplishments
The following is a brief review of computer standards in the U.S. nuclear industry
to help place in context the discussion of survey results.
Evolution of Computer Standards in the U.S. Nuclear Industry
The U.S. nuclear industry has a rich history in the development and use of design
standards. A 1972 example of a design standard for nuclear power plant safety
systems is IEEE Std 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power
Generating Station" (Ref. 8.1). This standard documents the minimum requirements
for the safety-related functional performance and reliability of protection systems
for nuclear power plants. Although this standard does not forbid the use of digital
computers for safety systems, the requirements in this standard reflect design and
operational experience with analog hard-wired technology.
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The use of digital computers in the monitoring of nuclear power plant performance
has led to the development and publication of design and development guidelines.
In the late 1960s, Gimmy identified guidelines for computer-based monitoring of
reactor performance at the Savannah River Plant, a production facility where three
large reactors are each equipped with an on-line digital computer that has over
3000 analog inputs and serves control room operators 24 hours a day (Ref. 8.2).
Gimmy states that the reliability of the computer-based system must be high for
operators to accept the technology. The following three guidelines, still useful
today, are discussed in detail:
1. Computer output should be simple and in a form needed by operators
. Resources should be allocated for computer repair, and computer
programs should allow for minor sensor faults
. A quality assurance system of cross-checks and auditing should be an
integral part of the programming
In a 1977 work, Gimmy describes the design and operational use of digital
computers in the protection system for the Savannah River Reactors (Ref. 8.3). The
paper deals with the approach to two problem areas that confront any
computerized protection system:
. How to ensure signal accuracy and proper response to real changes
but reject the spurious signals that are bound to occur
. How to develop and test computer software so that it will be as reliable
as hard-wired logic circuits
In this paper Gimmy discusses and identifies guidelines for the validation of signals
from differential pressure transducers. These transducers are useful in measuring
coolant flow. Gimmy also provides guidelines for the development and testing of
computer-based protection systems. After normal debugging and integration into
an operating system, a failure-response test was made. This detailed test used
deliberately induced failures in the computer and data inputs to force the software
down seldom-used branches of the logic. Today, this type of testing, so-called
structural testing, is an accepted practice in the evaluation of software.
In a 1984 work, Gimmy describes an expert system to aid operators in responding
to multiple alarms in a developing incident (Ref. 8.4). The system, called
"Diagnosis of Multiple Alarms," uses existing control computers to analyze the
pattern of alarms that accompany a leak from the primary or secondary coolant
system. The computer provides a message on a video display unit to indicate the
type and location of the leak. This is one of the first uses of an expert system to
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aid reactor operators in decision-making tasks. The paper presents and discusses
several useful guidelines on the design and evaluation of expert systems.
Combustion Engineering has designed and developed a digital-computer-based
protection system for a commercial nuclear power plant (Ref. 8.5). This is the
Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS) now operational at Arkansas Nuclear
One, Unit-2. This system initiates a reactor trip whenever the departure-from-
nucleate-boiling ratio (DNBR) or the linear power density (LPD) exceeds limiting
values. Six programmable digital computers read and process sensor data to
accomplish the protection function. The remainder of the protection system
consists of conventional hard-wired equipment.
References 8.6-8.9 describe the safety evaluation of the CPCS by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (USNRC). The safety evaluation resulted in many design,
development, and test issues, all of which were resolved prior to system licensing
in late 1978. Reference 8.5 discusses some of the problems in the validation of
safety system software. Reference 8.10 discusses the reliability, qualification, and
documentation of safety system software. Reference 8.11, the American National
Standards Institute's ANSIAEEE-ANS-7-4.3.2-1982, describes a standard that
embodies many of the lessons learned in the design, development, testing, and
safety evaluation of the CPCS. This standard establishes a means for promoting
safe practices for the design and evaluation of safety system performance and
reliability. The standard places a heavy emphasis on the design verification and
validation of software in achieving reliable software. USNRC endorsed this
standard through a regulatory guide (Ref. 8.12).
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
The software engineering subjects the panel surveyed consisted of standards,
tools, design and test research, and engineering simulators.
StandL, ds for SoftmmJ Designs
The main focus of the standards survey was on computer-based safety systems for
nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plant safety systems must be highly reliable
in the performance of their function. To minimize errors in the product, the
process of designing a safety system must be structured and thorough.
Standards and guidelines for the design of safety systems were found during the
survey. Reference 8.13 is a book that resulted from the European Workshop on
Industrial Computer Systems, Technical Committee 7 (EWICS TC7). This book
presents guidelines for the design, development, and acceptance of critical
computer systems. The failure of critical computer systems may affect the health
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and safety of the public. These guidelines address many subjects, such as
software quality assurance measures and the maintenance and modification of
safety-related computer systems. Further, each subject has a checklist. The
checklist is useful to a designer and to a verifier in evaluating conformance to the
guidelines. The integration of the guidelines and a checklist for many subjects
makes this book a useful design document. During the survey, the panel found
that all organizations designing computer-based safety systems were using these
guidelines and checklists.
IEC Standard 880, "Software for Computers in the Safety Systems of Nuclear Power
Stations," was published in 1986 (Ref. 8.14). The elements of this standard address
many phases of the software life cycle, consisting of requirements analysis, design,
coding, verification, hardware/software integration, validation, and maintenance. The
standard's appendices provide details on such matters as system development life
cycle, software performance specifications, and software testing. This standard
covers the major phases of the software life cycle. Organizations surveyed in
France, Germany, and the U.S.S.R. stated they were conforming to IEC Standard
880 in developing computer-based safety systems. Reference 8.15 describes the
development and qualification of a digital-based protection system in France.
EDF operates 54 nuclear units, 500 hydroelectric plants and 140 energy control
centers, and communication networks will play a key role in the rapid development
of its computer-based control and supervisory systems.
SPRINT specifications consist in a selection of a number of OSI Protocols together
with additions necessary to achieve interoperability in a multi-vendor environment.
They provide a common basis for specifying the communication networks and
defining requirements for vendors.
Based on the OPEN _SYSTEMS _INTERCONNECTIONS (OSI) 7 layer stack of
protocols, the SPRINT specifications are divided in two parts:
SPRINT 14 deals with the OSI first four layers and describes how to offer the
OSI connection mode Transport Service on different possible subnetworks, and
defines relaying strategies between subnetworks as well as addressing
structure;
SPRINT 57 describes layers 5 to 7 stacks that offer application layer services
such as file or message transfer.
The first SPRINT network is a local area network installed at the CRUAS nuclear
power plant. It allows each new computer to access a common database while
being provided with common facilities like application configuration services and
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gateways to other networks (local or long distance). Similar networks will be
installed in all the nuclear sites by 1992.
The second SPRINT application is scheduled to begin in late 1992 and is the
nationwide backbone of the energy management system (built on top of a private
X 25 subnetwork).
The British Interim Defense Standard 00-55, "Requirements for the Procurement of
Safety Critical Software in Defence Equipment," was issued in the United Kingdom
in May of 1988 (Ref. 8.16). This comprehensive standard contains elements on
safety management, software engineering practices, and the project life cycle.
Within software engineering practices, it addresses hazard analysis, safety integrity
analysis, specification, design reviews, unacceptable practices, and others. This
standard requires the use of formal specification and design techniques. It
considers conventional design methods inadequate for the development of high-
integrity software. Further, the standard identifies several software engineering
practices as unacceptable, e.g., the liberal use of "GO TO" instructions and
interrupts. Although the Interim Defense Standard is a military standard, it has
received considerable attention in the European and U.S. nuclear industries. This
attention has focused on formal specification and design techniques and the
unacceptable practices. While many organizations in the survey were aware of the
standard, no one had adopted the standard for use in the nuclear industry.
However, there is research under way on the use of formal methods; this is
discussed in the Software Design and Test Research section later in the chapter.
The nuclear industry in the United States does not now have a standard that is
equivalent to IEC Standard 880 or the guidelines in Critical Computer Systems 2
(Ref. 8.13). However, there is an effort in progress to develop an equivalent
standard. This effort is the revision to ANSIAEEE/ANS 7-4.3.2-1982, "Application
Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer Systems in Nuclear Power Generating
Stations." This standard development effort involves individuals from nuclear
utilities, vendors, and the USNRC.
Summary of European Software Design Standards
ANALYSIS
. Standards and guidelines are the basis of the design and development
of computer-based safety systems.
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COMPARISON
l° The U.S. nuclear industry does not now have equivalent standards and
guidelines for the development of computer-based safety systems;
however, an effort to develop equivalent standards is under way.
EXTRAPOLATION
lo Operational experience in the use of computer-based safety systems is
necessary to refinement and upgrading of standards and guidelines.
Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE) Tools
Computer-aided software engineering tools aid designers in development of
computer programs. A CASE tool supports one or more phases of the life cycle.
CASE tools aid designers in analysis tasks, design, coding, testing, implementation,
and maintenance (Ref. 8.17). The use of CASE tools adds discipline to the
development process, thereby reducing the potential for human error.
Several CASE tools were found during the survey. One of the first tools was the
Specification Application Generation Automatic (SAGA) software (Refi 8.18). The
authors describe this tool as a software design workshop that aids in the life cycle
phases from specification through coding. The features of this tool are (1) a
synchronous data flow specification language, (2) an interactive graphic support
of this language, (3) a top-down design by successive refinements, (4) consistency
and complexity limitation checks, and (5) the ability to reuse certified components.
The SAGA workshop serves as a tool for development of digital-computer-driven
displays and controls for France's 1500 MWe N4 nuclear power plants. Experience
in the use of SAGA has resulted in significantly shorter design and coding phases,
in addition to a common language for communication within the project (Ref. 8.18).
The SAGA workshop is also serving in the development of a digital protection
system. This tool aided in the analysis and graphic specification of the computer
program. Encoding occurs directly from preliminary and detailed designs
specifications by translating them (via SAGA) into code (Ref. 8.19).
Another CASE tool seen during the survey of France was OST (Ref. 8.20). OST
allows a user to describe realfime multimicroprocessor systems, perform dynamic
simulations, and store results for later analysis. The simulation works instruction
by instruction, and with the use of OST, the human user can modify and control
this environment. This allows for intensive study and testing of the code in
detecting and correcting faults. In the simulation of a system, the exact
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microprocessor code is not necessary. The objective of OST is to simulate, on a
host computer, the behavior of realtime software implemented on one or more
microprocessors. It has the capability to describe its environment and to modify
it easily for the validation of the software. OST is capable of simulating the
following microprocessors: M6800, INT8086, M68000, arid M6809.
Nuclear safety authorities in France are using OST in their studies of
microprocessor-based safety systems. OST is a powerful design tool in the
requirements and specification phase of the development process. These phases
are critical ones because of the difficulty of verifying the relationships among the
various requirements and the completeness of each phase. The detection and
correction of errors in these early phases of the development cycle enhance
integrity and minimize cost of the final software. OST is also useful in the dynamic
analysis of realtime software. Figure 8.1 illustrates how the nuclear safety
authorities use OST in the back-to-back testing of safety-related software.
Figure 8.2 is an example of the software life cycle used by the nuclear safety
authorities in France. There are seven phases to the life cycle: (1) the
requirements specification phase, (2) the functional specification phase, (3) the
architectural design phase, (4) the detailed design phase, (5) the coding and
implementation phase, (6) the integration testing and commissioning phase, and
(7) the operation, maintenance, and enhancement phase. This life cycle is very
similar to the life cycle used in the United States.
A microprocessor-based protection system is under development at Siemens
AG KWU in Germany, where an in-house-generated CASE tool named Specification
and Coding Environment (SPACE) is being used (Ref. 8.21). This tool has a
semantically direct specification language and uses graphical symbols for syntax.
The use of graphical syntax aids in its translation into code. SPACE was
developed in-house to meet specific requirements not available in commercially
available CASE tools.
SOSAT is a CASE tool principally developed at the OECD Halden Reactor Project
(Ref. 8.22). This tool can analyze programs implemented on a variety of
microprocessors. A disassembler extracts the program from a hexadecimal
memory dump of the processor and translates it into common assembly language
CAL. The CAL code forms the basis for further analysis. The development of this
CASE tool was a joint project of the OECD Halden Project, Technische
Uberwachungsverein Norddeutschland, and Gesellschaft f'tir Reaktorsicherheit.
SOSAT is a tool that automates many tasks in the analysis and testing of programs
stored on a variety of microprocessors. The following functions are available from
SOSAT:
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. Metric computations. SOSAT performs software measures consisting of
a count of the number of bytes, number of jumps, branches, I/O
instructions, interrupts, etc., in the source program. It also evaluates
measures based on Halstead Software Science: volume, length, effort,
etc. (Ref. 8.23).
. Static Analysis. In the structural analysis, SOSAT converts the code into
directed graphs. If division into graphs is not possible, it implies a
serious structural weakness and possible source of error. In the path
analysis, SOSAT aids in the generation of test data to ensure that the
analyzed code can be tested by a minimum number of test runs.
. Dynamic Analysis. In dynamic analysis, SOSAT instruments the program
with counters and screen input/output so that a user can follow the
execution of the program with selected data. This aids in the
debugging and the testing of the code.
An effort is under way to enhance SOSAT with the addition of analysis modules to
facilitate the comparison of the final program with the original specification. If
successful, this will serve an important function in the verification of the code to
the specifications. The SOSAT tools are best suited to analyze program modules
of limited size, e.g., digital replacement of logic circuits in safety critical systems.
The tool can handle larger programs, but interpretation of results is very laborious.
Finally, licensing authorities (Technische Uberwachungsverein Norddeutschland)
are now using SOSAT in the assessment of a microprocessor-based safety system
(Ref. 8.22).
Evidence of CASE tool development and use also exists in the Soviet Union.
Reference 8.24 contains a short discussion on the development of an expert system
for generating Fortran codes. The codes developed with the expert system are
for three-dimensional neutron-physics reactor calculations.
Tool kmessment and the Waterfall Model
The waterfall model of the software life cycle provides an overview of the design
and development process (Ref. 8.25). The reference also discusses the spiral
model of software development; however, the following discussion of the
development process is limited to the waterfall model.
The design and development of software for critical applications such as safety
systems is a complex, detail-intensive process. The waterfall model identifies a
means of dividing the process into functional phases to facilitate management and
control of the process. Figure 8.3 identifies the phases in the model.
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The first phase assesses the feasibility of the software project. The second phase
performs a requirements analysis to identify functions. The design and detailed
design phases decompose the functions into tasks and subtasks. The results from
the analysis of tasks and subtasks are the basis for specifications for the code. The
next phase is the coding of the specifications and the test of units of code. In the
sixth phase, units are integrated into subprograms and with the final hardware and
then tested. In the system test phase, the integrated program is validated against
the functions in the requirements phase. In the eighth phase, the validated system
is installed and checked for operation. Maintenance is performed on the software
to improve its functional performance and to correct errors undetected during its
design. In the final phase, the software is retired because it is difficult to maintain
or because a better product exists.
Figure 8.4 identifies where in the life cycle phases the previously discussed CASE
tools fit: SAGA and SPACE are helpful in the requirements phase; OST, SAGA, and
SPACE are useful in the design, detailed design, and code and unit test phases
of the life cycle; finally, OST and SOSAT are useful in the system test phase. No
one CASE tool is useful over the total life cycle. From the information available,
it was difficult to evaluate the scope and depth of coverage of a CASE tool for a
specific phase. What is clear, however, is that the European nuclear industry is
making ample use of CASE tools over many phases of the life cycle.
FEASIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS
DESIGN
DETAILED DESIGN
CODE & UNIT TEST
INTEGRATION
SYSTEM TEST
INSTALLATION
MAINTENANCE
RETIREMENT
Figure 8.3. Typical Phases of the Waterfall Model of the Software Life Cycle
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Summary of European Use of CASE Tools
ANALYSIS
lo Tools used in the life cycle reduce the potential for errors in the final
software because of the discipline provided by the use of the tools.
. The use of CASE tools generate data, e.g., structural test coverage,
useful in the final engineering judgment on the acceptance or rejection
of the program.
, It was difficult to determine the amount and quality of aid provided by
a CASE tool for a specific phase of the software life cycle.
COMPARISON
lo It is the author's opinion that the U.S. Nuclear Industry's use of CASE
tools is minimal in comparison to European use of tools.
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EXTRAPOLATION
.
In due time, the European nuclear industry will use a comprehensive
CASE tool set for all phases of the life cycle in software development.
Software Design And Test Research
Research on the design and test of high-integrity software is underway within the
nuclear industry in Europe. The text that follows discusses each of these activities.
In discussions at GRS Garching (Ref. 8.26), the panel learned of an ESPRIT
Project named DARTS, Demonstration of Advanced Reliability Techniques for
safety-related computer systems. This ESPRIT Project will use different methods
and teams to generate and test safety system software. Four teams from various
European countries are participating in the project. Two teams are to use diverse
formal methods in the design and development of the code; two teams are to use
diverse conventional methods in the design and development of the code. Once
the codes are developed, back-to-back testing methods will evaluate the codes.
The project will collect design and test data for each development method used.
The main goal of this project is the evaluation of different design and development
techniques in terms of effort required and reliability achieved; this includes the
assessment of fault-tolerant architectures consisting of more diverse versions. This
is a four-year project which started in 1989. The highly qualified researcher in
charge of the project has authored several technical papers on the subject
(Refs. 8.27-8.30).
Research is also under way on the design and test of safety system software at the
OECD Halden Reactor Project (Refs. 8.22, 8.31, and 8.32). Reference 8.31 reports
research results for the design and test of diversely produced programs for the
goal of enhancing safety. The research was a multinational effort. The Safety and
Reliability Directorate in the United Kingdom developed a specification for a safety
system, and three independent teams coded the specification: (1) a team at the
Halden Reactor Project, (2) a team at the Technical Research Center of Finland,
and (3) a team at the Central Electricity Research Center in the United Kingdom.
Although the research investigated many issues, the discussion that follows focuses
only on the fault-finding strategies and test data selection investigated.
The Halden Reactor Project used several different test data types consisting of
deterministic data and random data. The deterministic data consisted off
. Systematic data manually produced to test the functions identified in the
specification of the software
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. Acceptance test data and corresponding expected results based on a
team's understanding of the problem
The random data consisted off
. Uniform distribution of test cases within the high and low range of the
input data
. Gaussian distribution of test cases with the mean in the mid-range of the
input data
3. Uniform distribution of test cases at the boundaries of the input data
4. Gaussian distribution of test cases at the boundaries of the input data
In evaluating test data efficiency, each program developed in the project was
seeded with 62 faults, then each program was tested back-to-back with the same
input data type. The researchers found all seeded faults, but multiple data types
were necessary to do so. The most efficient data types in detecting seeded faults
were the uniform distribution of test cases within the high and low range of the
input data and the Gaussian distribution of test cases at the boundaries of the
input data. The least efficient data types were the Gaussian distribution of test
cases with the mean in the mid-range of the input data and systematic data.
Table 8.1 contains the results from this study.
These results are extremely interesting. The use of systematic test data is
necessary to show that the software meets the functions stated in the design
specification. However, while the use of systematic data is necessary, it is not
sufficient. The use of other test data such as a uniform distribution of test cases
within the input data range in conjunction with a Gaussian distribution of test cases
at the boundaries of the input data is also necessary. The use of these test cases
may flush out unintended functions in the code. This certainly was the case for
the seeded errors. From the results in Table 8.1, it would appear that testing with
both systematic data and random data are necessary.
The research results on test strategy represent only one experiment; however,
other related data exist. During the late 1970s, the Core Protection Calculator
System (CPCS) discussed earlier in this chapter was reviewed and ultimately
licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Refs. 8.6-8.8). This system
is a digital-computer-based protection system for a nuclear power plant. The test
strategy used in this effort was very similar to the combination of uniform
distribution of test cases within the input data range and the Gaussian distribution
of test cases at the boundaries. The CPCS has operated successfully for over a
decade.
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Table 8.1
Fault Detection Performance With Different Test Data Using 62 Seeded Faults
TEST DATA 1000 TEST CYCLES
Detected Undetected
ALL TEST CYCLES"
Detected Undetected
Acceptance Data 55
Systematic Data 49
Uniform Random 56
Gaussian Random 42
Uniform Boundary 49
Gaussian Boundary 51
More than 600,000 data sets
7 55 7
13 50 12
6 61 1
20 49 13
13 56 6
11 57 5
The survey asked all participants about the type of test strategy used in their
software test programs. No one was using a test strategy that contained random
data.
Summary of European Software Design and Test Research
ANALYSIS
1. An active research effort exists within Europe to evaluate the use of
formal methods in the design and development of safety systems.
2. The use of random data as part of a test strategy appears to be useful,
but it does not exist in practice.
COMPARISON
1. U.S. research exists on software for high-integrity systems such as safety
systems, but this research is outside of the nuclear industry.
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. Some use of random data as a test strategy exists in the U.S. nuclear
industry, but it is rare.
EXTRAPOLATION
. Research and progress on design and testing of software will be slow
and costly.
Eng/needng Simu/ators
Two workstation-based engineering simulators useful in the design of nuclear
power plants were found during the survey in France (Refs. 8.33-8.35). OASIS (Ref.
8.33) is a workstation-based simulator (under development) initially developed for
France's fast breeder reactor program. Its planned uses are in safety and design
studies for normal, disturbance, and accident conditions. In its current form, OASIS
is being used in the study of problems involving decay heat removal through the
emergency circuits of SUPER PHENIX 1.
OASIS consists of many parts, the main part of which is the interactive database,
PROBASE. This database contains all dynamic variables for the reactor at any
instant of time. Another part of OASIS is MISCENE; it is the equivalent of a
simulation code and calculates the state of the reactor at each instant of time.
Presently, by using the modular PWR simulation code CORIANDRE instead of
MISCENE, OASIS can be used for the representation of any kind of PWR as well
as for FBRs. The man-machine interface, a control panel, is the function of SYVIC.
Still another part is DANAOSS (under development, Ref. 8.34), an artificial-
intelligence-based module to provide on-line analysis of transients.
SIPA-2 (Ref. 8.35) is a workstation-based simulator used by the personnel at CEA
Institut de Protection et de S6ret_ Nucl_alre to study pressurized water reactors.
The specific uses of the workstation are for safety analyses, safety drills, and
training engineers. SIPA-2 models the primary coolant circuit and part of the
secondary coolant circuit; related systems such as primary process controls;
secondary process controls; the protection system; the safeguard system, and
containment. SIPA-2 is based on the advanced code CATHARE-SIMU, a version
of the advanced thermal-hydraulic computer code CATHARE developed by EDF
and CEA. As a first step, SIPA-2 will have the description and the data of the PWR
series CP1 (900 MWe, 3 loops) and P4 (1300 MWe, 4 loops) reactors. Most of the
plant models will be developed using automatic code generators.
During the visit to the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, the panel learned of an effort
to develop an engineering simulator for PWRs. However, this effort was in its
initial phases, and little information was available at the time of the survey.
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The Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA) is an engineering simulator developed at Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (Ref. 8.36). The desktop NPA is a microprocessor-
based reactor transient simulation, visualization, and analysis tool. NPA aids an
analyst in evaluating the transient behavior of nuclear plants by graphic displays.
The desktop NPA integrated advanced reactor simulation codes with on-line
computer graphics allows reactor plant transient simulation and graphical
presentation of results. The graphics software is written in ANSI standard C and
FORTRAN 77 and implemented over the UNIX/X-windows operating environment.
The full interactive desktop NPA capabilities are now realized only with RELAP 5.
RELAP 5 is a thermal-hydraulic code useful in simulating reactor coolant loops.
Stnnury of Europest Engineering Simulelom
ANALYSIS
.
An active research effort exists in France to develop and enhance
engineering simulators for use in the design and safety analysis of
nuclear power plants.
2. A similar effort has been initiated in the Soviet Union.
COMPARISON
II The Nuclear Plant Analyzer in the United States appears to be the
equivalent of SIPA-2 in France.
EXTRAPOLATION
Ii Because they are portable and flexible, additional uses will be made
of workstation- and desktop-based engineering simulators. The addition
of artificial intelligence such as expert systems to engineering simulators
will lead to the creation of powerful on-line plant diagnostic systems that
will be useful to control room personnel.
DATAB&BES
The panel tried to evaluate research on the use of databases in the European
nuclear industry. Within the nuclear elements of the organizations surveyed, there
were no research programs specifically on databases except in CEA France where
research is undertaken to make available an experience feedback knowledge
management tool called REX (Ref. 8.37). It is an object oriented database using
semantic networks. Databases such as ORACLE and INGRES (developed by firms
in the United States) were in use. Reference 8.38 describes the use of a large
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database in an expert system, 3SE. This is a realtime expert system that aids an
operator in monitoring all the electric power supplies in the 900 MWe PWR Bugey
Unit 2 nuclear power plant in France. This system contains 150,000 pieces of data
to describe over 12,000 components in the plant, and it uses the ORACLE
database management system.
The panel found no standards or guidelines on the use of databases. From the
discussions on databases, it seems the design issue in Europe is how best to use
databases in local area networks and wide area networks. Also, as operating
experience is obtained with the use of databases, guidelines and standards on
their use will naturally develop. The use of databases in the European nuclear
industry is about the same as that in the United States.
USER INTERFACE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The survey of user interface management systems focused on graphics languages
and interface tools and design techniques.
Graphics Languages And Interface Tools
The survey found that graphics languages were used to simplify the design of
display formats. DATAVIEW, a graphics language developed in the United States,
was used in the development of the interface for OASIS (Ref. 8.34), a workstation-
based engineering simulator.
Another graphics language is PICASSO (Ref. 8.39). PICASSO is an integrated
software package for the generation and execution of man-machine interface
functions. It was developed at the Halden Reactor Project in Halden, Norway.
PICASSO consists of two main modules: the off-line module and the on-line
module. The off-line module consists of picture configuration tools:
. An interactive graphics editor that is used to construct process pictures
and to configure the operator's dialogue
2. An interactive database generator that is used to generate a local
database for process variables
. A documentation tool to describe the pictures, database content, etc.,
in readable text
The on-line module contains the tools used when the system is coupled to a
realtime process or a simulator:
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A display program for displaying the picture
A dialogue program for decoding and controlling operator dialogue
A station supervisor program for data exchange with other computers
A trend system for logging and displaying plant data
The ability to handle both static and dynamic picture information and to run the
system with pictures and operator dialogue is the main difference between
PICASSO and other graphics design tools.
OSF/MOTIF and Open Look (Ref. 8.40) are graphics tools often mentioned by the
organizations surveyed in France, Germany, and the Soviet Union. These tool sets
were developed and marketed by firms in the United States. In general, the
surveyed organization was in the process of evaluating each of these graphics tool
sets but had not made a decision on which one to select.
The status and use of graphics languages and interface tools in the U.S. nuclear
industry are about the same as in Europe. Through informal conversations with
personnel in the nuclear industry, this author learned that U.S. organizations are
also in the process of evaluating OSF/MOTIF and Open Look.
Summm_ of GrapMcs Languages and Interface Tools Used in Europe
ANALYSIS
. The European nuclear industry is actively using graphics languages
and interface tools in the design of computer-driven interfaces.
COMPARISON
Ii The nuclear industry in the United States is using similar graphics
languages and interface tools in the design of computer-driven
interfaces.
EXTRAPOLATION
I. The nuclear industry in the United States and in Europe will continue
to make use of cost-effective, labor-saving interface design tools and
products developed in the digital computer and software industry.
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Duign Techniques
A leading European researcher in human cognitive behavior is Dr. Jens Rasmussen
of the RISO Laboratory, Denmark (Refs. 8.41-8.43). Rasmussen's model of cognitive
behavior and his means-ends relational network are relevant to the design of
nuclear power plant control room interfaces. Rasmussen classifies human
cognitive behavior as skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based behavior.
Skill-based behavior is automatic; it requires no conscious effort on the part of the
human. Upon perceiving an event, the human begins an automatic response. For
example, upon seeing a reactor trip, a skilled operator will automatically strike the
red manual trip button. A human acquires skill-based behavior by on-the-job
training and by simulator training.
Rule-based behavior requires a conscious effort by humans. For example, when
an operator finds that entry symptoms to a procedure are met, the procedure is
executed. Study and practice is necessary to learn rule-based behavior. Skill-
based behavior may be necessary to execute many of the steps in the procedure.
Knowledge-based behavior results from knowing and applying first principles.
Examples of first principles are the conservation law for energy and for mass.
Knowledge-based behavior is also hypothesis generation and testing. Another form
of knowledge-based behavior is planning based on component and system
performance.
Figure 8.5 presents Rasmussen's model of cognitive control in process systems.
The model is complex, but it addresses a difficult problem. The attention surface
presents data and information to the human in the form of displays. The data and
information serve as input to the human's cognitive process of skill-, rule-, and
knowledge-based behavior. The results from these various behavior types may be
interaction with the action surface (skill-based behavior), an intention for actions
(rule-based behavior), or a work plan (knowledge-based behavior). Human
interaction with the action surface results in a manually initiated control action that
affects the plant process. The human operator monitors the response of the plant
through the attention surface.
The design of the attention surface must identify the data and information
necessary for the human operator to evaluate the plant. In the process of
evaluating the plant, the human cognitive effort may require skill-based behavior,
rule-based behavior, and knowledge-based behavior. Instrumentation and data
processing are necessary to gather and format the data for the attention surface.
The design of the action surface may contain keys, switches, mice, handles, and
tracker balls. These devices permit the human to interact with control systems
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and components in the plant. They are necessary to allow the human operator to
execute assigned functions and tasks. Further, these devices may be necessary
for operator intervention to mitigate consequences of unforeseen events. The
design of the attention surface and the action surface should also account for
operator errors and provide recovery means. In Reference 8.41, Rasmussen and
Vicente identify, discuss, and analyze various human error types:
1. Errors related to learning and adaptation
2. Interference among competing cognitive control structures
3. Lack of resources
4. Intrinsic human variability
In discussing each of these types of errors, Rasmussen and Vicente also identify
interface design guidelines (Ref. 8.41). The purpose of these guidelines is to
increase the system's tolerance to human errors by providing the operator with
improved means of controlling their effects on system performance.
A methodology that uses skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based behavior
is cognitive diversity. Cognitive diversity maximizes human performance in the
execution of complex functions and tasks. For example, if an operator is
performing a critical task requiring skill-based behavior, the supervisor should
verify the task by performing rule-based behavior. Similarly, if an operator is
performing a critical task requiring rule-based behavior, the supervisor should
verify the task by performing knowledge-based behavior. If the critical task
requires knowledge-based behavior, no cognitive diversity is possible. The goal
of cognitive diversity is to reduce common human mode error in performing critical
functions and tasks. In its simplest form, cognitive diversity is the analog of
hardware diversity, a design technique to defend against common mode hardware
failures.
Effective support of human decision-making tasks requires decomposing the work
domain (Ref. 8.42). The work domain consists of several levels of abstraction
representing goals and requirements, abstract functions, general functions, physical
functions, and the physical form. Rasmussen identifies this explicit formulation of
the problem as the means-ends relational network. This appears to be the
equivalent of the waterfall model used in the development of software, and it
provides a top-level structure for designing the interface. The greatest detail exists
at the physical form level, but this is the most difficult level to identify and solve
problems because of the large quantity of data. Problem identification and solving
at the goal level is easier, provided the detail at the physical form level has been
mapped through the various levels of abstraction into goals.
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Figure B.5. Rasmussen's Model of Cognith'e Control for User Interfaces
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Figure 8.6 is an illustration of the means-ends relational network as the top-level
structure for designing an interface to monitor performance and energy in a typical
nuclear power plant. This illustration identifies only the top-level structure. A
considerable amount of work is necessary to identify and document the detail
needed for interface design specifications. Further, feedback from the use of these
design methods will provide the data necessary to fully evaluate their utility.
Finally, Reference 8.44 presents one application of the means-ends relational
network in a conceptual design of a display monitoring reactor coolant mass.
Reference 8.45 contains another example of Rasmussen's taxonomy for human
cognitive behavior in the U.S. nuclear industry.
European Designs for User Interfaces
Research on control room interfaces is under way at the Halden Reactor Project
(Refs. 8.46-8.47). The ISACS-1 Program at Halden (Ref. 8.46) is a prototype of a
computer-based integrated surveillance and control system. The goal of the
ISACS-1 prototype is to act as a single integrated interface for the control room
GOAL:
ABSTRACT
FUNCTION:
GENERAL
FUNCTION:
PHYSICAL
FUNCTION:
PHYSICAL
FORM:
Plant Performance
Law of Conservation of Energy
Energy Source, Energy Transport, Work, Energy Sink
Reactor as Energy Source, Coolant Transports Energy Through
Loops, Steam Turbine Work, Condenser Rejects Energy to the
Environment
Thermal Efficiency of Heat Engine.
Model-Based Displays, Mimics, Process Variables, System Variables,
Procedures, Expert Systems as Decision Aids, Control
Devices for Plant Components and Systems.
Figure 8.6. Use of Means-End Relational Network for Designing a User Interface
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operator in all operational situations (normal, disturbance, accident). All
information from the process and all commands to the process will pass through
ISACS- 1.
Many components within ISACS-1 are computerized operator support systems
(COSSes). COSSes serve between the process instrumentation and the man-
machine interface to refine process signals into information. Some COSSes use
process modeling in which parts of the process are simulated in parallel to the
plant process as an aid in monitoring the plant. Other COSSes utilize expert
system methodology in diagnostic systems and operator advisory systems. A large
number of COSSes have been developed and evaluated at Halden (Refi 8.48).
Other systems within ISACS-1 assist the operator in implementing manual controls.
To coordinate its many components, ISACS-1 uses an intelligent coordinator. The
role of the intelligent coordinator is twofold:
l. Continuously supervise appropriate COSS analyses for the current plant
situation, activate passive COSSes when necessary, and summarize and
display plant status for the operator
. When requested by the operator, coordinate additional assessments
and report the results
In the supervisory role, the coordinator will prioritize and convey information from
COSSes to the overview display. The operator may extract more detailed
information in second-level displays that are maintained by the coordinator.
Finally, the intelligent coordinator will propose detailed displays to the operator,
either process display formats or special display formats relevant to the current
plant state. In this context, the intelligent coordinator is performing the role of
an interface management system.
Summm_ of User Inter_tce Design Theory and Techniques in Europe
ANALYSIS
1. The cognitive control/process interface model appears useful.
.
The means-ends relational network provides a top-down interface design
structure.
. Prototype components of digital-computer-based control rooms are
actively being evaluated at the Halden Reactor Project.
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COMParISON
1. The U.S. nuclear industry is
control/process interface model.
EXTRAPOLATION
1.
making some use of the cognitive
Interface design methods will mature though operational feedback from
operators using the interfaces.
CONCLUSIONS
The panel's analysis of the European nuclear industry's activity in software
engineering, databases, and user interface management systems and the
comparison with the activity in the United States may be summarized as follows.
Engh_eermg
l. Europeans have developed and are actively using standards in the
design of microprocessor-based nuclear power plant safety systems.
Equivalent standards do not exist in the United States nuclear industry.
However, activity is under way to develop equivalent standards.
. Europeans are actively using CASE tools as aids in the design,
development, and test of software for nuclear power plants. The use
of CASE tools is much greater in Europe than in the United States.
. Europeans have active research programs to evaluate the use of formal
design methods to design and qualify safety critical software. Similar
research programs exist in the United States but not in the nuclear
industry.
. Europeans have active programs to develop and use engineering
simulators as tools for safety analyses and as design tools in the
development of new nuclear power plants. A similar use of engineering
simulators exists in the United States.
. European use of databases in large expert systems is similar to that in
the United States.
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User Interface Management Systems
° Europeans are using graphics languages in developing computer-driven
interfaces. They are also evaluating interface design tools but have not
yet selected a specific set for use. The U.S. nuclear industry's use of
graphics languages and interface design tools is very similar to that in
Europe.
. The cognitive control/process interface model developed by Jens
Rasmussen is applicable to nuclear power plant interfaces. Further,
the means-ends relational network provides a structure to achieve top-
down design of nuclear power plant interfaces. The U.S. nuclear
industry is aware of both of these developments and is using elements
of each.
Development Trends
o Europe is clearly ahead in the use of CASE tools for the design and
development of nuclear power plant software. Effective CASE tools
for all phases of the software life cycle will result in high-quality
software useful in nuclear power plants.
. The use of databases as parts of information management systems and
as parts of expert systems is relatively new. Operational experience and
feedback are necessary to provide a basis for the development of
guidelines and standards for database uses.
10. The use of graphic languages, interface design tools, and cognitive
models for interface design is also relatively new. Operational
experience and feedback are necessary to provide a basis for guideline
and standards development.
11. Computer software is not easily scaled from the cathode-ray tube
monitors that exist in today's control room to an all-digital control room.
The development of a computer-based control room for a nuclear power
plant will require a significant design and development effort.
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APPENDIX 8.A
TEGI-INOLOGY AREA: STANDARDS/TOOLS
The Technology Area of Standards and Tools consists of the following topics:
Software Engineering
Data Bases
User Interface Management Systems
The following survey questions are for the commercial nuclear power industry in
the country surveyed:
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
Safety System Software Standards
What standards are used in the design, development, and acceptance of critical
software for nuclear power plants? (Critical software executes safety functions
such as tripping the reactor, initiating engineered safeguard systems.)
Digital Process Control Symtem Software Standards
What standards are used in the design, development, and acceptance of digital
process control systems and computer-driven display systems for monitoring the
plant?
Otmlily/_mumn_ Smndat_
What are the quality assurance standards required in the design and development
of software? Are there research programs under way/planned for the development
of quality assurance methods and techniques?
Scaw,m
Does the nuclear industry in your country require the use of a software life cycle
in the development of computer programs? If yes, what is the life cycle?
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Computer Language Standard
Does your country require the use of a standard computer language in your
nuclear power plants? If yes, identify the language and the reason for its choice.
Is there a research program for the development of a standard language? If yes,
provide details on the program.
Formal Methods
Are formal methods required in the design and development of computer programs
used in the nuclear industry? If yes, what are the formal methods? Are there any
research programs under way/planned for the evaluation of formal methods in
software engineering?
Program C,eneratom
Are program generators used for the development of computer code used in
nuclear power plants? If yes, what were the reasons for choosing the generator?
Are there any research programs under way/planned for the development of
program generators?
T_Is
What tools, if any, exist to aid in the verification of design and coding of the
computer programs? Are there any research programs under way/planned for the
development of verification tools?
Configuration Control
What standards and tools are used in configuration control during the design and
development of software?
Scope of Software Testing
Does the testing and validation of software require structural, functional, and
statistical evaluations? Is research under way/planned for the development of
methods, techniques, and tools for structural, functional, and statistical evaluations?
If yes, what are they?
Metrics
Are metrics used in the design, development, and test of the computer code? If
yes, define the metrics. Are there any research programs under way/planned for
the development and use of metrics? If yes, what are they?
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b_ty
Does your country require any reliability standards prior to the use of software in
a nuclear power plant? If yes, what are they? Are there any research programs
under way/planned for the development of reliability methods and techniques?
Tools
What type of computer aided software engineering tools are available for the
design, development, test, and documentation of software? Are there any research
programs under way/planned for the development of computer aided software
engineering tools?
Fault Tolerance, Fault Avoidance
What are the requirements for fault tolerance/fault avoidance methods and
techniques for computers used in nuclear power plants? Are there any research
programs under way/planned for the development of fault tolerant/fault avoidance
techniques?
Common Mode Fault £)e_eruses
What are the defenses against common mode faults in critical software, such as
software used in safety systems? Is the use of functional diversity a required
defense against common mode software errors? Are there any research programs
under way/planned for the development of defenses against common mode faults
in software?
Domnttentation Standards
What are the standards for the documentation of software used in nuclear power
plants? When does documentation occur in the software life cycle? Are there any
research programs under way/planned for the development of documentation
standards?
M_inte_ Standards
What are the standards on the maintenance of software? Are there any research
programs under way/planned for the development of standards for software
maintenance?
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Sol_-e Retirement/Replacement
Do any standards exist for the retirement/replacement of software? What are the
requirements for the retirement/replacement of software? Are there any research
programs under way/planned for the development of standards for the
retirement/replacement of software?
Expert Symtem Developa_ent Tools
Has your country standardized on tools for the development of expert systems?
Neural networks? Are there any research programs under way/planned for the
development of such tools and standards?
Object Oriented Pmgranut_g
Do any standards exist for the use of object oriented programming? Are there any
research programs under way/planned for the development of object-oriented
programming tools?
Defense - V'uusea & Bugn
What tools are you using to defend against viruses and bugs? Are there any
research programs under way/planned for the development of such tools?
DATA BASES
Data Base Standards
What standards exist on data bases for nuclear power plants? Have your nuclear
power plants standardized on the use of a specific data base? If yes, what are
the name and characteristics of the data base?
Data Base Design Tools
What tools exist for the design, development, and use of data bases?
Data Base Development Tools
What research is under way/planned for the development of data bases and data
base tools?
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Report Generators
Are report generators used with data bases? Is research under way/planned for
the development of report generators?
Query Languages
Are query languages and view formats used with data bases? Is research under
way/planned for the development of query languages and view formats?
Data Entry Templates and Screens
Are entry templates/screen formats used for data entry to data bases? Is research
under way/planned for the development of entry templates/screen formats?
_tez"Sa_::es
Are graphic user interfaces used for working with data bases? Is research under
way/planned for the development of graphic user interfaces?
Tutorials
Are tutorials available for use in learning how to use the data base? Is research
under way/planned for the development of tutorials?
Networked DataBases
Are data bases interconnected by means of a network? What tools exist for use
of the data bases on a network? Is research under way/planned for the
development of networks and tools for using data bases on networks?
Information Models
In the design of data bases, how are information models used in the design
process? Is there any research under way/planned for the development of
information models for service in the design process?
Tools for Consistency Checks
What tools are used to check information for consistency and completeness in data
bases? Is there any research under way/planned for the development of tools to
check information for consistency and completeness?
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Security
What tools exist to maintain the security of data bases? Is there any research
under way/planned for the development of tools to maintain the security of a data
base?
Relational Data Bases
Are the data bases in your power plants relational? What standards exist for the
use of relational data bases? Is there any research under way/planned for the
development of relational data bases and of standards for their use?
Functional Applications
What are the functional applications of data bases in your nuclear power plants?
Is there any research under way/planned for the development of new applications
of data bases in your nuclear power plants?
USER INTERFACE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:
Software Development Tools
What tools are used for the development of application programs for nuclear
power plants? Is there any research under way/planned for the development of
tools?
User Interface Development Tools
What tools are used for the development of display formats for use in nuclear
power plants? Is there any research under way/planned for the development of
tools to aid in the development of display formats? A user interface management
system?
W'md_
Are standards and guidelines available in the use of windows for interface design?
Is there any research under way/planned for the development of window design
tools?
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Graphics Language
Has a graphics language been adopted as a standard/guideline for the design and
development of interfaces? Is a graphics editor used for development and
maintenance of display formats? Is there any research under way/planned for the
selection of a graphics language as a standard?
Menus
Does a menu standard or guideline exist for interface design? Is there any
research under way/plsrmed for the development of such a standard or guideline?
OSF/Mottf
Is the OSF/Motif toolkit used in the design and development of interfaces? Is
there any research under way/planned for the selection and use of toolkits for
interface design? If yes, what are the key factors in the selection process?
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B. GLOSSARY
BRS
CE
CEA
CO3
CPC
DNBR
FW
NPP
Boron Concentration Adjustment Control System
Combustion Engineering
Cadarache Research Center
Core Instrumentation and Control for the N-4 Control Room
Core Protection Calculation
Departure from Nuclear boiling Ratio
Feedwater
Nuclear Power Plant
N-4 PWR Next Generation of French PWR Plants
1,475 MWe (CHOOZ B1 is the first plant)
P-20
PC1
PWR
$3C
Siemens
KWU
SG
SPIN
VVER
"Controbloc" System for the N-4 Control Room
Pellet-clad Interaction
Pressurized Water Reactor
Simulator for the N-4 French PWR "Computerized Control Room" System
Siemens Power Generation Group
Steam Generator
French Digital Reactor Protection System
Russian-designed Pressurized Water Reactor
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